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I 
lost in their overcoats, waiting for the sun 
I
T'S NOT THE SORT OF THING YOU EXPECT FOLKS TO FIND 
appealing on those long cold nights of February. Or 
even in a Midwestern March, when no matter what the 
calendar says, winter refuses to do more than loosen its grip 
now and then, and that just to taunt us. In autumn, on the 
other hand, with the golden rays of sun glancing off the red 
and orange leaves, the good crack of the leaves as you walk, 
and the world's sweet earthy smell, you just might see the 
appeal. Or in spring, with the promises of white and blue 
and green and yellow realized each new day. But not in 
February. Surely not in February. 
But there were the articles, not one, but two (at least 
two) about longevity, about immortality. The first was a 
short piece on Ray Kurzweil, the fifty-six year old author of 
the recently published Fantastic Voyage: Live Long Enough 
to Live Forever (Rodale Books, 2004). Kurzweil is a member 
of the Inventors Hall of Fame, a 1999 winner of the 
National Medal of Technology, a recipient of the $500,000 
Lemelson-MIT prize, a "modern Edison" according to The 
Christian Science Monitor. Kurzweil figures that if he can 
survive another twenty years or so, then his own death is 
not inevitable, he can be immortal. So can we, and he invites 
us to join him on this never-ending stage. 
There are three bridges to immortality, according to 
Kurzweil. The first bridge currently lies in our hands. 
Eating well, exercising, and maintaining the appropriate 
health regimen that will get us to the second bridge, the 
biotechnological revolution. The third and final bridge to 
immortality is nanotechnology and artificial intelligence. 
Kurzweil foresees a day when nanobots will be introduced 
into our bodies to locate and attack diseases and to recon-
struct damaged organs. We can live forever. We are living in 
the midst of the biotech revolution, and on the cusp of the 
nanotechnology revolution. Foreseeable developments in 
science and technology are making immortality feasible for 
this generation. 
The second article, "Do You Want to Live Forever?" 
written by Yale surgeon and essayist, Sherwin Nuland, was 
a feature piece in MIT's Technology Review. Nuland's essay 
profiled the current posterboy of the anti-aging movement, 
the Cambridge, England computer engineer, Aubrey de 
Grey. The brains behind the Methuselah Mouse prize, a 
one-million-plus-dollar prize to encourage scientists to 
work to extend the length of a mouse's life beyond five 
years, de Grey and his colleagues are confident that upon 
achieving this goal, we will be released from the "trance of 
death." The same technology used to extend the life of the 
mouse will then be used to extend human life. Aubrey de 
Grey is on a mission, and he has persuaded some wealthy 
friends to join him. 
He is no kook; in Cambridge, he can frequently be 
found in the Eagle, the same pub in which Watson and 
Crick worked and relaxed as they progressed towards the 
discovery of the structure of DNA or, as Watson put it, "the 
secret of life." Aubrey de Grey thinks he's as close to discov-
ering the secret of immortality as Watson and Crick were to 
discovering their secret in 1953. 
Why bother? Why try to develop life-extension thera-
pies that will enable most of us to live not merely to one 
hundred and twenty years of age, the average lifespan that 
is now in sight, but to five hundred years, indeed, to five 
thousand years which is, I suppose, close enough to 
immortality for most folks? Because, according to de Grey, 
the most fundamental human right is the right to choose 
how long one wants to live. Because, according to de Grey, 
death is repulsive, and aging is barbaric. Aubrey de Grey's 
motivation is deeply moral. We are the sorts of creatures 
who deserve better than the decline into infirmity, the loss 
of the capacities that make for human excellence, and, 
finally, death. 
W
E NEEDN'T COUCH IT IN THE LANGUAGE OF WHAT WE 
deserve. Death is an evil for us, the "last great 
enemy," or so Christians believe. And if it is a 
great evil for us, it is because we are not merely animal, but 
because there is something that distinguishes us from the 
beasts, despite the creaturely status we share with them. 
Goodness, Truth, and Beauty can be known and enjoyed by 
us in a way appropriate to our difference from our fellow 
creatures of the field. And any diminution of that knowl-
edge and enjoyment, if even for a moment, is loss, indeed. 
But even as we are more than creatures, we remain 
creatures, animals like other animals, with a beginning 
and an end. That end in dependence, however hard and 
undesirable we find it, is no more barbaric for creatures 
like us than our beginning in dependence. Our deaths are 
no more repugnant than our births, or the birth of the 
donkey, or the monkey. And should we come to think of 
our deaths as more repugnant than that of our fellow 
animals, then pity the poor monkeys. It has not gone well 
for those creatures when we have lost sight of our own 
creaturely status. 
world's story is cruciform, but with a different ending. 
It is not good to die, it is not happy to decline into 
dependence, but there are far worse fates that can befall us. 
To believe that the story is about us, to believe that the story 
ends when our lives end, to believe that we are gods, is close 
to the truth, but so dangerously far away. 
The real story, the Easter story, goes differently. The 
Son of God who has dwelt among us loses control, hangs 
helplessly upon the cross and, finally, bears death's sting. If 
ever a death was repulsive, it is that one. And yet .... And 
yet ... .In that death and Easter morn we find life. The 
It's another cold, grey March day. Scattered snow 
flurries are predicted for this afternoon. The Red Lake 
shootings are the news. I walk my ten-year-old Lab, 
Sophie, past our small oak, its dull and shriveled brown 
leaves holding on, blowing lifelessly in the wind. Sophie 
hobbles-premature arthritis in her right knee-as she 
sniffs over the brown grass to a small patch of crocuses, 
shining purple and yellow. ;-
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JESUS STILLING 
After the sermon, 
after the healings, 
after the daily press 
of believers and unbelievers 
and the crowds' rabble, 
then the lull of lapping water, 
the sway and pitch of small waves, 
and the deep solitude 
of sleep, the dreams 
whatever God dreams-
new languages, Eden, 
the clamps and chisels 
of a father's workshop, 
a boulder wedged 
into an entrance. 
After the abrupt awakening 
to cries and tugs, 
to the wind's wail and buffet, 
the waves' explosion, 
the frantic bailing, 
then the rebuke and all 
is silent and deep 
like God in the wind before creation, 
like the darkness of sleep 
before birth. 
Jill Pelaez Baumgaertner 
TDK 
"credo ut intelligam": 
Augustine on the rationality of Christian faith 
I
N jUNE 1962, FLANNERY O'CONNOR WROTE TO A YOUNG 
man who in his first year of College had suffered a crisis 
of faith. She counseled him not to be misled about the 
true relationship of faith and reason, and reassured him 
that Christian faith does not require any abandonment of 
human reason: 
I certainly don't think that the death required that "ye 
be born again," is the death of reason. If what the church 
teaches is not true, then the security and emotional 
release and sense of purpose it gives you are of no value 
and you are right to reject it. One of the effects of 
modern liberal Protestantism has been gradually to turn 
religion into poetry and restoration of self, to make 
truth vaguer and vaguer and more and more relative, to 
banish intellectual distinctions, to depend on feeling 
instead of thought, and gradually to believe that God 
has no power, that he cannot communicate with us, 
cannot reveal himself to us, indeed has not done so, and 
that religion is our own sweet invention ... 
[S]atisfy your demand for reason always but 
remember that charity is beyond reason and that God 
can be known through charity. 
O'Connor's words here are both uncompromising and 
enigmatic. She has no patience with liberal Protestant, anti-
realist dilutions of Christian faith; a self-described "hilly-
billy Tho mist," 0 'Connor upholds a vision of faith which is 
adamantly realistic and, at least in her own mind, eminently 
rational. Yet there is at least a bit of the paradoxical in 
O'Connor's vision of the harmony of faith and reason. 
Christian faith, as O'Connor characterizes it, exhibits a 
curious duality: faith is both fully rational and yet beyond 
reason. But how, we might well ask, can faith be both? 
Not only does O'Connor set forth this paradox of faith 
and reason, she places particular emphasis on love as the 
fundamental link uniting faith and reason, for it is love, she 
notes, by which we are able to know God and by means of 
which we must transcend mere human reason. We might re-
construct O'Connor's exegesis in the following steps: (1) 
faith is not contrary to reason; (2) faith is nevertheless 
beyond reason; and (3) notwithstanding (1) and (2), faith is 
rational for, grounded in love, faith completes our rational 
natures by enabling us to know God. A modern student of 
philosophy need not be a staunch follower of Bertrand 
Russell to find such an outlook on faith, reason, and love to 
be perplexing, if not unintelligible. How can there be a kind 
James R. Peters 
of knowledge which is available to us only through a form of 
love, through a virtue which is essentially emotional and 
volitional? 
In characterizing faith and reason in the way that she 
does, O'Connor is working out of a worldview whose 
fundamental commitments and theories are pre-modern 
rather than modern in their origin. Indeed, I do not think 
that O'Connor's view can be rendered intelligible from the 
modern perspectives of a standard Cartesian, Lockean, or 
even Kantian epistemology, for each of these modern epis-
temologies, whatever their merits, conceives of reason 
essentially as an autonomous cognitive power or intellec-
tual function for organizing beliefs and attaining well-
grounded judgements. What I would like to explore here is 
one kind of pre-modern philosophical outlook which has 
the conceptual resources needed to respond to the modern 
skeptic who might find O'Connor's advice not only enig-
matic, but absurd. 
I
F THERE IS ANY CHRISTIAN THINKER WHO EMPHASIZES THE 
place of love not only in how human beings are to act, 
but also in how human beings are to make rational 
judgements, it is Saint Augustine. Central to Augustine's 
outlook is his conviction that our reasoning about how to 
live well as human beings ought to be directed and molded 
by our needs and desires as feeling agents who are funda-
mentally and above all else lovers. It is this centrality of 
love that underlies his view on the priority of faith over 
rational understanding. So, for example, when Augustine 
declares "credo ut intelligam,"- "I believe in order to 
understand,"-an important part of what he has in mind 
is that human reason cannot function properly apart from 
the transforming power of divine love. As Etienne Gilson 
in his classic work The Christian Philosophy of Saint 
Augustine remarks, "[t]he more a doctrine tends to be 
built around charity, the more Augustinian it is." There is 
no thinker, as far as I know, who is better equipped to help 
us deepen our understanding of the paradoxical interde-
pendence of faith, reason, and love, an interdependence 
assumed and alluded to by Flannery O'Connor, than Saint 
Augustine. 
Augustine on the rationality of belief 
Let us begin by noting how Augustine conceives of the 
interdependence of belief and rational understanding in 
human life in general. Having done this, we can better 
appreciate why, for Augustine, we cannot understand 
divine truths-truths concerning who God is and what our 
proper relationship to Him is-unless we first begin in 
faith. When Augustine wishes to distinguish reason (ratio) 
from faith or belief (fides or credere), he typically draws 
upon the basic distinction of first-hand versus second-hand 
experience. So, for example, in the Enchiridion, when he 
seeks to answer Laurentius' query about the role of reason 
in the life of faith, Augustine responds by distinguishing 
two sources of truth: reason and authority. What a person 
knows through reason, on the one hand, must be grounded 
in her own immediate and direct conscious experience of 
some reality. Augustine regards both sensory experience 
and the kind of rational insights gained in mathematics and 
logic as instances of beliefs based on reason. So, for 
example, one might through reason determine the visual 
qualities of a physical object by actually observing it. I 
know by my own reason that my daughter Nadia caught her 
first fish in Lake Eva, Tennessee, in the summer of 1998 
because I saw her catch it there at that time. Similarly, one 
might learn one of the truths of mathematics rationally by 
seeing for oneself how a theorem derives from intuitively 
obvious mental perceptions. I could be said to know 
through my own reason the validity of the Pythagorean 
theorem if I am able to grasp all of the steps necessary to 
demonstrate it. To know a truth by reason, then, is basically 
a matter, in some sense (either through sensory perception 
or mental conception), of seeing it for oneself. 
Often, however, as Augustine goes on to show, it may 
be inconvenient, or even impossible to know something for 
oneself through one's own reason. Indeed, at times, it is 
reasonable to believe some truth even when 
mony alone that their parents are who they say they are; it 
would be ludicrous, thinks Augustine, for children to 
suspend belief that their parents are their real parents until 
they are provided with independent evidence confirming 
their testimony. Augustine argues that generally it is good 
for children to love their parents and submit themselves to 
their authority. But children can only develop these filial 
virtues if they first trust their parents about things that they 
themselves cannot see. In other words, as a general rule, 
children violate no proper epistemic duty, but rather use 
their cognitive faculties properly, when they accept the 
authority of their parents and trust that what they say is 
true. Children are justified in believing in their parents' 
authority on the basis of the crucial ethical role that trust 
plays in a child's moral development. It would, in fact, be 
irrational for children to believe only those things they 
could confirm through their own reason. 
Augustine's case for the propriety of trust between 
friends resembles that for the justification of children 
trusting their parents, but it does not hinge on the same 
principle of hierarchical dependence and moral develop-
ment. Yet here as well Augustine holds that the very possi-
bility of enjoying a particular human good requires a will-
ingness to trust another's word for what one cannot see for 
oneself. The kind of person who refuses to rely upon the 
word of his or her friend without independent confirma-
tion of everything the friend says is unduly suspicious, "for 
there is also no friendship at all unless something is believed 
which cannot be demonstrated by positive reasoning." 
Finally, near the end of his analysis concerning the impor-
tance of believing in De Utilitate Credeni, Augustine 
one has not "seen it for oneself." 
Paradoxically, even in everyday life, it is 
reasonable to believe what is "beyond" 
reason. In fact, in order even to begin to gain 
access to truth through our own reason, we 
human beings must rely, at least implicitly, on 
the testimony of others. Unless we are willing 
to believe, that is, we can never even begin to 
reason. In every area of human life, in addi-
tion, there are times when it is reasonable to 
believe things not because we can confirm 
The willingness 
to trust is no less 
observes that "many examples can be cited 
which show that absolutely nothing would 
remain intact in human society if we should 
determine to believe only what we can grasp by 
perception." The willingness to trust, for 
Augustine, is no less than a necessary condition 
for civil community and for the cultivation of 
the virtues of character. The justification and 
rationality of belief in everyday life, for 
Augustine, is thus grounded in a teleology of 
human life, in an understanding of what 
persons are for. 
than a necessary 
condition for 
civil society and 
for the cultiva- · 
tion of virtues of 
character. 
their truth for ourselves, but because of a personal trust in 
what another person tells us. 
In De Utilitate Credendi, Augustine specifies two such 
crucial areas of human life where one is fully justified in 
assenting to a truth based upon another's testimony: 
friendship and the filial bond of children to their parents. It 
is significant that in both of these spheres of human life, the 
justification for believing in what one cannot see for oneself 
is bound up with the goodness of personal relationships. It 
is good for friends to love one another, as it is good for chil-
dren to trust their parents. In the latter case, for example, 
children typically believe on the basis of their parents' testi-
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Augustine on the rationality of Christian faith 
Thus far we have seen how Augustine defends believing 
on the basis of the testimony of others with whom we have 
a special, ethical relationship. Augustine also recognizes 
that one can be unreasonable not only by refusing to believe 
others when we ought to do so but, just as importantly, by 
being too willing to believe others when one should in fact 
withhold assent and be circumspect about their testimony. 
One can, in other words, be too willing to believe. For his 
position to be philosophically coherent and defensible, 
what Augustine needs to provide is a criterion of reasonable 
belief. It is clear that Augustine never intends to defend 
blind obedience to all socially established authority. If 
belief must at times precede reason, it is equally true for 
Augustine that our reason must aid us in discernment, so as 
to moderate our tendency to accept what others tell us. It 
is certainly unwise, thinks Augustine, to accept any and all 
religious authority. A wise person will accept the call to 
believe, but not uncritically. For Augustine some religious 
belief based upon testimony is rational, but not all reli-
gious belief is rational. Augustine's treatment of this 
problem of which religious authority to believe will 
provide the key for appreciating how Augustine would 
respond to the accusation that he endorses blind, religious 
authoritarianism. But before we consider that serious issue 
in any detail, we must look more closely at how Augustine 
conceives of faith and reason, for Augustine's doctrine of 
faith and reason builds upon his overall defense of the will-
ingness to believe the testimony of others and, most 
importantly, how this doctrine is rooted in charity. 
UGUSTINE ENVISIONS EACH HUMAN LIFE AS A JOURNEY 
of faith. In its ideal and proper form, human life 
egins in faith (fides) and ends in that fully 
completed state of understanding that he calls wisdom 
(sapientia). On Augustine's view, the starting point, faith, 
and the ultimate telos, wisdom, serve as the ideal alpha and 
omega stages of Christian discipleship. In a classic formula-
tion, Augustine remarks: "Faith seeks, understanding 
finds; whence the prophet says, "Unless ye believe, ye shall 
not understand" (De Trinitate) . The contrast with modern 
skepticism, such as that of Hume, is striking. Whereas 
Hume finds faith subversive to reason, Augustine envisions 
faith as effecting the crucial transformation of the whole 
human person, preparing and equipping him or her for 
reason's proper function and fulfillment. What faith starts, 
in other words, reason completes. And, indeed, reason 
alone, without the power of faith, cannot achieve the goal 
of understanding. Augustine here asserts three claims about 
the nature of faith: first, that faith seeks; second, that the 
faith which seeks is a necessary precondition for religious 
understanding; and third, that in attaining its own proper 
end of understanding or wisdom, reason finds what faith 
seeks. 
But what is the nature of faith in God? To have faith in 
the Christian God, for Augustine, requires believing certain 
truths, such as that God exists and that God has acted in 
history to redeem humanity in the life and death of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Part of the nature of faith is thus a matter of 
"believing that" certain propositions are true. But genuine 
faith on Augustine's view also means believing in God as the 
ultimate good and end of all human yearning and aspira-
tion. It is crucial to appreciate how for Augustine faith is a 
disposition requiring a commitment of the "whole person" 
and not just a trusting, partial intellectual apprehension of 
truths about a divine reality. Augustine explains this point 
especially clearly in his commentary on the Gospel of John, 
In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus: 
Dost thou wish to understand? Believe. For God has 
said by the prophet: "Except ye believe, ye shall not 
understand." ... For understanding is the reward of 
faith. Therefore, do not seek to understand in order to 
believe, but believe that thou mayest understand; 
since, "except ye believe, ye shall not understand." ... 
But the Lord Himself says openly in another place: 
"This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom 
He has sent." "That ye believe on Him," not, that ye 
believe Him. But if ye believe on Him, ye believe Him; 
yet he that believes Him does not necessarily believe on 
Him. For even the devils believed Him, but they did not 
believe on Him ... What then is "to believe on Him"? 
By believing to love Him, by believing to esteem highly, 
by believing to go into him and to be incorporated in 
His members. It is faith itself then that God exacts from 
us: and He finds not that which He exacts, unless He 
has bestowed what he may find. What faith, but that 
which the apostle has most amply defined in another 
place, saying "Neither circumcision availeth anything, 
nor uncircumcision, but faith that worketh by love"? 
Not any faith of what kind soever, but "faith that 
worketh by love:" let this faith be in thee, and thou 
shalt understand concerning the doctrine. 
For Augustine, believing on God is, from the point of view 
of human agency, as much a matter of the human will as it is 
of the human intellect. The human will for Augustine is 
both the faculty of choice and the seat of love. From an 
Augustinian point of view, one performs an act willingly 
insofar as one freely chooses to pursue it; in addition, one 
wills an object as one's highest good when he or she desires 
it above all else, desires it "for its own sake and seeks to 
enjoy it, to cling to it, forever." It is the latter sense of willing 
something as the ultimate good in one's life that we must 
attend to carefully. To believe "on God," as Augustine 
expresses it, involves the will because it expresses two key 
aspects of loving God as one's highest good: first, the 
acknowledging of God's worth, and second, the desiring of 
intimate communion with Him. It is of fundamental 
importance not to overlook how Augustine envisions a 
form of amor, ordinate love or caritas, as informing faith; 
merely "believing that" certain things are true of God 
without feeling and affirming in the manner of love is 
belief, but not faith. 
When he turns to the intimate kinship of faith and 
reason, and the importance of charity in both, Augustine 
relies on two passages of Scripture: 2 Corinthians 5:7: "For 
we walk by faith not by sight," and 1 Corinthians 13:12: 
"For now we see through a glass darkly but then face to 
face." Both texts inform Augustine's basic conception of 
faith, our proper starting point, and wisdom, our proper 
end. To have faith is to trust God, to love Him, or at least to 
yearn to love Him, as our greatest good. Yet the person of 
faith still seeks, rather than fully enjoys, as one who feels 
hunger rather than satiation. The experience of faith for 
Augustine includes both the joy of being found and the 
unrest of being unable to enjoy full communion with the 
One who has found us. Because the faithful do not yet fully 
abide in God, their love suffers the limitation of unfulfilled 
desire. Now if faith is this state of charity fledged, but 
unfulfilled and incapable of true flight, then wisdom may 
be regarded as faith transformed into fullness. For 
Augustine, wisdom is that final and complete union of the 
whole self with God sought by faith. Only in wisdom does 
the possessor of faith find what she seeks. To have this 
wisdom is to know the highest good and to "cling to the 
truth." Only by attaining this wisdom does the seeker of 
faith fully realize his or her potential as a rational being and 
become fully rational. 
While it is true for Augustine that wisdom is a state of 
"seeing" the highest good, like faith, wisdom cannot be a 
matter of neutrality, of some sort of "seeing from afar." 
Rather, the wise person not only sees but also tastes Truth. 
Such a person both sees God face to face and enjoys the 
beauty of God's person. As with Augustinian faith, 
Augustinian wisdom involves a union of intellect and will, 
but now in a way that completes what faith initiated. So, as 
Augustine remarks in our passage from In Joannis 
Evangelium Tractatus, understanding (intellectus) is "the 
reward of faith." 
H
ERE WE ENCOUNTER A CRUCIAL ASPECT OF THE FUN-
damental Augustinian doctrine of the harmony of 
reason and faith. While their misuse can certainly 
lead to conflict and mutual antagonism, in their natural and 
proper expression, jointly rooted in charity, the develop-
ment of faith and the development of reason are insepa-
rable. For Augustine, the perfection of reason in wisdom 
alone affords the yearning of faith its satisfaction. Of 
course, what Augustine insists on as well in his account of 
the religious life is the impossibility of attaining wisdom 
without beginning in faith. Thus we find that for Augustine 
love is essential for our proper functioning as rational 
agents. And love is as essential for understanding God as it 
is for believing in Him. Neither the belief in God nor a real 
understanding of God is available to a skeptic who insists 
on remaining a neutral spectator until sufficient evidence is 
found. For Augustine, the path to true understanding, or 
wisdom, is available only for those who, responding first in 
trust and affirming with their wills the authority of the 
highest good, seek through their love to see more clearly 
and fully the God in whom they already believe and to 
abide fully with Him. To declare with Augustine that "one 
must first believe in order to understand" does indeed 
sound quite strange, if not ludicrous, if one presupposes 
that understanding or wisdom is nothing more than a 
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combination of "believing that such and such is the case" 
and having evidence to support it. But then, wisdom for 
Augustine is not merely justified belief, but rational love in 
its full realization. 
To accord the principle "credo ut intelligam" its proper 
rank in Augustine's thought, it is crucial to look even more 
closely at this doctrine of rational love. We encounter one 
of Augustine's most far-reaching reflections on this 
doctrine in De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII. 
However, as for a good which is not loved, no one can 
possess it or have it perfectly. For who can know to 
what extent something is good when he does not enjoy 
it? But he does not enjoy it if he does not love it, nor 
therefore does he who does not love it possess what is 
to be loved, even if he who does not possess it could 
love it. Therefore no one knows the happy life and is 
wretched, because if it should be loved (and it should 
be), then to know the happy life is the same as to possess 
it .... For of all things, the most excellent is what is 
eternal, and therefore we cannot possess it except by 
that part of ourselves in which lies our excellence, i.e., 
by our mind. But whatever is possessed by the mind is 
had by knowing, and no good is completely known 
which is not completely loved. Nor is it the case, since 
the mind alone can know, that thus it alone can love. 
For love is a kind of desire, and we can see that desire is 
also present in other parts of the soul. If this desire is in 
accord with the mind and reason, it will be possible for 
the mind to contemplate what is eternal in great peace 
and tranquillity. Therefore the soul ought to love with 
its other parts as well this magnificent object which 
must be known by the mind. And since that which is 
loved necessarily affects with itself that which loves, it 
follows that what is eternal, loved in this way, affects 
the soul with eternity. 
Acknowledging the reality of different types of love in 
the human psyche, Augustine speaks here of a kind of love 
peculiar to reason, arguing, in a way reminiscent of Plato, 
that the rational mind cannot know the good without 
loving it. But how exactly does Augustine justify the claim 
that "no good is completely known which is not completely 
loved"? In essence, he does so by specifying the role of love 
as crucial both in the proper functioning of reason and in 
the nature of wisdom. 
Probably most contemporary readers, having become 
accustomed to the modern philosophical dichotomy 
between reason and emotion, will find Augustine's more 
Platonic conception of reason rather foreign. But it is not 
unreasonable to understand reason in Augustinian terms 
once we consider that reasoning is essentially an activity 
of rational agents pursuing some end, attempting to 
achieve something desired as good. The pursuit of any 
end for Augustine involves the will; for it is the will by 
which rational agents choose among alternatives and seek 
to satisfy some desire. What Augustine refers to here as 
reason is not reason thought of merely in a technological 
sense, as if reason were a mere blind machine indiffer-
ently processing data, but reason conceived of as 
purposeful, seeking an end, and thus passionate and 
desiring. Reason in this latter sense never acts merely as a 
piece of heartless technology. 
Perhaps a better way to put this point would be to note 
that Augustine views reason as an active faculty with its 
own proper end and desire. He does not conceive of 
reason as a passive tool like a calculator, which someone 
might use either for good or ill. Augustine regards reason 
in a way that is ethical and teleological. As Augustine 
states, reason by its very nature seeks to know and thus to 
possess and to enjoy the good. Reason's desire to know the 
good seeks not only to see its full nature but, strikingly, 
also to possess it. We possess an object of love by uniting 
our wills to it and grasping its nature intellectually. 
Wisdom, for Augustine, is thus a matter of both seeing and 
that Augustine has in mind when he speaks of wisdom. The 
process of gaining wisdom thus ends not in intellectual 
vision alone, but in the full completion of the rational soul. 
For the Augustinian seeker the road to wisdom reaches its 
terminus in the Imitatio Dei. 
G
IVEN THE PSYCHIC HOLISM OF REASON AND PASSION 
central to Augustine's understanding of wisdom, 
it should not be surprising to find Augustine 
refusing to accord reason autonomy from the life of faith. 
In order to have wisdom, a human being must realize fully 
his or her natural capacity of reason in three ways: to see 
the nature of the good, to love it completely, and to abide 
with it and take on its character. Hence the completion of 
rational nature is as much a way of feeling and willing as it 
is one of intellectual seeing. We can speak appropriately 
of Augustine's doctrine of sapientia as "holistic" for the 
reason that none of these functions of wisdom are really 
capable of existing in isolation. Seeing God as supremely 
good, as Augustine argues in De Diversis Quaestionibus 
possessing. And, furthermore, in 
describing this fulfillment of rational 
love, Augustine echoes Plato by including 
the element of imitation in the nature of 
knowing the good: the soul's communion 
with the highest good transforms the soul 
into an image or likeness of its object. The 
eternal good thus feeds the soul some-
thing of its own nature, as the creature 
participates in the Eternal Beauty of the 
divine nature. In so doing, human beings 
find true happiness and peace by 
becoming incarnate icons or likenesses of 
The road to 
LXXXIII, involves the proper response of 
love. To know God as the Good, in other 
words, requires the purity of heart to 
love God as God, that is, as the only good 
we should love absolutely and unequivo-
cally for its own sake, that is, to love God 
in and of Himself. Without this full 
assent of the will, one does not know 
God, just as from an Augustinian 
perspective we could say that we cannot 
know other human beings as human 
without affirming their dignity as free 
communion with God 
requires a life-long 
transformation of our 
perverse loves into 
forms of love that are 
purified and re-made 
through charity. 
the divine. Wisdom is this final state of full participation in 
the life of God, and nothing less. 
W
HAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUGUSTINE'S 
conception of wisdom for his overall theory of 
what it means to be rational? Since Augustine 
regards the proper function of reason to be the intimate 
sharing of God's glory, and not just the intellectual appre-
hension of facts, his theory of rationality is certainly not 
theologically neutral in the more familiar modern sense. 
His theory of what it means to be rational is no more 
neutral than is his metaphysical vision of reality as a hierar-
chical order of good beings. In fact the two are intimately 
connected insofar as the Augustinian rational person 
employs reason neither to master nature, nor simply to see 
why things are as they are, but to become the sort of person 
whose internal order enables one, by God's grace, to find 
one's proper place in the order of creation. Only such a 
divinely transformed person has the power to be fully 
united in heart and mind to the mind of God. And thus it is 
this fullness of being with God, of both seeing God face to 
face and being able to rejoice fully in submission to God, 
rational agents loved by the Supreme 
Being. Indeed, in Augustine's universe, one cannot know 
genuinely anything in creation without acknowledging 
its worth as a reflection of the Glory of God. To know 
anything at all, either creature or Creator, requires 
acknowledging and affirming its reality as a bearer of 
worth. The function of human reason is thus never a 
matter of merely seeing how things are. To reason prop-
erly is a matter of being in touch with reality and acknowl-
edging, rather than merely believing, what is the case. In a 
very important sense, then, Augustine's philosophy fuses 
our capacity for reasoning properly with our feelings and 
desires. 
But, as Augustine well knew, the road to communion 
with God requires a life-long transformation of our inordi-
nate and perverse loves into forms of love that are purified 
and re-made though Charity. More than anything else, it is 
perhaps this deep connection between wisdom and the 
transformation of our egocentric loves into properly 
ordered loves that underlies Augustine's declaration that 
"one must believe in order to understand." So Augustine 
explains the significance of "credo ut intelligam" in his 
Letter to Consentius: 
God forbid that He should hate in us that faculty by 
which He made us superior to all other living beings. 
Therefore we must refuse so to believe not as to receive 
or seek a reason for our belief, since we could not 
believe at all if we did not have rational souls. So, then, 
in some points that bear on the doctrine of salvation, 
which we are not yet able to grasp by reason-but we 
shall be able to sometime-let faith precede reason, 
and let the heart be cleansed by faith so as to receive and 
lovers the moment we begin our life of faith. Rather, as 
Augustine shows in his own autobiography, Confessions, 
the road to wisdom is a slow and inevitably difficult 
process of a pilgrim's progress and regress. Finally, for 
Augustine, faith is a gift of grace working in the human 
heart, transforming us into the sorts of persons who will be 
able to love well and to judge reasonably. 
And thus for Augustine a healthy human life must 
embody a mutual dependence between reason and faith. 
bear the great light of reason; this is 
indeed reasonable. Therefore the 
Prophet said with reason: 'If you will 
not believe, you will not understand'; 
thereby he undoubtedly made a distinc-
tion between these two things and 
advised us to believe first so as to be able 
to understand whatever we believe. It 
is, then, a reasonable requirement that 
faith precede reason, for, if this require-
ment is not reasonable, then it is 
contrary to reason, which God forbid. 
But, if it is reasonable that faith precede 
a certain great reason which cannot yet 
be grasped, there is no doubt that, 
Those who seek 
Just as it is the case that reason must await 
the healing power of faith in order to 
possess the truth, so human beings must 
believe reasonably and not carelessly 
pledge their loyalty to a false authority. 
Rather, in order to have genuine faith, one 
must completely and single-mindedly put 
one's trust only in God's grace. Augustine 
is well aware, as he recounts the drama of 
his own strivings in the Confessions, of a 
crucial problem we face regarding our 
need to believe in some authority: how 
does one reasonably choose which 
authority merits one's trust? As we see in 
the autobiographical narrative of his own 
wisdom must begin in 
faith because wisdom 
is a matter of the 
heart, and human 
beings cannot use 
their hearts well 
without believing in 
things that they 
cannot yet see. 
however slight the reason which proves this, it does 
precede faith. 
As this text indicates, those who seek wisdom must 
begin in faith because wisdom is a matter of the heart, and 
human beings cannot use their hearts well without 
believing in things that they cannot yet see. The heart must 
be "cleansed by faith so as to receive and bear the great 
light of reason." That faith serves to purify the heart and 
purge it of its inordinate love of self is a theme that runs 
throughout Augustine's writings. He tends to emphasize 
two particular ways in which the human spirit suffers from 
disordered loves. First, without God's grace, the human 
heart suffers from the malady of pride in both its treatment 
of other human beings and its relationship to God. In 
order to fulfill the two great commandments of charity, 
pride must give way to humility. But Augustine does not 
believe that human beings can cure themselves and will 
succeed in re-orienting their hearts through their own 
efforts alone. To be genuinely humble in our loves, we 
need a cure for our own disordered love of self, a cure only 
a divine physician can provide. As a manifestation of our 
pride, the human heart also suffers the malady of the inor-
dinate love of creation. We lust after the things of this 
world rather than love them properly as gifts of creation. 
Yet to attain our proper end of full union with God, our 
disordered loves must be corrected and transformed, that 
is to say, sanctified. And, this process of sanctification, of 
being made into a living image of God, is incremental, 
developing over a lifetime. Divine grace does not simply 
and immediately transform us into unselfish, humble 
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false commitments, for Augustine it makes all of the 
difference in the world how and where one begins on the 
road to wisdom. Starting off on the wrong foot or with the 
wrong frame of mind can be ruinous. Hence, blind faith in 
authority must be ruled out as an act of folly and a coun-
terfeit form of genuine faith. But, we might fairly ask, 
how, then, is one even to begin? For Augustine the answer 
lies in what we might term "reasonable faith." Already we 
have seen that Augustine believes it is sometimes reason-
able to trust the integrity of others when we cannot see 
fully and directly into their hearts. So we might ask in 
whom, if anyone, is it reasonable to place our ultimate 
trust? And wherein lies the difference between reason-
able trust in authority and blind authoritarianism? 
Augustine's answer, not surprisingly, reflects his 
understanding of our natural place in God's order. The 
authority in whom we may reasonably put our ultimate 
trust must be that of the only one who can provide the 
proper cure for our spiritual disorder and serve as our true 
Good. As I have noted, for Augustine the basic nature of 
our spiritual disorder is inordinate love, and the root of 
such disorder is, in one form or another, excessive pride. A 
related and second manifestation of this spiritual disease is 
our preoccupation with and excessive, possessive love of 
temporal goods. Each of these kinds of inordinate love is an 
obstacle in the quest for wisdom. If we are to know fully the 
highest good, and so both to love and possess it, then each 
of these forms of spiritual disease must be cured. For 
Augustine, the remedy for each comes not by means of our 
own devices, but only through God's grace. Thus faith in 
God serves as the medicine of the soul by means of which 
our unhealthy forms of affection are transformed into 
genuine loves. To the question, "Which ultimate authority 
is it reasonable to trust?" Augustine responds that it is 
reasonable to trust as one's highest authority only the 
authority of the One who is the True Physician. The ration-
ality of belief in God, which is essentially, for Augustine, the 
rationality of trusting in the proper authority, is, quite 
astonishingly for a modern reader, a matter, then, of the 
rationality of choosing the right physician. Hence, the 
Augustinian canons for rational religious belief, far from 
being merely a matter of epistemology, are bound up with 
such questions as "What are people for?" and even "Why 
are people so unhappy?" 
I
F WE ACCEPT THIS AUGUSTINIAN SCHEME OF THE ORDER OF 
being and acknowledge our own self-centeredness and 
lust for finite goods, then we can see how it is rational, 
on an Augustinian view, to believe on the God who alone 
offers effective grace to sinners. Thus we see that, for 
Augustine, making sense of when it is reasonable to submit 
to authority first requires a basic understanding of the 
human condition, of both what we yearn for and of why 
we fall short of attaining our restless heart's desire. As we 
have seen, children are generally reasonable in trusting 
their parents, as they need both the love and the guidance 
which their parents can provide. And friends may be 
reasonable in trusting one another, insofar as friendship, 
as well, is crucial for our wellbeing. And, finally, it is 
reasonable to trust in the God of Love, because unless we 
trust in Him, we will be incapable of functioning properly 
as rational creatures. Thus, in all cases of trusting the 
"other," the rationality of our believing is grounded in our 
status as human pilgrims. 
And so Augustine insists on the priority of faith over 
understanding because he views all human beings in terms 
of the drama of human sinfulness and redemption. In 
essence, Augustine leads us to the crucial insight that the 
question of in whom it is reasonable to believe hinges on the 
question of who we really are: epistemology, metaphysics, 
ethics, and even psychopathology(!) are thus inextricably 
interconnected in Augustine's thought. If Saint Augustine 
is right about our spiritual sickness and about the requisite 
nature of its cure, then he makes a good case, indeed, he 
makes an overwhelmingly compelling case, for the reason-
ableness of faith in God's gracious authority. f 
James Peters teaches philosophy at the University of the 
South in Sewanee, Tennessee. 
doubt and the hermeneutics of delight 
D 
OUBT MAY NOT BE THE QUINTESSENTIAL VIRTUE OF THE 
modern university, but it probably ranks among the 
top four or five most highly valued characteristics 
in the Academy. To doubt what has been taught, what has 
been believed, even what has been experienced has long 
marked not only critical thinking, but also the advance 
from childish belief into maturity. And higher education, 
particularly education in the humanities, is all about critical 
thinking that is not just neutral unbelief but a deliberately 
cultivated critical distance, a disbelief that The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines as "positive unbelief." 
Traditionally, such doubt, such positive unbelief, has been 
valued because it pares away extraneous theories, experi-
ences, emotions, and narratives in order to arrive if not at 
the truth, then at least at a better, or more useful, or perhaps 
more provocative explanation for observed data. 
In the postmodern academy-or at least among our 
current students-doubt often loses this cutting edge and 
instead spreads out into an ironic or cynical miasma, an 
unwholesome, menacing atmosphere of uncertainty, char-
acterized not by the paring down of unhealthy or 
outgrown choices but by the production of a paralyzing 
plethora of alternatives, none of which carries enough 
weight to interest students for very long. Our students 
look out over a flattened moral landscape that does little to 
excite their imagination. 
You might think that, having begun with this rather 
dreary genealogy of doubt, I would be eager to turn to its 
counterpart and cure: faith. But that is not the case. Instead, 
I intend to describe an alternative landscape for our 
academic vocations. 
This Doubt I have been describing, of course, is not 
"doubts about ... "-a plural common noun followed by a 
preposition and its object. It is not synonymous with "ques-
tions about," or "I wonder about" or even "is it possible 
that?" Rather the Doubt I am describing is a singular proper 
noun-Doubt with a capital "D," reified Doubt, calcified 
Doubt, the doubt that by a kind of false etymology we've 
confused with "doughty," as in brave, formidable, and 
capable, and have too often claimed as education's patron 
saint. Or to change the metaphor, I am discussing the Doubt 
that takes for granted its privileged status as the manner, or 
methodology, in which intellectual work must be 
conducted, in a distanced, critical vein. Or to return to my 
earlier image, Doubt forms the landscape in which we 
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academics often undertake our vocations, the geography of 
our minds. And this Doubt is often directed against reli-
gious faith: it is not by chance that the first definition of 
"doubt" in The Oxford English Dictionary points to reli-
gious doubt, noting that doubt frequently means 
"Uncertainty as to the truth of Christianity or some other 
religious belief or doctrine." 
The reason I do not contrast Doubt with Faith, 
however, is that I think that they are not parallel terms. 
"Faith" is not a methodology or a manner of investigation. 
Nor is it a landscape through which we pursue our vocation 
as scholar-teachers. Rather, faith is both a body of 
content-the confession of faith summarized in the 
Christian creeds-and the fidelity, or faithfulness, we 
profess in words and deeds as Christians. 
"Delight," I think, is a better contrast to Doubt than 
faith because delight can be thought about in ways that 
invoke both the methodology/manner and the landscape 
metaphors that I have already employed. Faith may wend 
its way across the landscape of Doubt or the landscape of 
Delight, but Delight provides the richer aesthetic and 
moral landscape through which to chart our course as 
scholars and teachers as we confess and profess our 
Christian faith. 
T
HE IMAGE OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR-TEACHER 
riding through the landscape of Delight comes to 
me, I must confess, from the genre of Romance. Not 
the romance of boy meets girl, but the great medieval Quest 
romances of Arthur, Gawain, Lancelot, and the whole 
Round-Table crew and, in particular, from the revision of 
those romances by Edmund Spenser in his late sixteenth-
century tale, The Faerie Queene. In the prefatory letter to 
The Faerie Queene, addressed to Sir Walter Raleigh, 
Spenser states his intention to meld the genre of Romance, 
with its questing knights and dragon-filled adventures, 
with the most serious of educational goals, the formation of 
mature persons; in his words, he intends The Faerie Queene 
"to fashion a ... noble person in virtuous and gentle disci-
pline," in other words to draw out, to educate mind and 
heart toward maturity. And he deliberately chooses the 
Romance landscape for this educational mission precisely 
because it offers a hermeneutic of delight. To those who 
object to his "method" of education, arguing that good 
discipline should be "delivered plainly in way of precepts, 
or sermoned at large" rather than "cloudily enwrapped in 
Allegorical devises," he replies that good teaching is much 
more "profitable and gracious" when it uses example 
rather than rule. Spenser is here following his own imme-
diate exemplar and fellow countryman, Philip Sidney. 
Sidney had argued, just a few years earlier, that litera-
ture excels the other arts and sciences because it teaches, 
delights, and moves us to take action. What makes litera-
ture particularly powerful is its ability to bind ideas and 
pleasure and stimulus to action all together in a single, 
exciting package. And because ideas, delight, and action 
come all bound up together in real life as well, to experi-
ence literature is to come close to experiencing life in all its 
richness and complexity. Literature, in fact, comes closer to 
replicating life than do other disciplines (for Sidney history 
and philosophy are the textual foils against which literature 
proves its value) because it provides an opportunity to test 
one's mettle in a secondary world. And it is by journeying 
through that world, through the landscape of delightful 
devices, that we are best able to learn. 
T
HIS HERMENEUTIC OF DELIGHT, I THINK, OFFERS US NOT 
a more constricted pathway of precept and rule, not 
a codification of duties, but a rich aesthetic land-
scape that encourages the learner-and the scholar-to 
look up and around rather than merely down or forward. 
And, although I wouldn't be adverse to arguing that litera-
ture in general and stories in particular provide the best 
means of moral education, what I want to say here is that all 
our academic disciplines depend upon narrative structures 
both large and small, and therefore are amenable to a 
hermeneutics of delight. In other words, I wouldn't agree 
with Sidney that only the discipline of literature teaches, 
delights, and moves to action. 
I am, however, a literature professor, and so I will illus-
trate my claims about the landscape of Delight from The 
Faerie Queene. In the first few stanzas Spenser introduces 
two main characters: the Redcrosse Knight, a young, 
untried adolescent, decked out with the armor of God and 
ready to plunge into his first set of adventures, and Una, a 
quiet but confident young woman whose parents are under 
siege by a fearsome dragon. The Redcrosse Knight has been 
charged by the Faerie Queene to fight the dragon, but in 
true Romance style we don't actually reach Una's home 
country and the dragon until near the end of Book 1. This 
delay is not merely a narrative strategy, but also, in 
Spenser's hand, a necessary aspect of education. Moral, 
mental, and spiritual formation cannot be rushed, and as 
we first meet him the Redcrosse Knight is in no way ready 
to meet the challenge the dragon poses. So Spenser dumps 
the Redcrosse Knight and Una into a textured, three-
dimensional landscape where they spend delightful hours 
riding through a forest, listen to a catalog of the names of 
the trees, lose their way, encounter and conquer the 
Monster Error with her ugly, swarming brood of baby 
books, chat, and generally begin to grow up. The landscape 
through which they travel is dense with experiences: they 
see, hear, touch, taste, and feel the world through which 
they travel, and not every experience is immediately trans-
muted into an assessable educational objective. The catalog 
of trees, for instance, is simply a constitutive feature of all 
tall tales and offers an opportunity for Spenser to add an 
English touch to his Romance while playing around with 
the sound of words: "The sayling Pine, the Cedar proud 
and tall, I The vine-prop Elme, the Poplar neuer dry." This 
landscape of Delight is richly aesthetic, sensual, in love with 
the stuff out of which the world is made-trees, and clear 
streams, and lowering rain, and well-made shields, and 
stout horses. 
It is also a landscape in which lurk dangers, and the 
Redcrosse Knight's judgment is tested, particularly when 
he rushes foolhardily into Error's den, ignoring Una's 
warning to wait: 
Be well aware, quoth then that Ladie milde, 
Least suddaine mischiefe ye too rash prouoke: 
The danger hid, the place vnknowne and wilde, 
And later he extracts himself from Error's clutches only 
when he hears Una shout: 
Add faith vnto your force, and be not faint: 
Strangle her, else she sure will strangle thee. 
and acts on her advice. Here, as we can see, the Redcrosse 
Knight would have benefited from a little doubt, as in 
"doubt about the wisdom of rushing into Error's den." 
"Doubt about" is certainly part of the landscape of Delight 
and "doubt about," properly used, restrains impetuousness 
with a quiet attentiveness. 
John Donne, a contemporary of Spenser who himself 
knew something about doubt, put it this way at the conclu-
sion of his third Satire: 
doubt wisely; in strange way 
To stand inquiring right, is not to stray; 
To sleep, or run wrong, is. On a huge hill, 
Cragged and steep, Truth stands, and he that will 
Reach her, about must, and about must go, 
And what the hill's suddenness resists, win so. 
Like Una, Donne recommends a wise doubt; or rather, he 
doesn't recommend a wise doubt, for Donne, like Spenser, 
refuses to harden doubt into a noun. Instead he retains 
doubt as a verb: to doubt wisely is actively to engage in 
serious inquiry; to doubt wisely is to ask questions about; to 
doubt wisely requires a disciplined, quiet attentiveness, in 
contrast to the careless sleep that will later overwhelm the 
Redcrosse Knight or the wrong-headed rush that propels 
him into Error's den. 
But wise doubting is only one action, and a limited 
action at that, within the landscape of delight. For, as 
Donne recognizes, within that landscape, indeed domi-
nating it, is Truth, a "huge hill, I cragged and steep," and to 
reach that Truth Donne, the Redcrosse Knight, and we as 
well must move through doubting to continue the task of 
ascending the steep and difficult heights of Truth. We 
"about must, and about must go/ And what the hill's 
suddenness resists, win so." 
Donne's equation of doubt with stillness might seem 
counterintuitive to us at first. On further reflection, 
however, we notice the importance of the restraining 
adverb. To doubt wisely is to ask questions while we stand 
still, looking around as we sort out the next best step to 
take. But to reify Doubt is to let questions pool out from our 
own standpoint and flatten the landscape of Delight; it is to 
mistake a part for the whole and to substitute for a rich 
diversity of aesthetic experiences only the mode of ques-
tioning. To give an example from my own discipline, the 
thesis-driven five-paragraph argumentative essay, which is 
rooted in doubt, is a useful tool, but not the only experience 
I wish young writers to have and, indeed, it is not one of the 
richer or most productive genres with which to explore the 
world. 
But if reified Doubt flattens the aesthetic landscape and 
reduces the diverse experiences to the 
here clarified his vision, but obscured it. The Una the 
Redcrosse Knight sees in bed with another knight is not Una 
at all, but a simulacrum, a false Una, created by Archimago 
himself. With a mind clouded by doubt, however, the 
Redcrosse Knight is unable to understand this more 
complicated, nuanced, sculpted moral landscape. He does 
not, for instance, stop to talk with the false Una, to ask what 
she might be doing with another Knight, or to consider 
alternative interpretive scenarios other than the one posed 
by Doubt. He succumbs to reified Doubt, to critical 
distance, a skeptical methodology that systematically 
excludes alternatives and tends toward linear conclusions. 
Doubt, for the Redcrosse Knight, becomes a zero-sum 
game. Branding Una as false, he leaves the house of 
Archimago under cover of darkness, and begins a down-
ward spiral of misadventures through an increasingly flat-
tened aesthetic and moral landscape, a fall that ends in the 
dungeon of Pride and the cave of Despair. Not until he is 
reunited with Una and is led by her to the House of Holiness 
does he once again encounter genuine aesthetic richness 
and regain flexible moral responsiveness. 
THE AESTHETIC AND MORAL POVERlY OF REIFIED DOUBT contrasts with the plenitude that is the very heart and soul of Christian witness about the world, 
ourselves, and God. Genesis 1 is nothing if 
single mode of questioning, it also flattens 
the moral landscape and reduces the 
number of moral responses, for Doubt 
insists upon distance and distrust. Spenser 
illustrates this descent into distance and 
distrust at the beginning of the second 
canto of The Faerie Queene. Following 
their initial shared adventures, the 
Redcrosse Knight and Una come to the 
house of Archimago, the hypocritical 
To doubt wisely is to 
ask questions while 
we stand still, 
looking around as 
we sort out the next 
best step to take. 
not an account that overflows with pleni-
tude. God not only speaks the world into 
existence, he lovingly crafts its particulars on 
six successive days. God not only speaks all 
things into existence, but he also divides 
them: light from darkness, firmament from 
firmament, seas from dry land. God not only 
divides the great spaces, but he names them: 
Day, Night, Heaven, Earth, Sea. God not 
villain and archenemy of the Faerie Queene. In a complex 
and comic scene, Archimago sets out to sidetrack the 
Redcrosse Knight from his appointed quest by deceiving 
him as to Una's true nature. Archimago arranges for the 
Redcrosse Knight to be rudely awakened in the middle of 
the night and hustled into Una's bedroom. There he sees 
Una, his true love, in bed with another knight. The 
Redcrosse Knight immediately abandons everything he 
knows about Una-her virtue, her faithful companionship 
on their adventures thus far, her willingness to stand by him 
when he foolishly rushed into Error's den-and doubts her 
integrity. And this Doubt leads him to a single moral 
response: distrust tinged with disgust. Una's roles as 
daughter, companion, and friend; her steady and trust-
worthy character; the moral weight she bears in the 
Romance as witness to the unified truth-all of these 
collapse into a single description: she now becomes simply 
"the woman who betrayed me." 
Unfortunately for the Redcrosse Knight, Doubt has not 
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only speaks, divides, and names his creation, 
but he fills it up with greater and lesser lights, fish and fowl, 
vegetation, and all the creeping things-each multiplying 
furiously after its own kind. Nor does plenitude end in 
Genesis 1. Genesis 2 reminds us that it is not good for adam 
to be alone. The psalms, Job, and the prophets witness that 
a single lament is insufficient to give voice to the griefs of 
the world. The historical books of the Old Testament and 
the Gospels of the New Testament speak to our need for 
multiple perspectives, for accounts that will bear witness to 
the rich experiences of lived reality. The Book of Proverbs 
reminds us of the need for moral flexibility: when do I not 
answer a fool according to his folly (Prov 26:4) and when 
do I answer a fool according to his folly (Prov 26:5)? 
Our theological doctrines, as well, force us to say more 
rather than less, point us to the rich complexity of reality: 
"We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of 
heaven and earth," says the Nicene Creed, but also "in Jesus 
Christ, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, 
begotten, not made, of one substance with the Father," and 
"we believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, 
who proceeds from the Father and the Son and who with 
them together is worshiped and glorified." God is one, but 
God is three. Christ is both divine and human, without 
confusion or division. The Father is the maker of heaven 
and earth, but all things were made by Christ, and it is the 
Holy Spirit who is the giver of life. To recite the Nicene 
Creed is to confess that in our religious account of the 
world, at the heart of our Christian faith, is plenitude, a 
rich aesthetic and moral landscape where to know 
anything truly is always to know more than one thing 
alone. And equally important, in this aesthetic and moral 
landscape, to know anything truly is to know it not alone: 
the only flaw in Eden was that it was not good for adam to 
be alone. Here, too, reified Doubt moves away from plen-
itude to reductionism. 
EIFIED DOUBT NOT ONLY FLATTENS THE AESTHETIC AND 
moral landscape, but, as with the Redcrosse Knight 
nd Una, it also tends to collapse the boundaries of 
the self and others, to foster an unhealthy subjectivity. 
Again, to revert to The Oxford English Dictionary, the first 
definition of doubt notes that it is "The (subjective) state of 
uncertainty with regard to the truth or reality of anything." 
The Redcrosse Knight, consumed by Doubt, merges 
the complex, personal, three-dimensional Una into a single 
extension of himself: she becomes merely "the woman who 
betrayed me." And once the Redcrosse Knight merges Una 
into his own subjectivity, he feels free to discard her. By 
violating the boundaries of her personhood, he deprives 
himself of her necessary and external point of view and 
opens himself up to be absorbed into the false world of the 
counterfeit Duessa. 
For, as a number of theorists have noted, radical doubt 
is not a methodology that can be consistently maintained if 
you wish to live in the world rather than in an insane 
asylum. Unless you begin with a modicum of trust-
unless, for instance, you begin with the assumption that 
another person is talking sense not gibberish-you reduce 
yourself to a solipsistic existence. Because trust is neces-
sary for life reified doubt can be pernicious; in fact, it 
sneaks in belief in something under the guise of ques-
tioning everything. Satan's interrogative in Genesis 3,-
"Did God say, 'You shall not eat of any tree of the 
garden?'"-is all the more dangerous because it is manip-
ulative and dishonest under the guise of asking a question. 
Eve's answer-and more importantly her own attitude 
toward God-is shaped not only by the false information 
embedded in the question, but also by a methodology of 
doubt that pares away the rich possibilities of the garden. 
Doubt, in other words, draws Eve away from looking 
around at the plenitude of the garden, with its implications 
of a generous creator, and redirects her attention to a set of 
binary alternatives: if God has refused you the fruit of this 
tree, he must not be a good God; and if he is not a good 
God, you need not obey him. And Doubt likewise 
collapses necessary boundaries-"you will be like God, 
Satan murmurs" -while insinuating a new set of beliefs. 
True plenitude needs boundaries, and the biblical and 
theological witness to plenitude insists on delineated 
borders: the proper division of light from darkness, waters 
from dry land; the creation of humanity in God's image, 
but not identical to him, such that the desire to erase that 
boundary, "to be like God," constitutes the primal sin; the 
Chalcedonian creed that insists on Christ's divinity and 
humanity-without confusion or division. 
These deeply Christian conjunctions of plenitude, 
boundaries, persons, and communities are echoed in 
Spenser's own narrative. His allegorical devices are not mere 
husks to be discarded for the real "moral" of the story. The 
Redcrosse Knight is a Christian everyman-outfitted with 
the armor of God, sent into the world, and faced with temp-
tations-to most of which he succumbs. But he is also a 
typical eighteen-year-old, brash and self-confident on the 
surface, seething with worries on the inside, and wracked 
with sexual desires and insecurities. It is just that enriched 
realism, as we are caught up in the Redcrosse Knight's misad-
ventures, that allows us to be educated within a rich aesthetic 
and moral landscape. The Redcrossse Knight and Una 
remain real persons and if, by virtue of Spenser's genius, they 
become emblems of the Christian life, and therefore more 
than just a questing knight and his lady, they do not become 
less than two memorable romantic figures. Spenser's deep-
ening of things via the word, of persons in community, of 
plenitude within unmerged boundaries is what ultimately 
fashions the noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline, 
what educates the mind and heart toward maturity. And 
Spenser teaches those of us who confess the faith and profess 
the faith that this journey toward maturity best unfolds not 
within the landscape of Doubt but of Delight. f 
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. . . . . 
vocation 1n pianissimo: 
the loss and recovery of vocation in contemporary life 
0 
N THE CORNER OF FOURTH STREET AND MUHAMMAD 
Ali Boulevard in Louisville, Kentucky, there is a 
cast-iron plaque that symbolizes as well as 
anything I know the deep significance of vocation for our 
contemporary life. The plaque commemorates Thomas 
Merton's 1958 "Vision in Louisville." Here, as Merton 
later recounted, he "suddenly realized that I loved all the 
people and that none of them were, or could be, totally 
alien to me .... My vocation does not really make me 
different from the rest of men or put me in a special cate-
gory except artificially, juridically. I am still a member of the 
human race, and what more glorious destiny is there for 
man, since the Word was made flesh and became, too, a 
member of the Human Race!" Merton's deep identifica-
tion with the whole of humanity became for him a new 
beginning in his life-long quest to become what God wants 
of everyone: to be fully the creature that God intends, and 
in so doing to bring joy and delight to the Creator. "Thank 
God! Thank God! I am only another member of the human 
race like all the rest of them. I have the immense joy of being 
a man!" 
We are less inclined to consider this "vision" and the 
transformation it precipitated as paradigmatic of voca-
tional experience because Merton's earlier decision to 
become a monk at the Abbey of Gethsemani seems much 
more representative of responding to God's call. 
Becoming a Trappist monk has all the marks of a genuine 
vocational sensibility: a period of aimless, anguished, and 
discontented searching; intense prayer to God (even if this 
God is uncertainly known) seeking direction; the gradual 
realization of one's true nature and the rejection of one's 
past as a rebellion against it; and joy and peace in the recog-
nition that one has found one's way. This sort of searching, 
and the insights it produces, makes for a compelling and 
exciting narrative. We know this because Merton's 
memoir on this time in his life, The Seven Story Mountain, 
became a national best-seller, providing inspiration to 
scores of individuals, many of whom decided to follow 
Merton into the monastery. 
The "Vision in Louisville," however, took Merton out 
of the monastery. Though he would remain a monk, this 
vision reflects Merton's ability to embrace the world in a 
way his entry into Gethsemani did not. Why might this 
latter embrace be more determinative for our under-
standing of vocation? Because vocation (from the Latin 
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vocare, which means "to call") refers to a person's calling, 
and thus presupposes a life lived in response to a summons 
(vocatio) from another. A vocation, unlike a career, is not a 
choice we initiate. It follows from and grows within a life 
that has become attentive to others who can question, 
provoke, inspire, and correct us. To be sure, we should 
understand Merton's entry into the Trappist order as a 
response to a call from God. What this response left unful-
filled, however, was a broadening of scope and commit-
ment beyond the Creator to include God's creation as a 
whole. In the "Vision in Louisville" Merton opened his life 
and made himself available and responsive to everyone. We 
might say that Merton's solitude, formerly fuelled by 
personal longing and the sense of his aloneness, after 
Louisville came to be inspired by a more varied and openly 
social encounter and engagement with others. 
our context for vocation 
In thinking about vocation, its meaning but also its 
possibility, the concrete and practical character of our 
living is critical because the patterns of our lives-the way 
we configure our built environments and schedules, the 
ways we choose and maintain our relationships, how we 
establish goals-determine whether or not we will hear, 
and thus respond to, another's summons. We must ask: is it 
possible that our culture, because of the priorities and plans 
in life that it models for us, may actually make it more diffi-
cult to hear the voice calling to us? 
This may sound strange, for few of us are likely to admit 
that we are hard of hearing. But hearing is, indeed, one of 
our most pressing problems. We live in a culture that satu-
rates us with one over-riding message: the world belongs to 
us, is ours for the taking, if only we exert our skill and inge-
nuity. Everywhere we look, whether we examine our living 
spaces, the media, or even our churches, we see the signifi-
cance of ME! Everywhere we turn, we are reminded of the 
opportunities to satisfy self-chosen ends and desires, and 
the importance of doing so. In this world there is little room 
for another (even the Holy Other) to appear as genuinely 
other, and thus little chance that some voice will register as 
distinct from my own and will be heeded as in some way 
authoritative or determinative for my living. 
Consider the following comment from the head of 
Philips Design, an international electronics firm: 
"consumers want to be omnipresent, omniscient and 
omnipotent, with the maximum of comfort and freedom 
and with the minimum of effort." As consumers, now 
replete with divine attributes, we want a world tailored to 
suit our own preferences and desires. We do not like to be 
told that our wants are inordinate or possibly unjust. We 
seek to be like gods, to be absolute beings, not constrained 
or limited by anyone or anything. The most convenient way 
for us to achieve our godlike status is to believe that others, 
if they count at all, have their own spheres of influence that 
do not overlap with or impinge upon our own, and to act on 
this belief. You do your thing, I'll do mine. 
Since there is little in an individualistic society that 
either constrains or informs the way we choose to live, we 
have substituted careerism for vocation. As is well known, 
many people today move through several different careers 
in their lifetime. What often drives this movement from 
one career to another is the quest for greater (and usually 
this is identified as "more financially lucrative") opportu-
nity and self-satisfaction. There is little sense in the careerist 
mindset that our choosing and our living are beholden or 
accountable to a reality-whether community, region, or 
God-greater than ourselves. The world is ours for the 
taking. The most successful among us are those who have 
taken the most. These are the rugged and resourceful indi-
viduals who "deserve" to be rewarded handsomely. 
B 
UT ARE WE HONEST WITH OURSELVES AND TRUE TO THE 
world when we cast ourselves in such individualistic 
language as this? In the 1920s the Jewish philoso-
pher Martin Buber-a philosopher Merton read in 
earnest-described in memorable terms the nature of the 
modern predicament, an analysis that remains true to this 
day. He noted that, in fact, no one lives alone. "To be" is to 
be "in relation." Our lives, when we look more closely, are 
shot through with various forms of interdependence. We 
see this on a biological level in our need for food and water 
and air, and on the social level in our need to express 
ourselves through the medium of a symbolic (and thus 
shared) world. For the most part, however, we do not like 
to acknowledge our dependence on others. "The self-
willed man does not believe and does not meet. He does 
not know solidarity of connexion, but only the feverish 
world outside and his feverish desire to use it." And so 
others are reduced to the status of objects that can be 
understood, controlled, and used for our own personal 
benefit. As objects of a utilitarian mind they are not in a 
position to challenge our claims to possess or ignore them. 
This is the world of the "l-It," a world in which the 
integrity or sanctity of others is not recognized. 
To this objectifying and instrumental stance in the 
world Buber contrasted the more authentic "1-Thou" rela-
tion. To receive and engage the world as a "Thou" rather 
than an "It" means that we no longer treat others as items 
within a self-chosen and self-coordinated plan. Whereas "I-
It" bespeaks our separation from others, "1-Thou" bears 
witness to a meeting with another in which genuine 
welcome and exchange can occur. In this meeting my desire 
is transformed because it is now questioned and redirected 
by the integrity of the other. Most importantly, when 
another person is met as "Thou," he or she speaks to me and 
I listen. Another person related to as "It" is silent, not 
because incapable of speaking, but due to our unwilling-
ness to hear. "l-It" is the path of alienation and individua-
tion whereas "I -Thou" is the path of meeting and mutuality. 
''All reality is an activity in which I share without being able 
to appropriate for myself. Where there is no sharing there 
is no reality. Where there is self-appropriation there is no 
reality. The more direct the contact with the Thou, the 
fuller is the sharing." 
B
UBER'SANALYSISATTEMPTEDTOSHOWTHATHUMANLIFE 
lived at its most authentic pitch is dialogical. A 
dialogical life is one in which the lives of others-
whether plant, animal, human, or divine-intersect mean-
ingfully with our own so that the course of our living is 
adjusted to be more responsive to their rightful claims and 
needs. Presupposing interdependence, we can see now that 
a responsible human life is one that acknowledges, 
respects, and celebrates the integrity and the call of others. 
The problem with so many trends in contemporary life is 
that they reduce human existence to a monologicallevel, 
even to the level of the soliloquy, because we only are the 
ones who do the thinking, talking, deciding, etc. Others do 
not practically inform our acting and our planning because 
they are not really permitted to speak to us. Their voices 
have been either silenced altogether or reduced to the 
whisper of a pianissimo. 
the silencing of others 
Again, it may seem strange to suggest that others have 
been silenced, because many of us feel that we live in a 
world of constant speech and intervention. Television, 
radio, a barrage of sales pitches, Instant Messenger, pop-
up ads, cellular telephones, beepers, and pagers all make 
sure that we cannot escape others. And so we crave silence 
and quiet because of the cacophony of voices that address, 
even assault, us. The world around us, we are tempted to 
say, has not become quieter but much noisier, so noisy in 
fact that we sometimes wish to follow Merton into the 
silence of the Trappists. 
If we are to understand this silencing of others that has 
been detrimental to a sense of calling in our own lives we 
need to realize that there are different kinds of silence as 
well as different kinds of speaking. It is possible, for 
instance, that a person can speak without really being heard 
or being heard only falsely. This failure of genuine commu-
nication may stem from our lack of preparation to listen 
(we don't know "where they are coming from") or from a 
refusal to hear anything other than what we want to hear 
(our minds have already "been made up"). Sometimes the 
encounter with another reveals so many differences-in 
culture, language, or desire-that it is hard to establish 
common ground. As Buber would put it, people meet, but 
their minds do not. The net effect, however, is the same in 
that my world, despite being addressed by another, remains 
unchallenged and unchanged. Lacking genuine connec-
tion, the encounter does not affect or redirect my ways of 
thinking or acting because as a rational agent I am in charge 
of my world. Whenever I meet others I do so 
"way of life," but a feel for the reality of the larger than 
human world and the sense that we have any obligation to 
care for the living forms through which we necessarily live. 
Our overriding temptation is to forget that we are biolog-
ical beings enmeshed in biological processes that are 
vulnerable to exhaustion and destruction. Urban life, in 
other words, shields us from our dependence on a bewil-
dering host of natural, non-human others, with the result 
that we now think we live in a purely human 
in terms that are acceptable to and established 
byrne. 
Another way to put this is to say that as 
modern individuals we are autonomous or 
free. We are each a law (nomos) unto 
ourselves (autos), having been liberated from 
the shackles of tradition and authority. The 
mark of our enlightenment, as Immanuel 
Kant famously put it, is that we have the 
courage to "think for ourselves." Modern life 
in its many practical forms-in politics, 
economics, education, religion-reflects this 
growing tendency to protect the individual as 
much as possible from external influence or 
compulsion. We are in charge of our lives and 
Even as we 
exalted the 
world. The natural world, like so much else in 
a consumer society, is either reduced to enter-
tainment or to a limitless fund from which we 
can draw resources as we see fit. That the 
natural world has a sanctity of its own, or that 
its members or diverse habitats have a claim 
upon our being, is lost on us. Nature doesn't 
speak, mostly because we are insulated from 
nature and do not have the ears to hear or the 
eyes to see. And so we continue to destroy at 
an unparalleled pace, without much remorse 
or sympathy, but with a great deal of igno-
rance. 
autonomy of the 
individual, we 
relegated our 





Our insularity becomes clear if we think 
finally answerable to no one but ourselves. 
It would be foolish, as well as supremely ungrateful, to 
suggest that these forms of liberation are uniformly bad. 
Nobody wants to go back to a world in which vast segments 
of the population-women, rural folk, ethnic and racial 
minorities, the handicapped and mentally ill-had no say 
over the course of their lives. But it would also be naive to 
think that the harvest of modernity has been unambigu-
ously good, for even as we exalted the autonomy of the 
individual, we relegated our freedom to paths of alienation, 
disenchantment, boredom, and anxiety. Fewer and fewer, 
one could argue, know what their freedom is ultimately for. 
In fact, many of us feel that the choices we make are, in the 
end, without much significance or value. 
How we became modern individuals, as well as the 
implications of this novel development, is an immensely 
complex affair. At stake, however, is a clear understanding 
of how modernity and postmodernity foster new ways of 
relating to others. As I will argue, the varied cultural devel-
opments we call modernity significantly changed the way 
we structure our practical lives. The result, owing to the 
increasing insularity and independence of self from other, 
is that a sympathetic hearing of others has become much 
more difficult. We can see this if we briefly highlight a few 
of the salient features of modern and postmodern life: 
urbanization, technology, consumerism, risk, and violence. 
First, we should note that contemporary life is increas-
ingly urban life. Indeed, the mass migration of millions of 
people from farms, or from villages closely tied to farming 
life, represents an unparalleled development in human 
history. What is lost in this development is not simply a 
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about food. Few of us today have the appreci-
ation or knowledge of where our daily food comes from, 
and what natural conditions are necessary so that safe, 
nutritious food can be produced over the long term, i.e., we 
don't understand the vital connection between healthy 
food and healthy soils, watersheds, and natural habitats. 
Given that virtually all the "food" we buy is heavily 
processed and laced with preservatives, and given that 
much of it travels more than a thousand miles before it 
reaches our stores, we are in no position to determine 
whether our eating is just or unjust, healthy or sickly, bene-
ficial or destructive. Habitats are thus reduced to resource 
stockpiles that we manage however we see fit. Whether or 
not natural organisms have integrity of their own is a ques-
tion most of us cannot meaningfully entertain. 
Furthermore, contemporary life is increasingly medi-
ated by technology. Cultural critics ranging from Neil 
Postman to George Grant to Sven Birkerts have all noted 
how technology has really become the ontology of our age. 
What they mean is that technology does not simply refer to 
the growing number of gadgets or devices that supposedly 
make it easier for us to live in the world (after all, the spirit 
of invention has been with us for a very longtime). Rather, 
the technological complex itself has become the medium 
through which we encounter and experience reality. A 
technological filament now runs through most of our 
encounters with others so that we no longer meet them 
directly and in their full depth and complexity. What we 
know and what we experience is what our technological 
media filter, frame, crop, or airbrush, all determined by 
the limits of the machine, its program, programmers, and 
financial sponsors. 
Raising questions about the pervasive presence of 
technology in our practical lives does not make us 
Luddites. The issue is not whether we are for technology 
or against it. Rather, what is at stake is how technological 
devices determine how we will experience and relate to 
others. What happens in a technological age is that a 
machine becomes a substitute for attentive, patient, 
intensive, and refined skills that otherwise develop as the 
result of socially determined contexts. We like machines 
because in many instances they make our lives easier: we 
don't have to work as hard or as long, nor do we need to 
master as many skills or depend on others for help. Our 
connection to reality is readily reduced to 'the pushing of 
buttons and the turning of handles.' The result, however, 
is that we become more disengaged from others and from 
reality, relating to them with less care and understanding. 
And so we become easily bored, forever on the search for 
novel, more enticing, forms of entertainment. As Albert 
Borgmann has noted, " ... the feelings of liberation and 
enrichment [guaranteed by a machinery not of our design 
and often beyond our understanding] quickly fade; the 
new devices lose their glamour and meld into the incon-
spicuous periphery of normalcy; boredom replaces 
exhilaration." 
Third, contemporary life is for the most part consumer 
life. Clearly, it would be a mistake to think consumption 
itself to be a bad thing. After all, to survive we must 
consume water, food, goods, and services. Consumption 
becomes problematic, however, when it becomes the domi-
nant means we have for connecting with others, and when 
it is not balanced by the understanding that follows from 
also being producers in the world. To be a producer is to be 
attentive to and to work within limits determined by 
natural and social contexts (we have to work with available 
and useful materials to satisfy socially-driven and accepted 
needs). But when we live primarily as consumers these 
contexts recede in significance, and the limits for our 
deciding and purchasing are then driven primarily by our 
own or media-manufactured desires. 
Consumerism reflects an oblique relation to reality. 
Others come to be viewed as commodities and thus are not 
experienced in their true depth. They register now prima-
rily in terms of how they satisfy our own advancement. 
Given that we evaluate ourselves by comparing ourselves to 
others, it is inevitable that we will consume pointlessly, 
simply so that we will be perceived to fit within a group or 
be further ahead than our rivals. Moreover, as mere 
commodities, things appear to us anonymously and 
without context. It is safe to say that never before have we 
shopped with as much ignorance as we do today. We don't 
know how things were made, what all the (personal, social, 
environmental) costs were, who made them and under 
what conditions, and we are thus powerless to consider 
whether or not our consuming is done with even a measure 
of justice or compassion. 
Fourth, contemporary life is experienced by many as a 
precarious existence. In part this has to do with a funda-
mental transformation that occurs in modern societies. 
Speaking very generally, one of the most important features 
about traditional societies is that they provide a sense of 
order in which time and place have a determined signifi-
cance. Change occurs slowly and is incorporated within a 
larger structure that makes for a feeling of security and 
permanence. Modern societies, characterized as they are 
by (increasingly global) economic and industrial develop-
ment, sever the connection between time and place as 
discrete localities and their systems of order are penetrated 
and shaped by foreign influences. Social and economic 
relations become "disembedded," lifted out of their local 
contexts, and are redefined by factors beyond the control 
of any particular group. As a farmer, for instance, I no 
longer produce for myself or my neighbor but for people 
far away and in economic conditions over which I have 
little control. 
T
HE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT ARE 
immense because they render a riskier, undeter-
mined future. We don't know what might happen 
next because the paths of our own existence are perpetually 
being interrupted by foreign paths we could not have fore-
seen or predicted. In a fast paced, competitive, global envi-
ronment we must be ready to scrap existing schedules or 
plans to take advantage of whatever opportunity comes 
along. The result is that the bonds that tie us to others, to 
region, even to principles, become much more temporary, 
superficial, and tenuous. We have to be flexible and mobile 
if we are to be successful. The cost of our flexibility, 
however, is a diminishment in our capacity to trust each 
other (trust being a key element in the formation of deep 
social bonds). We are not around long enough and don't 
have the time (measured in years) to really get to know, and 
hence, to trust, each other. 
Finally, contemporary life is perceived to be violent and 
dangerous. The danger referred to here is not simply the 
fear of human aggression and destruction, since these have 
been with us from the time of Cain. Rather, and owing to 
the dissolution of community boundaries and protections, 
the danger that many feel stems from the unpredictability 
and foreignness of others who are perceived to interfere 
with or interrupt the comforts of the familiar. When one 
adds to this the fiercely competitive character of global 
economics, we should not be surprised to see a rise in xeno-
phobia, tribalism, and ethnic hatred and violence. Faced 
with uncertainty, and operating in a context of general 
ignorance of others who are different from ourselves, we 
instinctively close ourselves off from others or lash out at 
them in fear, seeking security or innocence. 
Clearly, this is a troubling phenomenon because it rein-
forces separation and a general avoidance of others. 
Keeping other people at arm's length becomes more worri-
some, however, with the realization that what we most 
need-patient, sustained encounters with others so that 
our differences can be faced, understood, and accepted-
we cannot have, given the frenetic pace and general insen-
sitivity of global competitiveness. It is much easier and 
simpler to demonize the other and to see in them the cause 
of all our own troubles. But in doing this we only perpet-
uate and escalate cycles of misunderstanding and violence. 
embracing the world 
I have been arguing that contemporary life makes it 
much more difficult for us to enter into deep, abiding rela-
tionships with (human and non-human) others. The 
result is that we cannot, practically speaking, be in a posi-
tion to hear with sensitivity or sympathy what others have 
to say to us. Their call to us, and their claim upon us, goes 
unnoticed. Given this reality, it is not surprising that many 
of us, despite throngs of people and an unending noisy 
assault through various media, find ourselves alone, unin-
spired, bereft of a meaningful sense of purpose. Though 
we may find ourselves together with others, we are not 
genuinely present to each other or available to each 
other's needs and concerns. 
This development is of tremendous vocational and 
theological significance because at issue is not only the 
flexibility, consumption, cynicism, individuation-all mili-
tate against it. And so what we most need is an intentional 
effort to resist our culture's ways, recognizing that in so 
doing we open ourselves to healthier, and more communal 
and convivial lives. 
A good place to begin is in the development of what 
Albert Borgmann has called "focal practices." A focal prac-
tice is an activity that aims to draw us more deeply into the 
complexity of reality because, as we are drawn in, the world 
in its details and mystery now becomes illuminated for us. 
As an example, consider something as simple as a family 
meal. It begins with the preparation of food. Cooks will 
start by thinking about what the family members like to eat 
and what is good for them. This will require some famil-
iarity with personal taste as well as scientific matters of 
nutrition (if the cook does not know what his or her family 
members like to eat, that will be a clear indicator of family 
disconnect, and a call to get to know them better). Then the 
cook will need to assemble the food for its preparation. 
Here, too, the cook will want to know whether the food he 
or she is buying is good food, fresh and wholesome, rather 
than the pseudo-food produced by flavor-factories. This 
presupposes some understanding of the food system or, if 
one is more diligent, a willingness to grow one's own food 
and thus palpably witness its quality. The meal itself, care-
fully and lovingly prepared, can now be an silencing of creation, but also the silencing 
of the Creator. As Buber put it, "Every 
particular Thou is a glimpse through to the 
eternal Thou ... If you explore the life of 
things and of conditional being you come to 
the unfathomable, if you deny the life of 
things and of conditional being you stand 
before nothingness, if you hallow this life 
you meet the living God." As we insulate or 
close ourselves off from others we 
condemn ourselves to loneliness and want, 
just as we falsify the dialogical character of 
all living. In this context the only possible 
What we most need occasion in which family members eat and 
share together, learn about each other's 
is an intentional 
effort to resist our 
culture,s ways; in so 
doing we open our 
selves to healthier, 
and more communal 
triumphs and struggles, joys and pains. In 
participating in a family meal the world of 
the family, its needs and concerns, but also 
the needs of the world as it impinges upon 
the family, become illuminated. By listening 
attentively we can develop personal plans 
for action that respond sympathetically and 
and convivial lives. compassionately to what we have learned. 
Space and time are intentionally created so 
god that remains is an irrelevant or impotent god, an idol 
that merely reinforces the ubiquity of self-presence in the 
world. 
If we are to overcome our anomie and recover a strong 
sense of calling in our lives we must learn, as Merton did, to 
accept fully our humanity as interdependent created 
beings. This means that we need to overcome the alien-
ation, insularity, fear, suspicion, arrogance, ignorance, and 
inattentiveness that often characterize our relatedness to 
others. We need to develop concrete, sustained practices 
that will bring us into closer and deeper proximity with one 
another, for it is out of this intimacy that we will see how we 
need each other and how we benefit each other. We will also 
come to listen better, gradually to hear the other's call to us, 
and thus find our lives inspired, directed, and corrected. 
Achieving such deep connections is by no means an 
easy matter. The patterns of contemporary life-speed, 
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that the voices of others can be heard and 
addressed. Each person, in turn, gains an important 
perspective on how he or she should order and live his or 
her life. 
To be successful, the family meal cannot be rushed or 
entirely controlled because what is most important is that 
family members become available to each other. Each of us 
alone going to a fast-food establishment on our own time 
would merely perpetuate family ignorance and indiffer-
ence. Making room for a family meal is, we must admit, a 
counter-cultural practice. All of us are too busy, driven by 
chaotic schedules that keep us apart rather than bring us 
together. We must learn to make choices that protect what 
is most important. We need to learn to say no to cultural and 
economic forces that separate or shield us from each other. 
Of course, the meal need not be restricted to family 
members. As history and anthropological research abun-
dantly demonstrate, the meal has long played an important 
role in breaking down barriers between insiders and 
outsiders, the familiar and the foreign. Mealtime is a time of 
hospitality wherein strangers have the potential to become 
companions (from the Latin compan-literally "one who 
shares bread" with another), even friends. We should not be 
surprised, then, that the meal, as in the Eucharist, is also of 
great religious significance for it is in our eating together, in 
the community and mission we create together, that we 
concretely display what we understand our divine calling in 
life to be. 
N
UMEROUS EXAMPLES OF FOCAL PRACTICES, OF PEOPLE 
becoming present to each other and attentive to 
their contexts, can be described and imagined. 
They can even be linked to what we otherwise characterize 
as careers. Teaching can be understood as a focal practice 
when teachers become intentional about attending to and 
connecting with their students in ways that allow for their 
distinct identities and concerns and potential to emerge. 
Doctoring can be the occasion for the patient to have his or 
her idiosyncratic needs sympathetically examined and 
addressed. Farming, unlike agribusiness, can be the work of 
genuine husbandry wherein the farmer attends to the 
specific limits and possibilities of the land and of animals. 
Building can be an activity in which builders respond to the 
unique demands of materials (do we have sufficient and 
sustainable supplies of wood and metal?), design (will this 
particular building endure, be efficient and beautiful?), and 
communal need (is the community best served by this 
project?). Mere jobs are transformed into focal practices 
with the patient effort to understand more clearly and with 
greater sensitivity and care. The overriding goal is to open 
ourselves more fully to the integrity of the world, for 
without its integrity it cannot have a voice that is uniquely 
its own. To do any of this, however, will require time. It will 
also require patience and a willingness to repent and 
forgive each other, since few of us are so faithful as to be 
true to each other all of the time. Listening cannot be forced 
or sped up, because at issue is our willingness to give up 
control and to submit ourselves to the call and the needs of 
others. 
* * * 
I have suggested that a meaningful sense of vocation 
depends on the possibility that we be open to hearing the 
call of another, that we become genuinely present to each 
other. Our examination of a limited number of trends in 
contemporary life indicates that this is not as easy as it 
seems. We are not especially well-positioned to attend to 
each other because the patterns of our practical living rein-
force isolation and the silencing of others. I am also 
suggesting that it is a mistake to think that vocation 
depends on some special, even supernatural, calling from 
the heavens. Though it may well be that God has a "special 
plan" for our life, waiting for such a plan more often than 
not serves the purpose of enabling us to evade the calls of 
others around us right now. 
This is an important point that needs emphasis. 
Waiting for a "special call" from God presumes that our 
relationship with God is fundamentally private-God and 
I have a communication line that is cut off from others and 
cannot be interfered with-a notion that clearly reflects a 
modern, individualistic sensibility. What this view denies is 
that our relation to God, as well as God's relation to us, is 
mediated through the life of creation as a whole. We meet 
God as we participate in the life of God as revealed in 
creation, the human face, and the community of a body of 
believers focused on and inspired by the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. It is a delusion to think that we can be in a 
meaningful relationship with God if our relations with 
others are violent, jealous, destructive, or dishonorable. 
But as we attend to others, even 'one of the least of these 
who are members of my family' (Matt 25 :40), we at the 
same time attend to God. 
What we need to do, as well as what we need to know, 
is, for the most part, available to us if we but make ourselves 
attentive and available to the world. This is the point that 
Merton learned as he struggled to realize the implications 
of his "Vision in Louisville." Understanding and living 
one's divinely appointed vocation is not about getting 
control over our lives and faith so that nothing can get 
between us and God. It is, rather, about "letting go." As Paul 
Elie puts it in The Life You Save May be Your Own, "The 
spirituality of stripping and letting go, the practice of reli-
gious detachment, would be his [Merton's] way out of 
Gethsemani; it would be the key to his life in the 1960s, the 
root of his sympathy with religious people of all kinds." 
And it should be, likewise, the key to our lives. 
The whole of creation is currently in a state of 
languishing and exhaustion. We see this in unprecedented 
species loss, habitat destruction, community disintegra-
tion, and worker anxiety and stress. The question of first 
importance is whether or not we can hear creation's groan-
ings. Do we have the patience and the care to be attentive to 
its needs? Following upon that, we need to ask whether we 
have the resolve and commitment to respond practically in 
ways that will alleviate suffering and celebrate health wher-
ever we find it. This is our task. This is our calling as crea-
tures made in the image of God yet sharing in the fate of 
creation. Though our work may at times seem mundane, it 
is always fraught with divine significance, for in serving the 
well-being of all of creation's members we bring peace to 
the world and delight to God. f 
Nor man Wirzba teaches philosophy at Georgetown College 
in Kentucky. 
American Protestant story-telling in the new-old church 
A
S THE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL OF "THE CHURCH IN THE 
heart of the city" gathered that winter evening, they 
brought their copies of the new book that their 
pastor had given them to read. They had read the chapter 
on the practice of discernment in Practicing Our Faith: A 
Way of Life fora Searching People Oossey-Bass, 1997), and 
they spent the next hour discussing what it might mean for 
the congregation to practice discernment as a "way of 
life." For some of the leaders, the discussion opened up 
possibilities for thinking about Christian living that they 
had not encountered before. 
The church is located in a neighborhood that was 
undergoing gentrification, and at that time the congrega-
tion was also planning to undertake renovation of its sanc-
tuary. Several leaders of the congregation were articulate 
advocates of historical preservation, and many people in the 
congregation were committed to restoring the church to the 
appearance it had when first built 125 years before. At the 
same time, the congregation had tried to be more inten-
tional about liturgical practices. Over the course of the next 
year, the congregation carried out a series of renovations in 
which the competing "values" of liturgical renewal and 
historic preservation of architecture and interior design 
would conflict at several levels all at the same time. 
Then, for the remainder of the meeting, the leaders of 
this mainline Protestant congregation turned their atten-
tion to the meeting's agenda following a process defined by 
Roberts Rules of Order. Some of them did so with the 
sheepish awareness that they were reverting to a proce-
dural process that was largely contrary to whatthey had just 
been discussing. The fact that at least some of these leaders 
felt awkward about what they were doing was a hopeful 
sign; the fact that they were not immediately able to inte-
grate this practice of discernment into their already 
existing habits is a reminder of how difficult it can be to 
reform our way of life as a searching people. 
Almost seven years later, conversations in American 
Protestant congregations and the academy about how to 
understand Christianity as "a way of life for a searching 
people" have evolved and, I would like to believe, matured 
in several ways. Although different in focus, Thomas G. 
Long's book Testimony: Talking Ourselves into Being 
Christian Oossey-Bass, 2004) and The Practicing 
Congregation (Alban Institute, 2004) by Diana Butler Bass 
have convergent perspectives, particularly around the 
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importance of storytelling for Christian identity. 
The publication of Testimony provides further 
evidence that the Project on the Education and Formation 
of People of Faith at Valparaiso University is continuing to 
make steady progress. (Long's book expands on Tom 
Hoyt's essay on this topic found in the first book in the 
series.) Fluid writing and a well-executed strategy of expo-
sition are but two of the notable qualities of this fourth 
volume in the Practices of Faith series. The first part of 
Testimony explores "the hunger for authentic God talk." 
Long identifies with the uncertainty of those Christians 
who are unsure about how to put their faith into words in 
"nonchurchy places," but he also wants to encourage 
contemporary pilgrims to see the connection between what 
happens on Sunday morning and what happens during the 
rest of the week. Accordingly, he wants to go beyond 
narrow notions of "testimony" associated with evangelical 
autobiography to recover the sense of testimony as a form 
of bearing witness. To do so, he invites readers to image 
themselves as taking the witness stand "in a world full of 
stories." While Jesus Christ is the "key witness" in this trial, 
Christians should think of themselves as offering a "corrob-
orating witness" for Jesus Christ. 
C 
HRISTIANS LEARN TO BEAR THIS KIND OF WITNESS IN 
the world in the "language school" of the church, 
where they are taught "words and ways of living 
that shape [their] pilgrimage every day and in every place." 
Worship is a critical feature of this process of formation in 
faith. Long invites readers to think of the relationship 
between Sunday and the rest of the week not so much as a 
matter of sequence as of depth. "Sunday worship is like the 
key scene in a play where suddenly everything in the rest of 
the drama becomes clear and all the characters are seen in a 
true light." 
In Part Two of Testimony, Long wisely takes his readers 
through the daily cycle of talking with and about God. In 
the course of carrying out this strategem, he makes many 
wry observations. Each chapter provides just enough expo-
sition to carry out the task, but not so much that the reader 
is impeded. For example, in one notable sequence Long 
uses graphic illustrations from Richard Lischer's memoir 
Open Secrets and Thomas Merton's journals to show how 
worship can train the vision of Christians so that the way 
they "see" people around them is transformed. 
Over and over again, Long emphasizes that the 
purpose of Christian truth telling is to "increase the love of 
God and neighbor." At several points in reading this book I 
found myself feeling rather uneasy about the limited ways 
in which the practice of testimony was oriented in relation 
to the classic creeds of the Christian tradition, on the one 
hand, and the witness of martyrs, on the other. This may be 
a function of the author's strategy of distinguishing 
between what happens on Sunday morning and what 
happens through the week rather than active avoidance. 
That sense is confirmed by his compelling remarks about 
the relationship of the confession of sin to what he calls "the 
courage of memory." 
The problem, as I understand it, is that many Christian 
congregations have not yet achieved such courage in the 
way they offer their Christian witness in the world. Long 
would readily agree, but he sees such "apparent failures" 
as opportunities for gaining wisdom about how to speak. 
"Learning to talk," then, takes place in the context of 
worship, where Christians learn to see the world in a 
truthful way. The question that must be asked is what do 
we say about a congregation whose witness is not reliable? 
This issue recurs in the epilogue where Long tells about 
how Russian Orthodox Christians endured the infiltration 
of spies in their congregations. 
THIS CONUNDRUM ALSO LIES AT THE HEART OF DIANA Butler Bass's winsome and relentlessly upbeat book The Practicing Congregation: Imagining a New Old 
Church. Although not published in The Practices of Faith 
series, this book extends the insights of Bass, Dykstra, et al., 
in ways that are intended to be encouraging to pastors and 
congregations alike. Instead of re-telling the story of "the 
decline of mainline Protestantism," Butler Bass describes 
the emergence of patterns of renewal that are occurring in 
faithful ways in a fragmented world in which traditions are 
being reengaged in the context of the recovery of Christian 
practices such as discernment and testimony. 
As a trained social historian of American Christianity, 
Diana Butler Bass offers an overview of the history of 
American congregations that is well-focused and 
insightful. Mainline Protestants should find her account of 
the three-fold "disestablishment" of Christianity and/or 
"religion" in American life easy to follow even if some may 
not like the portrait that she paints of the circumstances in 
which they minister. Similarly, her explanation of the 
shift(s) in authority that have been occasioned by the social 
process of "detraditionalization" is lucid. She illustrates 
the shifts by discussing her own religious experience 
across the span of childhood, adolescence, and young 
adulthood. 
Her identificaton of the four types of congregational 
life that have been displayed across a period of four 
centuries of American history is also helpful. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "comprehensive 
congregations," which were usually state-supported, 
"understood their mission as a call to serve all the people in 
a geographical community." By contrast, "devotional 
congregations" that emerged during the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, provided "innovative and 
distinctive worship practices" that attracted members to 
various free-church denominations that emerged in the 
early American republic. 
T
HE "SOCIAL CONGREGATIONS" THAT EMERGED DURING 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century found 
ways to re-incorporate the ideal of comprehensive-
ness, but not for the town as a whole, but rather for those 
families who found their denominational "home" in a 
particular community. After World War II, "participatory 
congregations" began to emerge that were not dependent 
on denominational structures or geography to provide 
members. These more market-oriented congregations 
developed innovative worship and new programs as 
recruitment tools in the context of decentralized 
complexes that basically constituted congregational life as 
a "group of groups." 
It is in this historical context that Butler Bass offers her 
own description of the emergence (after 1990) of a fifth 
type of congregational life-that of the "practicing 
congregation"-which comprises "one distinct style of 
vitality" under the more general phenomenon of changes 
associated with the "intentional congregation." Like 
participatory congregations, intentional churches are 
dynamic, fluid, and flexible in the ways they approach 
structure, leadership, worship, and ministry. Part of what 
makes an "intentional congregation" is the way that it 
engages tradition. Embracing the notion that Christian 
tradition involves "the ongoing argument about true disci-
pleship," she explores the ways that congregational 
conflicts may best be understood as conflicts "between 
rival versions of tradition." 
Drawing on the social theories of Georges Balandier, 
Butler Bass describes three forms of tradition that are 
evident in contemporary American Protestant congrega-
tions. Adherents of "fundamental traditionalism" treat the 
Christian tradition as a set of "fixed 'values and models' 
that must be preserved" in the face of the perceived threat 
posed by modern changes. By contrast "formal traditional-
ists" maintain given forms, but adapt core beliefs to newer 
ideas. This explains why it is that there are many mainline 
Protestant churches today that "appear exactly the same as 
(or very similar to) the congregations of a generation ago. 
However the substance of teaching and ministry is actually 
quite different." 
A third approach, which she prefers to call "fluid retra-
ditioning," engages the prospect of change as "a creative 
challenge" rather than a threat. This view of tradition 
recognizes the paradoxical nature of modernity and tradi-
tion-that modernity creates the possibility for a return to 
tradition and that tradition 're-reads' and re-creates itself. 
In this stance, religion is a reconstructed form of tradition 
within modernity that appeals to a 'core lineage' of 
believing, experiences, and practices based upon the expe-
rience of 'past witnesses' which emphasizes both conti-
nuity and change." Balandier refers to this pattern as 
"pseudo-traditionalism," but Butler Bass has chosen to 
accent this feature of "lived tradition" because she thinks 
that this is more characteristic of American congregations, 
particularly those communities of faith that have moved 
beyond the kind of "formal traditionalism" that empha-
sizes appearances over substance. 
As she encourages mainline Protestant congregations 
to become more intentional about living Christian prac-
tices, Butler Bass calls upon congregations and leaders to 
leave behind the habit of thinking of themselves in terms of 
the oppositional categories of "liberal" and "conserva-
tive." She ultimately shows how the dynamics of change in 
American congregational life associated with post-liberal 
"practicing congregations" and post-evangelical commu-
nities associated with the "emergent church" have 
combined to create the preconditions for "a new conversa-
tional circle-a place not bounded by theological lines, but 
a place of institutional boundary crossing." 
In the final chapter, Diana Butler Bass draws upon the 
work of Urban T. Holmes III to call for "a more imaginative 
approach" to congregational renewal, one in which 
congregations will dare to "invent traditions." She empha-
sizes that imagination is "the stage on which narrative, 
tradition, and practice perform their dance." Butler Bass 
calls upon pastors and congregational leaders to exercise 
"faithful imagination" by engaging in the kind of story-
telling in which a congregation can learn to make sense of 
their life together in new ways by collectively "moving 
around the circle of narrative, tradition and practice." She 
provides several vivid examples of how congregational 
conflict can be better understood if pastors and laypersons 
pay attention to the different kinds and levels of congrega-
tional memory and tradition that can become rival versions 
of how Christian discipleship is to be embodied. 
In many respects, I think it is apt to say that the congre-
gation that sees itself as "the church in the heart of the city" 
fits the profile of the "intentional congregation" described 
by Diana Butler Bass. A core group chose not to move to 
suburbia in the 1970s during the era of white flight because 
they wanted to continue to offer a ministry in the down-
town area. Pastoral leadership in the 1990s encouraged the 
congregation in its creative re-engagement with the prac-
tices of the Christian tradition. Gradually, the congrega-
tion's "traditional worship" began to evolve. "New-old" 
practices such as Maundy Thursday footwashing and 
more frequent celebration of the eucharist began to take 
place. These changes also helped the congregation to 
begin to think more carefully about how it offered hospi-
tality to homeless neighbors. 
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Arguably, where this Midwestern urban congregation 
has struggled the most has been with the practice of discern-
ment, a practice that both Thomas Long and Diana Butler 
Bass recognize as linked in significant ways with the 
congregational practice of testimony. The practice of 
discernment probes to the heart of the congregation's 
praxis, exposing their reliance on the powerful practices 
of "procedural democracy" within, as well as outside, the 
congregation. For this reason, and others that could be 
stated, it would have been helpful if Butler Bass had 
focused more attention on the potentially negative effects 
of cultural practices on how the identity of congregations 
is constituted. 
REINHARD HUETTER HAS ARGUED IN HIS BOOK 
uffering Divine Things: Theology as Church 
ractice, Christian practices can exist alongside 
one another in different ways. The practice of testimony, 
which everyone would agree is necessary for Christian 
discipleship, may not yet be a "constitutive practice" and 
it is also quite possible that the practice of discernment 
might "inhere within the practice without being either 
necessary or constitutive." To ask which practices do and 
do ' not have constitutive significance for a particular 
congregation is to call for the kind of candor that many 
mainline Protestant congregations prefer not to exercise 
because it probes to the very heart of the traditioning 
process. 
Congregations that attempt to reinhabit the practices 
and rites detached from the context of the surrounding 
practices within which the forms and rites once thrived 
might best be described as engaged in projects of "spiri-
tual gentrification." Like the surrounding neighborhood 
in which carriage houses now are occupied by efficiency 
apartments, congregations like "the church in the heart of 
the city" may find new uses for old Christian practices like 
testimony and discernment. That does not necessarily 
mean that they have displayed faithful imaginations in so 
doing. To borrow a line from Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it 
might mean that they are perpetuating an American 
Protestant habit of mind-"Protestantism without 
Reformation." That is, offering a testimony to the world 
that is not grounded in the judgment of God's Word upon 
our life together. 
In the absence of more robust Christian practices of 
giving and receiving counsel (and even mutual admoni-
tion), I am not as optimistic as Diana Butler Bass that the 
"intentional congregation" is likely to "get off the 
ground." What is needed, it seems to me, is more candor 
by American Protestants about the effects of nostalgia 
on our memory and greater caution about how pastors 
and congregations go about the task of discerning faith-
fulness in practice. We will need to be able to distinguish 
the kind of "pseudo-traditioning" that is constituted in 
false witness from the kind of "fluid" traditioning that is 
innovative for the right reasons in the right ways at the 
right times because it is informed by a discerning 
memory. 
In the meantime, while I appreciate the constructive 
purpose of Butler Bass's book, and I applaud her for daring 
to imagine a new story line for mainline Protestant congre-
gations, I think it is premature to suggest that we have 
"gotten our stories straight." As Tom Long might put it, this 
kind of discernment about traditions will require confes-
sion of sin as well as "the courage of memory." Whether 
mainline Protestants will someday develop the courage of 
memory that will be sufficient to confess our sins is a ques-
tion that still awaits a verdict from all those who hear us give 
our testimony about dying and being raised with Christ. f 
Michael G. Cartwright is Dean for Ecumenical & Interfaith 
Programs at the University of Indianapolis. He is currently 
working on Remembering Our Hope, (Brazos Press) in 
which he will explore fifteen traditions ofProtestant spiritu-
ality that have helped to shape the experience of Christians 
in European and American cultures. 
WAITING FOR THE QE II 
I'm waiting for the QE II 
to steam up the river of this backwater port, 
can you think of anything more exciting for us! 
they'd see her coming down river 
and the countryside would go wild, 
screens of nervous birds rising and 
calling across open spaces of marshland, 
jeeps and cycles careering along shore roads 
to bellow the news that our town 
was host to a queen of the seas. 
And then when she had arrived, smooth as a whale 
panting next to our tiny pier, 
deep deep horns breathing way down through her funnels 
and shafts, 
men in white sunhats puffing Cuban cheroots 
would line rails and ladies in pastel frocks 
would wave lace hankies, our village 
children would dive off surrounding sailboats 
(could they for once be naked and brown?) 
yes, our children would dive for tossed coins 
sparkling like firecrackers as they fell 
to meet sparkling blue surf. 
I know it's impossible, I know 
our river is never anything but brown 
that it's been silting up for the last two hundred years 
but its long life deserves some kind of respect, 
and as I come to die in this bed 
which faces down river toward open sea 
I'll still gasp as the huge white sides of her 
like museums, stadiums, capitols gleaming in 
afternoon sun, move past this window to cast 
longer and longer shadows on my wall 
until the moon out of embarrassment 
will hide his head in clouds, then boldly show 
tears on his face with the pride of it all. 
Ray Greenblatt 
Good Bye Lenin! 
l
AM ONE OF THOSE WOMEN WHO HATE TO SHOP. IN 
department stores I feel oppressed, as though the moun-
tains of merchandise towering over me might sap my 
soul. Even as an adolescent, I joined girlfriends on their 
periodic bike-rides to "The Mall" (always spoken in rever-
ential tones) only because I enjoyed the wind whipping 
through my hair as we dodged cars and acorns on streets 
lined with beautiful eucalyptus and California oaks. I got 
through the window shopping part by thinking of the five-
mile return on our trusty three-speed steeds. 
Thus, whenever I saw documentaries displaying the 
nearly empty shelves of stores under communist regimes, I 
did not feel as horrified as my peers. Instead, I secretly 
thought-if even naively-how much easier it would make 
life if only a few choices were available to consumers; 
maybe then my girlfriends would join me on their bicycles 
purely for the joy of the ride. It never occurred to me that, 
under a communist regime, we might have to wait years 
even to purchase one bicycle. 
What disturbed me about Communism, at the time, 
were not the empty shelves. I was disturbed by the loss of 
another kind of freedom: East Germans could not ride their 
bikes into Western Germany at will. Especially horrific was 
an image that dominated the political landscape of my child-
hood: the Berlin Wall. Seared into my memory is a clip from 
a black and white documentary shown in a grammar school 
classroom: in the film, as twenty-somethings sneaked over 
the Wall, barbed wire caught the sweater of one woman, 
exposing her naked breasts to the camera. Though prepu-
bescent boys in my class hooted, I ached for the woman, 
thinking how desperate her situation must have been if she 
could still smile in delight, her exposure nothing in compar-
ison to the confinement that she was escaping. 
My conflicted responses to Communism reached an 
apex late in 1989. Shopping for a wedding gift in a trendy 
department store, my throat tightening from commodity 
claustrophobia, I noticed a table of cute boxes set up next to 
the china displays. A sign above it read something like, "Buy 
part of the Berlin Wall! Only $10, each box contains verifi-
cation of its authentic contents." That led to the one and 
only impulse buy of my life-perhaps because the fall of the 
Wall represented to me throat-opening release. I wanted to 
purchase part of that freedom. 
These memories came flooding back to me as I watched 
Good Bye Lenin! on DVD. Released in 2002, the German 
2612 7 The Cresset Easterj2005 
Crystal Downing 
film (with English subtitles) focuses its fictional tale on 
circumstances surrounding the fall of the Wall. Including 
archival footage of 1989 and 1990 events, the delightful film 
is narrated from East Berlin by a boy close in age to the 
earlier documentary's breast-baring escapee. Filled with 
charmingly humorous and tender moments, Good Bye 
Lenin! delivers its own conflicted response to Communism. 
Alex Kerner, the narrator, is the son of Christiane, a 
true believer in the communist regime. When her husband, 
a doctor, flees to the West, Christiane becomes "married to 
the Socialist Fatherland," throwing herself into support 
and guidance of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
She not only leads nationalist youth programs but also 
writes letters with constructive criticism about the ugly and 
ill-fitting clothes produced by nationalized factories. The 
intensity of her commitment is symbolized in an early 
scene: ironing as she dictates a letter about clothing flaws, 
Christiane punctuates her sentences by spitting on the hot 
iron, which sends out a sizzle almost as searing as her prose. 
Things change on 7 October 1989, when, onherwayto 
receive a government award for her many contributions, 
Christiane witnesses two loves in conflict: her son Alex, 
having joined a peaceful march demanding freedom of the 
press, is beaten by state police. After screaming, "Stop it!" 
Christiane falls to the ground, a heart attack sending her 
into acoma. 
A
LEX, PERHAPS THE MOST ATTENTIVE SON IN THE 
history of cinema, spends hours by Christiane's side, 
talking to her as she lies comatose in the hospital bed. 
When he cannot be there, he has recorded tapes of his voice 
playing so she can still hear his voice. His dedication 
throughout the film would drip with sentimentality if not 
for comic moments, as when, leaning over the hospital bed 
to get a better look at nurses' legs, Alex accidentally 
dismantles the drip tube in Christiane's vein, one drip 
subverting the other. 
After eight months, Christiane finally wakes from her 
coma. However, the doctor warns Alex and his sister 
Ariane, "Your mother's life still is in danger .... She 
wouldn't survive a second heart attack. You must protect 
her from any kind of excitement." A closeup of the doctor's 
desk signals the difficulty of following this advice: on a 
piece of granite sits a piece of the Berlin Wall, with an 
engraved plaque: "18.8.1961 + 9.11.1989." During her 
coma, the socialist government to which Christiane dedi-
cated her life had crumbled: "everything she believed in 
vanished in just a few months." And her children worry that 
this discovery will kill her-quite literally. 
M
UCH OF THE FILM'S ENTERTAINMENT STEMS FROM 
the clever ways that Alex attempts to conceal 
from his mother the fall of the Wall. Though he 
and Ariane had discarded their state-produced shoddy 
furniture and clothing as soon as new products entered 
from the West, Alex gathers enough items from storage and 
garbage heaps to restore to its pre-fall state the room at 
home where Christiane must remain bedridden. No longer 
able to purchase his mother's favorite foodstuffs produced 
by the socialist state, Alex scavenges for old jars and bottles, 
pouring superior products from the West into the 
austerely-labeled containers. To solve the problem of tele-
vision, Alex arranges for his friend, Denis, an aspiring 
(though comically untalented) film director, to make 
socialist-oriented videos that appear, through a hidden 
VCR, right when Christiane wants to watch the news. 
Though Good Bye Lenin! exposes the austerity and 
confinement of socialist totalitarianism, it also indicts 
Western capitalism. After the border is opened to the 
West, red banners honoring Lenin are merely replaced 
with red banners advertising Coca-Cola. At one point, the 
camera focuses on a ritualized changing of the guard in 
front of a neoclassical building, our vision interrupted 
when a red car, a red truck, and then a red semi go by, all 
advertising Coke. 
The changing of the guard from socialism to capitalism 
is also symbolized when Alex passes through a border 
checkpoint, the guards too busy flirting with garishly 
dressed women to check his passport. In his newfound 
freedom, Alex heads toward a Western porn shop, where 
he joins a group of conservatively clad mom-and-pop 
patrons curiously watching a woman lick whipped cream 
off her own grotesquely huge breasts. In fact, much that we 
see of Western culture is grotesque: Alex and his girlfriend 
Lara attend a nightclub with performers dressed like 
mutants; when he visits a market that once held little on its 
empty shelves, Alex sees someone dressed in a huge chicken 
costume saunter by aisles now overflowing with canned 
goods. Even the new furniture being moved into worker 
housing is grotesque: we see a lamp shade made of shocking 
pink fur standing next to tacky zebra upholstery. 
So when Christiane finally gets out of bed, motivated 
by the first steps of Ariane's infant daughter, Paula, we feel 
some of Alex's concern. Paula stands up and toddles to the 
window, enchanted by something in the sky: a blimp with 
"WEST" written in huge characters on its side. Taking baby 
steps like her granddaughter-not having walked for 
nearly a year-the hesitant Christiane heads toward the 
window, saying "Paula, you see?" Though Christiane refers 
to her own walking, we know that what Paula actually sees 
out the window could traumatize the idealistic socialist. 
Fortunately, by the time Christiane joins the toddler, the 
blimp has gone behind a building, hidden from her view-
as have been most signs of the "West." 
Leaving Paula in a room where the exhausted Alex 
snoozes in a chair, Christiane heads outside, only to 
encounter many strange sights: a swastika scrawled on the 
rickety elevator wall, a huge billboard advertising lingerie, 
a balloon-festooned corner lot displaying BMWs for sale. 
Significantly, when Christiane reaches out for something to 
hold her up, she grabs onto discarded state-made furniture 
piled along the road, items that were produced under the 
ideology that supports her psyche. 
Next comes the most evocative image of the entire 
film, from which the movie takes its title. As Christiane 
totters in disorientation, she turns to see a shadow cross a 
white high rise: it is a helicopter dangling a leg-less human 
figure from a rope. When the helicopter comes into sight, 
we see that the figure is a black metal statue of Lenin, right 
arm outstretched, left arm clutching a book. The figure 
floats down the street, directly above a red car, until it fills 
the mise-en-scene, the arm gesturing toward us, as though 
in welcome. The shot cuts to the back of Christiane's head, 
Lenin's arm reaching out toward it, as though to bless her. 
Then, like the blimp that disappeared from Christiane's 
sight around a rectangular high rise, the helicopter does 
the same. This time, of course, it is Marxist-Leninism that 
is disappearing. 
A
T THAT MOMENT, ARIANE EMERGES FROM THE SUBWAY 
carrying shopping bags in each hand. When she sees 
the disoriented Christiane, Ariane quite symboli-
cally drops the bags of Western merchandise and runs to 
her mother's aid. Due to this incident, Alex has Denis 
make another fake news video, hoping that it might allay 
Christiane's fears about the disappearance of Lenin from 
their socialist state. Showing actual news clips of 
Easterners escaping from East to West, Denis, pretending 
to be a news broadcaster, reverses the trajectory, 
announcing that Westerners, sick of capitalism, have been 
sneaking into East Berlin, bringing their decadent prod-
ucts with them; but, rather than force them out, the noble 
socialist state is giving Westerners asylum. As we watch the 
video being made we discover that Denis, though dressed 
in a suit coat as he sits behind his "news desk," wears no 
pants, reminding us of Lenin with no legs. 
Christiane, however, who sees Denis, like Lenin, only 
from the waist up, is convinced by the news program. After 
all, it reinforces what she wants to believe: the moral supe-
riority of socialism over capitalism. She even suggests that 
her family take some of the refugees from the West into 
their home, sharing resources so they can practice what 
socialism preaches. Alex states in his next voice-over, "My 
scheme had taken on a life of its own. The GDRI created for 
her increasingly became the one I might have wished for." 
The film, then, is not meant to be an expose of either 
socialism or capitalism; it is about the power, both for good 
and ill, of idealism. 
The film symbolizes Christiane's socialist idealism in 
several provocative ways. Numerous scenes are filmed 
with green-tinted low key lighting, muting all colors into 
greenish shades of gray. However, in every one of these 
shots one red item stands out, as though to represent 
Christiane's idealistic hope for Marxism in the midst of 
East Berlin's bleak environs. When she faints during the 
greenish-grey protest march, she is wearing a bright red 
dress; as she lies comatose in her greenish-gray hospital 
room, a red plastic container sits on a table by her head; 
when Alex heads to the hospital to visit her, he walks up to 
a greenish-gray station to board a bright red train; while he 
zooms around the greenish-gray streets setting up illusions 
to protect her, he wears a red motorcycle helmet. The list 
goes on, creating the same effect as in Schindler's List 
(1993), where a little girl in a red coat periodically punctu-
ates the black and white film. In GoodBye Lenin!, however, 
the effect is far more subtle. 
More obvious as a symbol of idealism is a rocket motif 
that frames the narrative. The film opens with a television 
image of archival footage showing the first German to be 
sent into space: SigmundJahn, on 26 August 1978. As the 
young Alex and Ariane watch the monumental flight, 
enchanted by the rocket's ability to transcend the greenish-
grays of quotidian existence, their mother screams at state 
operatives who question where her husband has gone. 
Institutionalized for depression after this, Christiane 
returns in several weeks to be greeted by Alex dressed as a 
rocket, as though in hope that she can transcend her 
despair-which she does by idealistically throwing herself 
into the socialist cause. 
W
E NEXT SEE THE TEN-YEAR-OLD ALEX OUTSIDE, 
shooting off another rocket of his devising: a 
three-foot high science project. The camera 
follows its vapor trail into the air, then tilts back down to 
earth, where we now see a twenty-one-year-old Alex 
sipping beer on a park bench. It is not long after this that 
Christiane collapses into her coma, and Alex states in a 
voice-over, "In her long, deep sleep she orbited like a satel-
lite around our small planet and our even smaller republic." 
During Christiane's "orbit" away from psychological 
trauma, Alex gets a job installing satellite TV dishes: a 
product that establishes contact with satellites, reminding 
us of his desire to establish connection with his comatose 
mother. 
When Christiane finally comes home from the hospital 
and asks to watch TV, Denis quips in English, "Houston, we 
have a problem." Their efforts to maintain Christiane's 
idealistic belief in the Socialist Fatherland are thus paralleled 
to sending a rocket into space. The head of a school where 
Christiane once taught importantly notes that "some 
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comrades in the collective thought she was too idealistic," 
creating problems in the greenish-gray, down-to-earth 
"daily running" of the institution. 
G
OOD BYE LENIN! THUS SHOWS HOW IDEALISM CAN BE 
conceptualized in two ways: not only as na'ive 
escapism from down-to-earth realities, but also as 
the ability to maintain a visionary hope that transcends the 
coarse manipulations of both marketplace and state. Alex 
maintains the latter hope for his mother, making extreme 
sacrifices of time and energy while encountering criticism 
and outrage from others around him. But he never gives up. 
Even his sister Ariane despairs after seeing their father 
order food at the Burger King where she works. In her 
angry return to their apartment, a bottle of Coke slips from 
her hands, smashing on the floor. When her boyfriend 
plops a tea towel on the mess, insufficient to stop the 
spreading liquid, we get a visual metaphor for the spread of 
capitalism in East Berlin, bringing with it disturbing 
changes-like the return of their fleeing father-to its once 
controlled world. After Alex hears Ariane's news, we see 
him standing in the greenish-gray light of his bedroom. 
Behind him, a red rocket he built as a child lies sideways on 
a shelf. Filmed with a low-angle lens, it looks as though the 
rocket has pierced through his head. 
Worse is that which pierces his heart. On an outing to 
the countryside (using a car they waited three years to 
purchase), Christiane tells her children that she lied about 
their father, who went to the West for a medical conference: 
Your father didn't stay in the West because of a woman. 
Thatwasalie. Whenisaidheneverwrote, thatwasalie 
too. He wrote letters to me, and to you, too. They're 
behind the kitchen cabinet .... I was supposed to follow 
with you. I just couldn't do it .... They could've taken 
you away from me ... .I didn't go. 
Her love for socialist ideology surmounted her love for a 
person-for several people, in fact, since her children were 
forced to assume that their father rejected them. With this 
revelation, we are given the film's indictment of idealism, 
of what happens when the love of ideas supplants the love 
of humans. Significantly, after Christiane admits her lies 
she suffers another heart attack, much like her first one 
when her love for Alex conflicted with her love for the 
socialist state. 
After admitting his mother once again to a hospital, 
Alex heads toward a red taxi sign shining in the midst of a 
greenish-gray street. He is stunned to see his "childhood 
idol": Sigmund Jahn, the first German in space. But now, 
rather than "telling kids about the secrets of the universe, 
the freedom of weightlessness and the infinite reaches of 
space, he was just driving a tiny, smelly Lada taxi." The film 
leaves ambiguous whether the taxi driver is, indeed, Jahn or 
just someone who looks like him, but as Alex engages the 
driver's services, he narrates, "And so we flew through the 
night as if gliding through outer space, light years from our 
solar system. We passed strange galaxies harboring 
unknown life forms and landed in Wannsee," the Western 
town where his father lives. There, Alex tells the surprised 
parent that Christiane's dying wish is to see her former 
husband one last time. By now we realize that Alex's 
idealism is different than Christiane's, for it is motivated 
not by ideology, but by love of his mother. 
A
S A FINAL EXPRESSION OF THIS LOVE, ALEX ARRANGES 
one last illusion for the dying woman. He has Denis 
produce a video that shows Sigmundjahn becoming 
Secretary General of the Party and Chairman of the State 
Council of the GDR. The taxi driver, who plays Jahn, sits in 
front of a desk, with a bust of Lenin behind him, and says to 
the camera: 
Up there in the vast emptiness of space, life on earth 
seems small and insignificant. You ask yourself what 
humanity has achieved .... In the last year, thousands 
have come here. People we used to consider enemies 
now want to live in our midst. We know our country 
isn't perfect, but the ideals we believe in continue to 
inspire people all over the world .... Socialism isn't 
about walling yourself in. It's about reaching out to 
others and living with them. It means not only 
dreaming about a better world, but making it 
happen. Therefore I have decided to open our 
country's borders. 
At this point Denis cuts in footage of people destroying the 
Berlin Wall while "Jahn" continues: 
The rat race isn't for everyone. These people want a 
different life. They've realized there's more to life than 
cars, VCRs, and television sets. They are willing to 
bring good will, hard work, and hope to building new 
lives for themselves. 
This, of course, is the best of political idealism, tran-
scending the ideologies of both capitalism and of socialism. 
Significantly, the filmmakers put these words in the mouth 
of someone who, in a rocket, rose above what holds us to 
earth: the gravity of material objects. 
Pretending to watchjahn's "televised" statement from 
her hospital bed, Christiane stares, instead, at her son who 
sits diagonally in front of her. Unbeknownst to him, Lara has 
told Christiane the truth, that "the border doesn't exist 
anymore; it's just one country now." We see on Christiane's 
face admiration for a son who would take such extreme 
measures to keep her happy. So when she says "Wow!" after 
the "broadcast," we, unlike Alex, realize that her exclama-
tion is not about the power of socialism; it is about the power 
of love. The ultimate idealism, in this film, is implemented 
not in political agendas, but through the sacrifice of people 
who put the happiness of the (m)other above their own. 
After Alex catapults his mother's ashes into the sky with 
a rocket similar to his childhood invention, we are given the 
last image ofthe film: a grainy photograph of the young Alex 
staring in admiration at Christiane, who stares out at us. 
Like the statue of Lenin floating above the streets of East 
Berlin, she was flawed. But, also like the statue, she extends 
to us a welcoming gesture, inviting us to consider that 
there's more to life than cars, VCRs, and television sets. t 
Crystal Downing teaches at Messiah College. Her 
book, Writing Performances: The Stages of Dorothy L. 




HERE IS A SCENE IN SPIDER-MAN 2 IN WHICH EVER 
earnest Peter Parker defends himself against his 
beloved's assessment of his erratic behavior. "It's not 
that black and white," he says. "That's because you compli-
cate everything," M.J. shoots back. Being Spider-Man can 
really hang you up. 
So can answering a question like, "What are your 
favorite albums?" I'll stand before my inquirer's patient 
gaze, nearly formulating an answer, when another factor 
will occur to me and I have to recalculate. So many cate-
gories present themselves that in compiling a list I would 
have to consider at least: (1) Favorite albums I no longer 
own; (2) Favorite albums I no longer listen to; (3) Favorite 
albums I can no longer listen to; (4) Favorite albums I 
cannot listen to for reasons other than neglect or aversion; 
(5) Favorite albums I actually play; and (6) Favorite albums 
that are not one album. And these at the exclusion of 
Favorite albums received as gifts, Favorite albums 
purchased myself, and even, Favorite albums shared with 
my cat, Squeak. 
In most cases, selections from Two and Five would 
suffice. London Calling and Born to Run belong here, as 
do Purple Rain and Kind of Blue. In fact, most of our 
favorite albums fall into these two categories. The 
former are those discs we've outgrown but still revere, or 
keep promising ourselves we'll get to one of these days; 
the latter we do get to, though that could be as much from 
habit as inspiration. I actually play Jackson Browne's 
Late for the Sky (on cassette in the car), the Allman 
Brothers' Eat a Peach (because I have it on CD), Curtis 
Mayfield's Superfly (because I don't) and Grand Funk's 
Survival (because I'm hopeless). 
Category Five always includes recent releases that we 
are currently crazy about, and that's often what people 
are after. I could take such occasions to rave about J acqui 
Naylor, the best singer in jazz, who not only reaffixed "I 
Got the Sun in the Morning" at the center of the universe 
(on Live at the Plush Room), but makes the Rolling Stones' 
"Miss You" ache with new longing and regret on Shelter. 
Eschewing the usual ultra-sultry extremes of the genre, 
Naylor doesn't breathe, she sings. I'll be shoving her new 
album, Live East/West, under people's noses for months 
to come. 
Of the remainder, category Six-Favorite albums that 
are not one album-is the easiest to explain.lt refers not to 
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multi-disc sets, but rather to cases of one's favorite album 
being really a series of albums that make for a singular expe-
rience, e.g., the young Rod Stewart (not disco Rod or that 
current gentleman of Great American Songbook fame). The 
combined effect of The Rod Stewart Album, Gasoline Alley, 
Every Picture Tells a Story, and Never a Dull Moment is so 
great that selecting only one of these as a "favorite" is as 
painful and debilitating as sawing off a leg. Each stands . 
alone, but rich worlds of folkie reverie, soul serenading, 
good-natured storytelling, and serious rock 'n' roll (thank 
you, Micky Waller) are available only through experi-
encing Rod's first four solo albums as one. 
A classic category Four album is These Are My Roots: 
Clifford Jordan Plays Leadbelly. This has got to be one of 
the most bracing and imaginative albums in jazz. But it's 
heavy; I have yet to listen to it all at once. Several tracks 
feature Sandra Douglass who, to quote Nat Hentoff's 
liner notes, "projects a singularly evocative fusion of 
poignancy and defiance, of pain and impregnable determi-
nation." Just to hear her sing "Take This Hammer" is 
enough for one sitting. 
Categories One and Three are the stuff of heartache. 
Not a week goes by that I'm not reminded of an album that 
got away; this parting could be due to theft, forgetfulness, 
regrettable trade-ins or other forms of attrition, but the 
hole left in my collection cries out, not to be denied. And 
those poor Jayhawks, two of their seven albums are 
untouchables. Tomorrow the Green Grass and Smile, while 
undeniably terrific records, are so integrally interwoven 
with two beautiful and tragic periods of my life that they 
cannot be approached. 
*** 
THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORIES (OR IS IT THE PROBLEM OF complicating everything) comes up often in talk of the Bible and church history. Ways of interpreting 
the Scriptures, how to accommodate the status quo, forms 
of church polity, all contribute to the myriad configura-
tions of called-out ones. At a recent gathering we were 
invited to consider John 17: 20-26 "in light of the world's 
many denominations": 
I pray not only for them, but also for those who will 
believe in me through their word ... so that they may be 
one, as we are one ... that they may be brought to perfec-
tion as one .... Father, they are your gift to me .... 
Upon hearing this section I waved away the assigned 
context; never had the idea of "Christian disunity" seemed 
more irrelevant to the understanding of a scriptural 
passage. The word "gift" hung in the air, sparkling and 
clean; all else fell away. 
I had recently taught six months of crash-course confir-
mation at a church in San Francisco. Using Luther 's ''A Brief 
Instruction on What to Look For and Expect in the 
Gospels," our accepting of Christ as a gift (and only then as 
an example) had been hammered home. But understanding 
ourselves as gifts, for which Christ gave thanks, that had 
been missed. 
I sat crestfallen. I wanted to run to the home of each of 
my students and embrace them with this word: "Father," 
Christ prayed, "they are your gift to me!" You are a gift! 
Before commending himself to eternity Christ gave thanks 
for you! For believers to come! Even awkward, wavering 
high school believers! 
Seems I discounted too hastily my category of favorite 
albums received as gifts. Every album comes with a story, 
and often how it finds its way into our life is more inter-
esting than the music within it. Albums that come to us as 
gifts are not merely acquired, but appropriated. This is how 
Luther sees salvation in Christ: as a gift from God that 
becomes entirely our own. "This means that when you see 
or hear of Christ doing or suffering something, you do not 
doubt that Christ himself, with his deeds and suffering, 
belongs to you. On this you may depend as surely as if you 
had done it yourself; indeed as if you were Christ himself." 
It's spiritual air guitar. 
And there are more gifts to follow. 
When our confirmation experience ended with the 
Easter vigil, we were studying Luther's preface to Romans. 
There he writes that God's gifts must be received by us 
daily, "although even then they will be incomplete." This 
doesn't mean that God's grace comes to us in bits and 
pieces, I told the kids, it means we remain in bits and pieces, 
subject to old desires and sins, even as grace "takes us up 
completely ... in order that the gifts may take root in us." I 
wish I'd stressed that we, as graciously received gifts to 
Christ, must give ourselves daily. 
I
n a short piece about the Christian life, Timothy Lull 
wrote, "The Christian finds great joy in concrete 
things-including those activities which add joy to life 
and build real fellowship among people. Among these, 
music has a special place." Of course, he was thinking of 
Bach. But insofar as popular music can build real fellow-
ship, there is a special place for our favorite albums and the 
categories that make selecting them so impossible. Next 
time somebody asks me for mine, I'm ready. 
* * * 
I
N THE ADVENT/CHRISTMAS ISSUE OF 2003 I MENTIONED 
several jazz albums that include treatments of Negro 
spirituals and gospel hymns ("sorrow songs"). Since 
that time others have occurred to me: Wynton Marsalis' In 
This House, On This Morning; David Murray's Speaking in 
Tongues (with Fontella Bass on vocals); and the lovely 
Spirituals and Dedications by a collective featuring Jane 
Bunnett, Stanley Cowell, and Dewey Redman. There are 
many more .... 
And after the Easter 2004 issue had gone to press ("a 
believer sings the truth"), Johnny Cash's people released 
My Mother's Hymn Book, a CD of sacred material culled 
from the last recordings Cash made before his death. It is 
fitting that one of the few Christian heroes in the music 
business would release, even posthumously, a gospel album 
as his final offering. t 
J.D. Buhl has upgraded his day job, but is still looking for 
full-time teaching work. He remains adjunct faculty at 
Holy Names University, St. Mary's College, and the 
University of San Francisco. 
naming what we eat 
]on jensen 
''Man gave names to all the animals 
In the beginning, long time ago." 
Bob Dylan 
W
HAT'S HIS NAME? IT'S USUALLY THE FIRST QUESTION 
that people ask when seeing our eight-week-old 
baby for the first time. Even before Sylvia was 
born everyone wanted to know what we would name her 
and abundant advice came from all corners, even complete 
strangers we passed on the street. At the hospital, after she 
was born, a couple of the nurses were a little disturbed 
when we didn't settle on a name within the first twelve 
hours. She simply couldn't leave the hospital as "Baby Girl 
Sandhorst," the "name" on her ID bracelet. 
The birth of our child has already taught me many 
things, among them that our culture has a thing about 
names. Having a name, I've come to realize, is a ticket to 
legitimacy in our society; it's a sign of membership in the 
club and a necessary condition for respect. To be nameless 
is to be nonexistent, or at least not significant enough to be 
worthy of attention or consideration. This phenomenon of 
namelessness signaling lack of respect is evident in the 
treatment of those humans who are seen as "inferior" by 
the privileged segment of society. A black male was (and too 
often still is) a "boy" to many whites no matter what his age, 
level of education, or occupation. To acknowledge his 
name would mean that he was an equal, or at least deserving 
of minimum respect. 
The connection between naming and respect is equally 
obvious, I think, in our treatment of other animals. We 
name our pets, of course, and for many people they take on 
the roles of children. Since many people treat pets like 
members of the family, it simply wouldn't do to have them 
nameless; namelessness would deny them their agency and 
identity. When my wife, Rachel, worked with PAW, a local 
organization focused on finding homes for stray and 
unwanted cats, it was amazing how differently people 
reacted when the homeless felines had a name. A "cute little 
calico" didn'thave a chance, but call her "Puffball," and the 
orphan nearly always found a good home. 
In our house, pets not only have names but multiple 
nicknames that match their personalities. Both the dogs 
(dopey old Buster and sassy little Reba) and the cats 
(naughty Oscar and sweet Ellie) are members of our family, 
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loved like siblings, doted over like grandchildren. Though 
they 've now gone to "be with Jesus," even a lizard (Inca) 
and goldfish (Walter) had names. 
Naming pets is normal, even ubiquitous-do you 
know anyone who has a pet without a name?-but 
certainly not all (or even most) animals in our society get 
names. Nor do they get even the smallest amount of 
respect, as is always true with the nameless. 
Probably no one has done more to raise awareness 
about the treatment of animals in our society than Peter 
Singer. The controversial Princeton philosophy professor 
is author of Animal Liberation, the book that converted 
millions of individuals to a vegetarian diet and was instru-
mental in launching the animal rights movement. Singer's 
book is a combination of philosophical arguments about 
sentience, suffering, and equality, paired with matter-of-
fact descriptions about the way that we use animals in our 
society for medical and product testing, but especially for 
food. In his characteristically blunt manner, Singer makes 
the point that eating is where nearly all of us most 
frequently encounter other animals, though we rarely stop 
to think about these nameless others. 
For most human beings, especially those in modern 
urban and suburban communities, the most direct form of 
contact with non-human animals is at mealtime-we eat 
them. This simple fact is the key to our attitudes to other 
animals, and also the key to what each one of us can do to 
change these attitudes .... In general, we are ignorant of the 
abuse of living creatures that lies behind the food we eat .... 
We buy our meat and poultry in neat plastic packages. It 
hardly bleeds. There is no reason to associate this package 
with a living, breathing, walking, suffering animal. 
The numbers alone are mind-numbing. Literally 
billions of animals are raised in factory farms, slaughtered, 
and eaten every year. Most of them never see the light of 
day unless it's peeking out of a truck on the way from the 
"farm" to the slaughterhouse. Crowded conditions, suffo-
cating air, unnatural diets, brutal treatment, the list of 
atrocities against animals goes on and on. 
Each Fall I assign Singer's book to the students in my 
environmental philosophy classes and it is no exaggeration 
to say that it rocks their world. They are horrified, 
disgusted, outraged, and very defensive. For Singer, the 
course of action is clear: we should become vegetarians, 
and remove our direct and indirect support for this unnec-
essary and unethical torture of other sentient beings. Not 
just the treatment of the animals, but the environmental 
and social costs of industrial farming make a very 
compelling case for hitting the salad bar the next time you 
visit a steakhouse. 
My point is not to make a case for vegetarianism, 
though I think the case is a strong one, and I was a vege-
tarian for many years. Rather, my point is that this system is 
only possible because we shut ourselves off from the lives of 
the animals that become the food on our plates. We never 
see these animals, the real flesh and blood creatures with 
hearts that beat and lungs to breathe. As anyone who has 
spent time around other animals knows, these are living, 
conscious beings like you and me, perhaps not created in 
the image of God, but with personalities and emotions, 
with individual existences that are masked by the industrial 
logic of modern economics. 
What makes it possible for our food system to work in 
this way is our tacit compliance with this separation from 
the source of our food. We continue to buy and eat meat 
even when we have no clue where it came from, how the 
animal was raised, what it ate, how it lived. We choose to 
"look away" rather than face the uncomfortable reality of 
what it took to put the meat on our plates. Singer offers us 
the option of vegetarianism, but even there we do not face 
the basic issue of the separation between eater and farm, 
between consumer and producer, and thus we perpetuate 
many of the same problems. I wonder about a different 
approach. What would happen if, instead, we insisted that 
these animals that we eat have names, with all that comes 
with having a name? 
* * * 
"You aren't going to name him, are you?" As with our baby, 
this was the inevitable first question when people learned 
that we had decided to raise a steer. People were horrified 
that we would name an animal that we intended to eat. 
Some of that same horror still exists when friends learn that 
we have our freezer full of "Leo meat." 
Though I'd like to claim otherwise, our decision to 
raise a steer last summer was not an experiment carefully 
designed to test the significance of naming animals. 
Initially I was just looking for a non-motorized lawn mower 
for our five-acre homestead (though I confess that thoughts 
of juicy hamburgers and luscious roasts also crossed my 
mind when I approached some dairy farming friends about 
selling us a young steer). 
We made the necessary arrangements for the arrival of 
this bovine addition to our hobby farm : mending old fence, 
cleaning out the barn, purchasing a water tank, setting up a 
system of temporary electric fence. Perhaps more signifi-
cant was the adjustment in attitude. That long grass that 
was once a problem was now a resource, good forage, and 
this was not the same as getting another cat. 
When the appointed day arrived, we went to the farm 
to look at options and settled on a dark-faced Jersey with 
intense brown eyes and a yellow ear tag with a prominent 
#43 as his badge of identification. An hour or so later, 
Daniel's truck rumbled up the driveway and we unloaded 
this bewildered young steer into our barn. Not fifteen 
minutes had passed when Rachel yelled from the house: "Is 
the cow supposed to be out in the yard?" I thought, "we 
talked about this, Rachel, it's a steer, not a cow," but I said, 
"No! He's not supposed to be out in the yard," as I ran 
around the corner of the barn after him. 
Within a few days we had the fencing under control. 
(Well, I guess he did get into the garden a couple more 
times; I never realized how much cattle like Brussels 
sprouts.) But it was also obvious that this creature had to 
have a name. It's one thing to talk about "the steer" or 
"number 43" when the animal is in a feedlot pen with 
thousands of others. The reality is very different when 
this creature is happily munching the grass outside my 
kitchen window. 
The next eight months were both an adventure and an 
education as we did "rotational grazing" with Leo, the 
steer, all around our yard. Part of that education was agro-
nomic-though mostly I learned that a ruminant on grass 
doesn't need much else-but I also learned some valuable 
lessons about ethics, lessons that were very different than 
what I picked up reading Kant in graduate seminars. I'm 
still doing my own ruminating on the exact content of these 
ethical lessons, but this much is clear: the treatment of 
others of all sorts, whether the sweatshop workers who 
make all our clothing, the migrant workers who pick our 
strawberries, or the animals that eventually fill our sand-
wiches, depends upon a distance, both literal and 
emotional, that is impossible when someone has a name. 
Once that distance is broken, the comfortable rationaliza-
tions that prop up our lifestyles quickly crumble. 
The phrase "keeping our distance" has many mean-
ings, but at least one of them allows us not only to condone, 
but to actively support practices that we simply would not 
tolerate under different circumstances. For me, the key to 
this realization came from Leo the steer, and it came from 
one simple act: naming what we eat. t 
Jon Jensen teaches philosophy and environmental studies at 
Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. 
being the body of Christ 
S
UDDENLY OUR EARS ARE FILLED WITH THE RINGING OF 
bells; our noses are filled with the pungent sweetness 
of lilies; our eyes and the whole church are filled with 
bright light. Soon we will taste the wine and swallow the 
bread. "Halleluiah! Christ is Risen!" bursts out of our 
mouths. "Risen indeed!" reverberates through the whole 
body. The great vigil of Easter fills our senses and our 
hearts. We know the resurrection of our Lord with our 
whole being. 
But before long we also remember the witness of those 
who were there on the first Easter morning. We recall their 
longing and their fear. We know the potent mixture of joy 
and confusion that made the news of resurrection into 
nonsense. We understand why Jesus' friends would have 
locked themselves in a room and why they would have 
wanted to touch him when he appeared among them. We 
experience our hearts burning within us when we read the 
scripture. We rejoice in the breaking of the bread. And then 
Jesus seems to disappear again. To be with this resurrected 
one, to follow this Lord who dies and who lives, is difficult. 
It is difficult for each baptized follower who longs to be 
loyal to show constancy in love, to make a good confession. 
It is difficult for the whole church which is Christ's body. 
The single-minded confession and intensity of Easter scat-
ters into conflicted argument or fades into indifference and 
distraction. 
Perhaps this is why the early church used the weeks 
before Easter to prepare those who would go down into the 
water of Christ's death and be raised up with him at the 
festival of his resurrection. Expectant catechumens made 
ready to enter the church with a period of intense instruc-
tion and training. Then on Easter through water and the 
Word they entered into Jesus' death and rose to new life 
joined with his body. Today most are baptized as I was-
only weeks old, months away from Easter, and with no 
preparation. Rather than descending into a deep pool of 
water, we were sprinkled with three tidy drops of water: in 
the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 
Nonetheless, we too entered into Jesus' death and rose to 
new life joined to those saints of old in his body. 
I admire the ancient practice of Lenten preparation and 
I appreciate the value of penitential Lenten disciplines such 
as fasting. But I have experienced Lent otherwise; in my 
experience going to worship at night in the middle of the 
week is what marks Lent off from the rest of the year. When 
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I was a confirmation student, St. Andrews Lutheran in 
Ames, Iowa, did not have soup suppers, but we did gather 
in the dark on Wednesday evenings to sing, to pray, and to 
hear a series of instructive Lenten sermons. Of the sermons 
I remember few details. What I do remember-in my 
muscles and my ears and my eyes and my heart-is the 
sensation of singing together in the sanctuary with night 
surrounding us. Could it be that the harmony was richer in 
the dark? Or is it just that those Lenten hymns have a certain 
timbre that one feels in the spine as well as hearing? Was 
there something about the shape of the building that 
fostered this? 
Edward Sovik was the architect for our church. His 
church buildings are theological statements in ordinary 
materials: brick, concrete, wood, stone. As the people 
entered the sanctuary, we passed by the font. We gathered 
with a cross in the midst of the congregation. When we 
spoke the creeds, we turned toward the cross and faced 
each other. We were still using the red Service Book and 
Hymnal so we didn't share the peace of God, but when we 
ate Christ's body and drank his blood the altar rail linked us 
to one another even as each one knelt on a separate cushion. 
Leaving the church we read words from Ephesians on the 
back wall: "There is one body and one Spirit, just as you 
were called to the one hope that belongs to your call, one 
Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all, 
who is above all and through all and in all." Those Lenten 
services did not prepare me for baptism, but they surely knit 
me into this one body which is Christ's. 
The church as Christ's body is one of many evocative 
metaphors that direct Christians' efforts to live together 
faithfully and in response to God's gift of new life. The 
hymn "The Church's One Foundation" offers several in its 
first verse. If Jesus is the foundation, then the church must 
be a building. This recalls the New Testament assertion that 
Christ is the cornerstone and Paul's admonition that each 
of our bodies is a temple for the Holy Spirit. But wait, the 
church-she is also Christ's bride; and she is also a new 
creation and she has been purchased with Jesus' blood. 
Identifying the origin of her unity, the hymn echoes 
Ephesians. It also acknowledges many-ness. Positively, her 
members come from every nation; lamentably, she is 
distressed and torn apart by schisms and false teaching. In 
the hymn all these images work together, although a 
painter might have trouble portraying the quick shift from 
architecture to a wedding. Surely the sight of the wounded 
body of Christ should give us pause, especially when we 
realize how often those wounds are self-inflicted by the 
members' disputes. 
The New Testament also portrays both the unity and 
the many-ness of this body. The Christians in Corinth are 
still infamous for their divisions, so when faced with 
conflict and disharmony we often turn to Paul's letters to 
them. When Paul asked, "If all were a single organ-an eye 
or an ear-where would the body be?" he may have 
expected his readers to think of the terra cotta models of 
eyes or ears or other body parts those who longed to be 
whole offered to Asclepius, god of healing. One way to 
understand this passage is as an affirmation of division of 
labor. Paul admonishes: Let everyone make use of their 
gifts and let all receive those gifts. Don't long to be what 
you are not. Don't try to do miracles if you can't; rather 
receive someone else's miracles. Not everyone needs to be 
a prophet, or a teacher, or a healer, but we all need 
prophesy, teaching, and healing. The eye is the eye, the 
hand is the hand; anyone who wants to chop vegetables for 
soup, direct a choir of singers, or tie the shoe on the foot 
that runs the good race is well served by eyes and hands that 
work together. This is sound advice. It applies to the church 
and to the relationship between the church's members. But 
noticing the utility of division of labor and acknowledging 
the value of all the parts in connection with one another is 
hardly distinctive to Christians. 
S, THE CHURCH IS A BODY MADE OF MANY PARTS, BUT IT 
s not just any body. It is not like those ancient stone 
statues of ideal bodies whose head was changed by 
each new office holder. The church is Christ's body. In 
Ephesians we read that Christ is the head of the church. Of 
course this is not an assertion of anatomical fact; it is a 
metaphor. That Christ is the head of the church is meant to 
tell us something true about the nature of the relationship 
between flesh and blood human beings and God who took 
on human flesh and shed his blood on our behalf. Since the 
bodies we know about and regard as normal have only one 
head, to imagine Christ as the head of the church is to 
suggest that the church's unity comes from sharing the 
mind of Christ. Having that mind, the body is always being 
transformed and renewed. Rather than being conformed 
to the standards of the world, our schisms are healed and 
we grow in harmony with one another, as suggested by 
Clement of Rome's flattering comments to the church at 
Corinth. "You were sincere and uncorrupted, and forgetful 
of injuries between one another. Every kind of faction and 
schism was abominable in your sight. You mourned over 
the transgressions of your neighbors: their deficiencies you 
deemed your own. You never grudged any act of kindness, 
being 'ready for every good work.' Adorned by a thor-
oughly virtuous and religious life, you did all things in the 
fear of God. The commandments and ordinances of the 
Lord were written upon the tablets of your hearts." 
The notion of headship is also used to speak of asym-
metrical relationships, as when the headmaster is in charge 
of a school, or to support the claim that a husband is the 
head of the wife who is submissive to his authority. That 
Christ, the same one who "did not count equality with God 
a thing to be grasped," is the head of the church seems to 
have a different message pointing to Christ as the source of 
the church's identity, character, and direction. Perhaps that 
is better conveyed by saying that as Yahweh breathed life 
into the earth-creature, adam, so the spirit of Christ 
animates the church. Or perhaps we make the point by 
observing that having entered into the church through 
baptism into Christ's death and resurrection, we are 
continually transformed into his image by eating his body 
and drinking his blood. At the table where Christ is both 
meal and host our disagreements and disputes are 
secondary to what we share. Nourished by this meal, we 
who are Christ's body take up God's work in the world. 
The members of the church do not stay inside the 
building singing in the dark or shouting "Halleluiah! Christ 
is Risen!" in the morning light. The body of Christ comes 
up from the water and away from the table into the world 
God made, loves, and saves. It takes up the good work of 
giving proper honor to the head, regarding all the members 
with love, and serving one another and the whole of 
creation as a bride serves the bridegroom. Martin Luther 
urges us to treat each other as little Christs. By this he does 
not advise asking, "What would Jesus do?" as if any of us 
could substitute for the Savior. Rather we ask, "How would 
I respond to you if you were Jesus, the incarnate one?" In 
doing so we anticipate the day when the Son of Man returns 
and says to those who gave water to thirsty neighbors, who 
fed hungry strangers, and who gave their coat to naked 
enemies, "Just as you did these things to one of the least of 
the members of my family, you did to me." There is 
humility in this service, as when Jesus washes his disciples' 
feet. There is delight in it, as when a bride feeds her groom 
a luscious piece of cake. There is courage, as when prophets 
call for repentance and demand justice. 
Jesus incarnate entered into the ordinary things of this 
life. Jesus risen illumines the beauty of this world and its 
brokenness. We, who are joined together as Christ's body 
and filled with his spirit, follow after him by turning our 
gifts to the daily work of prophesy, of feeding, of washing, 
of healing. With these actions we point to the cross and to 
the risen one whose name we bear. By our work we glorify 
the one Lord, Jesus the Christ, who took on human flesh, 
who lived among us, and whose dying and rising gives us 
life everlasting. t 
L. DeAne Lagerquist teaches theology at St. Olaf College 
where she was recently appointed Lilly Vocational Scholar 
(2005-06) in St. Olaf's Lives of Worth and Service 
program. 
361 37 The Cresset Easterl2005 
---
HISTORY 
I learn the particulars of your divorcing 
my close friend thirty years after 
the fact-not from her, but from you. 
Your story is constructed of amends 
and happenstance, the unexpected child 
of a chance exchange-a puzzling 
paragraph or two on our screens 
until we confirm that we are 
who we are: old friends of each others 
and of hers, of course, the source 
of the long white space between us, 
three full decades of detachment 
ftom detail. It's nearly as long 
since I've heard ftom her. But now 
you want me to know these things : 
that to everyone's complete surprise 
your second marriage took. You'd 
done it right with the other woman 
you assumed I'd always known 
about, made good in your career 
somehow, though you'd had to 
begin again there too, move 
from the state where you had learned 
to wonder what you were living 
without, to a place less storied. 
Now we-you and I-are both 
at a new place. And though I know 
we will let distance stand again 
like history between us very soon, 
I am surprised at how sad I am 
to read your long and careful 
explanation, how glad I am 
to know the things I never knew. 
Mary M. Brown 
to be a pilgrim 
G
IVEN THE HOUR-LONG WATER TAXI RIDE FROM 
Venice, it takes some effort to get to the village of 
Torcello, on one of the Venetian islands. So on the 
lovely spring day when I arrived there were few other visi-
tors. The sense of the holy was palpable. With such ancient 
buildings as Torcello's Byzantine church still standing and 
in use for worship, it may appear that here in Europe things 
do not change very much. No doubt many Cresset readers 
appreciate visits to England where it may seem that most 
buildings are old, the churches and pubs sitting with a 
patina from their years of use. This place seems old, and 
seems to have an identity as a special place. However, we, as 
much as anyone else in the western world, are suffering 
from a lack of sense of place. It is, I think, a mark of moder-
nity that we are far more concerned about time than place. 
There are reasons for this. We live in an age when tech-
nology makes place less localised. Travel is now easier and 
cheaper than it has ever been. We can move around freely 
both within our own country and internationally. People 
travel not only for pleasure but to find work, and so, often 
they have difficulty in locating exactly where home is. We 
see many places through television and film and our sense 
of the strange and bizarre is more diminished than in the 
past. We live in an age when buildings can both go up and be 
taken down quickly. We spend a lot of our time looking at 
things on websites so that we live in a 'virtual place.' And in 
this age, philosophy has given much more emphasis to time 
than place, as philosophers and geographers such as Peter 
Jackson, Edward Soja, and Anthony Giddens have recently 
reminded us. 
Our theology has, more or less, played along with this. 
"It is not the building but the people," we as good 
Protestants glibly repeat. Just recently two important theo-
logical books about place were published, the first by an 
Anglican bishop, Dr. John Inge, A Christian Theology of 
Place (Ashgate, 2003) (now nominated for the 2005 
Michael Ramsey Prize for Theological Writing) and the 
second by a Durham University professor, David Brown, 
entitled, God and the Enchantment of Place (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
lnge cites the Marxist philosopher, David Harvey, 
concurring with him that "we have been experiencing, 
since 1970, an intense phase of time-space compression-
compression that has had a disconcerting effect upon polit-
ical-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well 
---
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as upon cultural and social life. He feels that we have 
witnessed 'another fierce round in that process of annihila-
tion of space through time that has always lain at the heart 
of capitalism's dynamic,' and points out that one of the 
results of this is that urban places that once had a secure 
status find themselves vulnerable and 'residents find them-
selves forced to ask what kind of place can be remade that 
will survive within the new matrix of space relations. We 
worry about the meaning of place when the security of 
actual place becomes threatened."' 
Now, as people formed by the New Testament, we say 
that there is no need to go to a particular place to worship. 
The New Testament writers develop a theology where 
there is not only a supra-national view of the church but 
also a supra-geographical view. Just as Jerusalem has been 
Christified, so wherever the church meets, there Christ is to 
be found. In the words of W. D. Davies, "for holiness of 
place Christianity has fundamentally substituted the holi-
ness of persons." It is in word and sacrament that the pres-
ence of Christ is valued and, as such, can be carried on the 
missionary journeys like those that first spread Christianity 
throughout the then-known world. 
However, it was not long before the early church began 
again to give place a special significance. We have no docu-
mented evidence before Constantine, but the fact that early 
Christian sites were known and recoverable at that time 
suggests that there already existed an oral tradition about 
them. Perhaps also there was a need to be connected to the 
church of the persecution, and the places of martyrdom 
and of the saints did that. 
A
S THE SITES BECAME 'HOLY,' THEY BECAME CENTERS FOR 
pilgrimages, with all the hazards and difficulties of 
travel. Christian pilgrims would leave home, some-
times for considerable time, in order to go and pray at these 
places. Of course, there was not one single motive for their 
actions; as Chaucer clearly shows us, there were motives of 
desire for travel, for escaping the local mores, and for 
economic benefit, as well as religious motives. Yet without 
the religious justification pilgrimage would not have 
existed. 
Theological objections to Christian pilgrimage hardly 
began with Luther and the Reformation. Indeed, Jerome 
and Gregory of Nyssa were involved in an argument over 
this issue in the fourth century. Gregory was convinced that 
--
genuine pilgrimage must be internal. He would have appre-
ciated Bunyan's Pilgrim Progress, for Bunyan captured 
what Gregory thought of as true Christian progress. 
Jerome, on the other hand, was convinced that there is 
some value to place itself, although he acknowledged that 
the behavior that went on around holy places was not 
always holy! 
However, during the Reformation many of the places 
of Christian pilgrimage were destroyed and the emphasis 
moved away from looking and experiencing to listening to 
the Word. Contemporary culture is perhaps moving back 
to the visual, yet as Brown writes, ''Although arguably we 
are moving once more to a more visually based society, the 
temptation for any written culture is still there, to support 
the natural superiority of the verbal over the visual." 
Is there an argument for our giving a greater place to 
place again? I think there is, and not only because it is a 
human need. We can see this human need in the numbers 
that flock to Graceland or those who travel to see the homes 
of the rich and famous. But, in addition to this natural 
human attachment to place, there is a theological reason. 
We live after God's Incarnation and this gives a value to 
materiality in our spirituality. Inge picks up this idea in his 
book, commenting that "just as there is no experience of 
place without body so there is no experience of body 
without place." And "God relates to people in places, and 
the places are not irrelevant to that relationship but, rather, 
are integral to divine human encounter." 
I
N MY OWN LIFE, PLACES HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT-WHERE I 
went to school, where I proposed to my wife, where I 
saw the home team win, where I learned to eat fries with 
mayonnaise. This is equally true spiritually; there are 
places, as T. S. Eliot reminds us, where prayer has "been 
made valid" and where we find it easier to pray. These are 
storied places and we need to know and continue the story 
for it to be powerful. Interestingly, in Europe, where 
church attendance is falling, religious pilgrimage is 
growing. We may not view relics in the same way as our 
Medieval forebears, but we recognise they have hallowed 
places for us. We walk where they walked. 
This leads to how we treat places. We are good on infor-
mality and welcome, and there should always be that in a 
holy place. Yet we also recognise the "sacred" as, for 
example, when we treat the dining table with respect and 
do not put certain things where we are going to put food. 
We can do that in our religious places, separating some 
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places for particular uses, rather than moving into any 
space currently unoccupied. 
This brings us to another aspect of holy place, the 
balance between the immanence and transcendence of God 
as these are expressed in our places of worship. Our experi-
ence of holy place requires both. As David Brown argues, it 
is not only the architecture of a building which is important 
but also what happens in that architecture. He examines 
Gothic architecture and explains its transcendent character, 
but relates that to the immanence of God as expressed in the 
doctrine of the reality of Christ present in the communion. 
Likewise, he points to the immanence expressed in the 
preaching stations of the New England Puritan churches, 
and observes the conjunction of that immanence with the 
transcendence experienced in the preaching of the living 
word with its 'Thus saith the Lord.' 
Understanding each other's Christian tradition 
requires an understanding of the differing ways we have 
sought to gain this balance between transcendence and 
immanence, and the mistakes we have sometimes made in 
recognizing these dual aspects of God. Brown comments: 
Transcendence speaks of that otherness which is non-
physical, immaterial reality; immanence of its involve-
ment in the material. The danger in heeding only the 
transcendence is that an unbridgeable gap is created 
between ourselves and God; the danger in accepting 
only immanence is that the divine is reduced to some-
thing like ourselves, his reality in effect treated as equiv-
alent to the totality of the world. So both are needed to 
complement each other. That is why the advocate of 
icons and the Renaissance each have their proper place. 
And this is, I think, something of an invitation to 
pilgrimage, a suggestion that we go to, and take in, holy 
places. Perhaps our motives, like our Christian ancestors, 
are mixed. N evermind. A monk of Mount Athos, that place 
of monasteries in Greece, once commented that monas-
teries welcome everyone, for perhaps those who come as 
tourists will leave as pilgrims. ;-
Terry E. Hemming, Chaplain at St. Swithun's School, 
Winchester, England, recently spent a Hilary term as 
Farmington Fellow at Harris Manchester College, Oxford, 
researching the use of place in the education of young 
people. 
THE VILLAGE AHEAD OF YOU 
I am not sure how this ends. If the body 
dissolves or is taken up, if the roof of sky 
feels like cellophane or moss. 
When I was five I wanted to be a hen so 
at a petting zoo I reached below one 
to collect an egg. Her quills were stiff 
and the vanes were damp and warm, sticking 
a little to my knuckles. She didn't peck 
-
or squirm or try to stop me. There's something of Abraham 
and Isaac in this. You should know 
I would never have collected sticks to burn you. 
Patty says she'd collect only green ones but Patty 
likes to please everyone. I love you 
more than God and I do not 
accept the parts of the story where 
bodies are taken up with a greater 
plan in mind. You should love your home. 
Lot's wife did not turn back to watch 
fire spitting from the shoulders and hair 
of those who followed; she looked back 
at her house and at her pasture. 
Land gets taken up by fire too and possessions 
are not always wrong. Wear something comfortable. 
Sleep with my nightgown. Don't try to look 
after anyone else. Every town has a bell, bells 
return us to ourselves. The second time 
your father left I flew to Quito and was miserable. 
It was Palm Sunday so I stood with a crowd 
at the back of a cathedral. A girl gave me 
a cross woven out of palm leaves, grit 
at the corners of her eyes and brown, milky 
irises. A basket filled with crosses 
hung from each of her arms and she wore pink 
bedroom slippers over thick brown socks. 
She stood in front of me a long time, I thought 
because of blindness. I was too sad to know 
I was supposed to pay her. It is difficult to be happy 
knowing the way that story ends. The point 
is that we sing the songs and lay the palm leaves 
down, that we turn to gaze at the man who sits 
halfway up the mountain with his head between his knees. 
I believe we will know when the time comes 
what it means to crouch beside him, using both our hands 
to raise his face to ours. 
Kaethe Schwehn 
-
called to completion 
L
IKE MANY CHURCH-RELATED COLLEGES, GUSTAVUS 
Adolphus has implemented programs focusing on 
questions of vocation, even going so far as creating 
a Center for Vocational Reflection. We have retreats, 
scholarships, faculty development programs, course 
enhancement grants, and conferences. The goal of all 
these wonderful efforts is to ask questions about who we 
are as humans, and what we are called to do and be. The 
unofficial motto of our Center for Vocational Reflection 
is taken from Frederick Buechner's definition of "calling" 
as, "the place where your deep gladness meets the world's 
deep need." 
I love Buechner's definition of vocational calling, but I 
fear that, given the cultural forces at work, the quest for 
one's authentic calling can easily slip into a narcissistic 
pursuit centered more on one's own deep gladness than on 
the world's deep need. As Charles Taylor notes in The 
Ethics of Authenticity, our quest for authenticity can 
degenerate into an embrace of individual choice for its own 
sake. For our choices to be meaningful, writes Taylor, they 
must take place against a shared moral horizon that lends 
them significance. To guard against the relativistic and indi-
vidualistic undertow of our culture, I suggest we begin the 
quest to locate our vocational calling by taking coordinates 
from a biblical understanding of the relationships between 
God, humans, and the earth. 
Janel Curry, a professor of geography at Calvin 
College, has done fascinating research on the attitudes of 
seminarians towards the natural world. In addition to 
administering surveys, her research methodology involved 
giving subjects a blank sheet of paper and instructing them 
to draw a diagram depicting what type of relationships, if 
any, there are between God, humans, and nature. One 
common diagram constructed by the seminarians could be 
called "the chain of command model." God is on top, 
humans are second in the chain of command, and nature is 
underfoot, at the bottom of the hierarchy. The three enti-
ties are distinct from each other and the relationships are 
marked by power and domination rather than intimacy. 
Imagine that you were given that assignment. What 
would you draw? I have had a lot of fun doing this exercise 
with students. Some question the existence of God and 
create diagrams depicting humans and nature as all that 
exists. Students sympathetic to the deep ecology move-
ment or to Eastern religions have constructed diagrams 
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showing that humans, nature, and god are all essentially 
one. For others, nature is merely a stage-set for the real 
action, which is God's salvation of human souls out of this 
wretched earth. 
Questions about the relationships between God, 
humans, and the natural world are not merely academic, 
nor without consequence. Rather, our answers influence 
how we see our vocations on this earth. Are we the masters 
of our own fate in a godless universe? Are we dwellers on a 
wretched earth who should focus solely on getting lost 
souls into heaven? Is the goal of life to exploit the earth to 
the fullest so as to maximize consumption? Or, is our 
calling something quite different? 
The Genesis creation narratives are powerful stories 
addressing some of the most basic questions that humans 
have asked-not the Darwinian question of how biological 
populations might change over time, but the bigger ques-
tions: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" 
"Why are we here on earth?" "What is my calling?" The 
first creation narrative in Genesis begins with the words, 
"In the beginning God created the heavens and earth." The 
second creation narrative starts with, "When God created 
the heavens and the earth .... " The phrase "heavens and 
earth" indicates "everything." The competing sun gods and 
moon gods were not divinities at all, but were created by 
God. Thus, the starting point for all Scripture is the decla-
ration that the universe and everything in it is the product 
of a purposeful Creator. What we see around us is not mere 
stuff, but a holy mystery-God's creation. Punctuating the 
story of creation is the refrain, "and God saw all that he had 
made and it was very good." 
G
OING BACK TO THE EARLY CHURCH THEOLOGIANS, 
such as Basil of Caesarea, the six days of creation have 
traditionally been interpreted not as literal twenty-
four-hour days, but rather as a way of explaining the different 
orders of creation and different modes of God's interaction 
with the world. The days function as a taxonomy differenti-
ating, for example, the creatures of the sea from the creatures 
that move along the ground by placing their creation on 
different days. Interestingly, on day six, God creates the live-
stock, wild animals, the creatures that move along the ground, 
and the human race. Humans, made in the image of God, 
don't even merit their own unique day of creation, but are in 
the same order with all the creeping and crawling creatures. 
The second creation narrative elaborates on this sense 
of continuity between humans and the rest of creation: 
''And the Lord God formed the human from the dust of the 
ground .... " The Hebrew language has a play on words 
here, for the word "human" is adam, which comes from the 
word adamah, which means dust or earth. So, God forms 
the adam from the adamah. Literally, in the Hebrew the 
word "human" means dust creature or earth creature. Steve 
Bouma-Prediger has pointed out that in English we might 
find a comparable relationship if we think of the connec-
tion between the words 'human' and 'humus.' To be human 
is to be taken from the humus, the rich, black, organic soil. 
But we are more than dust. Later in Genesis 2:7, God 
breathes into the nostrils of the human the breath of life, 
and the human comes alive. The story disabuses us of 
popular notions that we are products of blind chance or 
that we are autonomous self-made men and women. Yet, 
neither are we produced on an assembly line, for in a 
tender, loving way, God brings the dust creature to life. 
THE STORY THEN PRESENTS US WITH A PARADOX: GOD makes the earth creatures in his own image and bestows upon them a special role in completing the 
creation. In Genesis 2:4-5, the creation is not yet complete. 
The shrubs of the field have not yet appeared, for "God had 
not sent the rain on the earth and there was no human to 
work the ground." The creation first needs the ongoing 
involvement of its creator, and in some remarkable way the 
creation needs humankind to assist in its completion. Later, 
in Genesis 2:19, humans participate again in God's project 
of creation. God brings the various beasts and birds to the 
human to see what the human would name them. 
The human role in completing the creation involves 
both work and learning. Work came before the Fall. Work 
is part of our calling, even if the Fall made it much more 
difficult and toilsome. And what is this work we are called 
to do? In short, it is completing the task of creation, 
drawing out the potentials inherent in the creation. This 
work is described as tending the garden (Gen. 2 : 15) and 
exercising loving dominion over the creation. 
Recall those diagrams of the relationship between 
God, humans, and nature. It was a trick question. Our first 
mistake was in our categories. Biblically, we should not 
speak of nature, but rather of creation. Biblically, there is 
the Creator and everything else, whether in the heavens or 
on earth, which is the creation. Lacking a purposeful 
Creator distinct from the creation, neither the atheist's 
diagram nor the deep ecologist's diagram provides a basis 
for a meaningful vocational calling. They yield no horizon 
of significance to lend purpose to our work and learning. 
On the other hand, the chain of command model of rela-
tionships sees little or no ongoing involvement of God with 
the creation and little connection between humans and the 
rest of creation. It gives the human license to do with nature 
as he or she sees fit. This chain of command model may be 
the source of Christianity's sometimes poor ecological 
record, but it is not a biblical model. 
Who are we, then, and what is our calling? The early 
chapters of Genesis, while not encompassing the whole 
testimony of Scripture, give us a starting point. Biblically, 
we are earth creatures, sharing an essential continuity and 
deep connections with the rest of creation. The creation 
does not belong to us, but rather, we belong to it. 
Biblically, each and every one of us is called to be a geog-
rapher in the original sense of the word's two Greek roots 
geo (earth) and grapho (to write). We are to write the 
earth's stories, naming its plants, animals, mountains, 
valleys, lakes, and rivers, and in so doing, to voice the 
creation's praise of its Creator. We have good work to do: 
rooted in real places on the surface of the earth, we are 
given the task of tending the garden and exercising a 
loving, servant leadership that brings the rest of creation 
to its full potential. As dwellers on God's good earth, our 
task is to live humbly before our Creator, aware of our 
connections to the rest of creation, ever voicing the 
creation's praise-our true, earthy vocation. t 
Mark Bjelland teaches geography at Gustavus Adolphus 
College. He is spending this year in Wales. 
hunger and thirst: Terri Schiavo's sentencer 
M
AGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (MRI) OF THE 
brain, according to a recent study in the journal 
Neurology, suggests that thousands of patients 
labeled "minimally conscious," and even "vegetative," 
may actually be near normal in registering what they hear, 
though unable to show much response. Their condition is 
by no means terminal and the New York Times reports that 
some patients thought vegetative have almost completely 
recovered. 
In recent years, it has not been unusual to cut off such 
patients' food and water, when it is received through a tube, 
under the theory that they would prefer to be starved and 
dehydrated to death-a painless process only if one is 
absolutely unconscious. St. Louis neurologist Dr. William 
Burke has described it as follows: 
A conscious person would feel [dehydration] just as 
you and I would. They will go into seizures. Their skin 
cracks, their tongue cracks, their lips crack. They may 
have nose bleeds because of the drying of the mucous 
membranes, and heaving and vomiting might ensue 
because of the drying out of the stomach lining. They 
feel the pangs of hunger and thirst. Imagine going one 
day without a glass of water. Death by dehydration 
takes ten to fourteen days. It is an extremely agonizing 
death. 
Moist cloths and drugs can alleviate some of this agony, 
but they will not be administered if the patient is considered 
wholly unconscious. 
Given the new MRI evidence of consciousness, 
disability rights activists have called for a national morato-
rium on the dehydration and starvation of people alleged to 
be in a persistent vegetative state, until they can be exam-
ined for the sort of brain activity described in the Neurology 
study. Such brain-imaging would be relevant in cases like 
that of the Florida woman Terri Schiavo, according to a 
neurologist cited by the Times report. 
AsofMarch 15, thedatethisessaywascompleted, Terri 
was still alive. But her guardian, Terri's estranged husband 
Michael, had convinced a state trial judge that she was in a 
persistent vegetative state and would clearly want her 
feeding tube withdrawn, if she were competent, based on 
her earlier casual remarks to Michael and his relatives 
about people in quite different medical circumstances. 
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The judge had discounted the memory of Terri's friend 
that Terri had strongly opposed the denial of life supports 
to Karen Ann Quinlan by her parents, saying "How did 
they know she wouldn't want to go on?" and "Where 
there's life, there's hope." 
Terri's parents and other observers reported, on the 
contrary, that she was purposeful, curious, and interac-
tive-e.g., responding with patterned happy sounds when 
her mom spoke to her and making a face and laughing when 
her dad, with his scratchy mustache, kissed her. She was 
said often to be up in her wheelchair and to use a tube only 
at mealtimes, like many other people with disabilities. The 
parents had often asked that the media come to observe 
Terri, but Michael had refused to let them do so. 
Terri's parents further argued that as a good Catholic 
she would never wish to refuse or be denied the basic neces-
sities of life. Pope John Paul II declared last year that even 
those who, unlike Terri, are terminally ill and exhibit "no 
evident sign of self-awareness or of awareness of the envi-
ronment, and seem unable to interact with others or to 
react to specific stimuli" still "retain their human dignity in 
all its fullness." Thus the intentional and inherently-lethal 
denial of "water and food, even when supplied by artificial 
means, ... is the deliberate and morally unacceptable 
killing of a human person." 
Furthermore, the parents doubted Michael's truthful-
ness because he had financial and personal conflicts of 
interest. He hadn't remembered Terri's statements refusing 
care until some time after he had won a million-dollar 
malpractice settlement to pay for her life-long care and 
rehabilitation. (The parents had offered to let him keep the 
money if he would let them take Terri, but he had refused.) 
Although the parents' doctors said she might be weaned 
from tube feeding, Michael allegedly had provided no 
therapy at all since just after winning the malpractice cases. 
He was living with another woman by whom he had two 
children, and admitted in a legal deposition to turning 
Terri's wedding rings into jewelry for himself. 
B
OTH SIDES CLAIMED NEUROLOGICAL SUPPORT, SO AN 
MRI brain scan just might have tipped the scales, and 
that is what Terri's parents requested. The trial judge 
refused them and instead pronounced this sentence: 
"ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that absent a stay from the 
appellate courts, the guardian, MICHAEL SCHIAVO, shall 
cause the removal of nutrition and hydration from the 
ward, THERESA SCHIAVO, at 1:00pm on Friday, March 
18, 2005." Surprisingly, he also denied the parents' request 
to attempt to provide Terri with food and water by mouth, 
once the tube were removed. 
Disability and pro-life activists immediately mobi-
lized to find some way to save Terri's life. Victims' rights 
advocates also got involved, asking that the Department 
of Law Enforcement investigate evidence of foul-play. 
(Should there also be a "Feminists for Terri" group, 
protesting Michael's treatment of his wife?) The 
Department of Children and Families asked for a delay in 
Terri's demise so that the allegations of abusive neglect to 
provide therapy could be investigated. The same judge 
denied this motion as well. But let no one think that Terri's 
death or survival will end the matter, for the Schiavo case 
is just the tip of an iceberg. 
A
CCORDING TO DICTA IN FLORIDA'S BROWNING CASE, 
unless there is a family dispute, all legally incompe-
tent patients-not only those alleged to be vegeta-
tive, but those fully alert and talkative-can be denied arti-
ficially-supplied food and water by their guardian or surro-
gate, without a living will or any prior judicial hearing 
whatsoever. Although recognizing "that a surrogate might 
act contrary to the wishes of the patient," the state Supreme 
Court required in Browning only that the surrogate be able 
to prove (not actually prove) what the patient would want 
with "clear and convincing" evidence and be satisfied that 
the "evidence of the patient's oral declarations is reliable." 
If anyone cared to do so, a criminal violation of these stric-
tures could presumably still be punished after the ward's 
death, but only if there were evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the surrogate acted precipitously. 
A dissenting judge in Browning pointed out that judi-
cial approval is required before a guardian can even sell 
property of a ward, and he worried presciently "that, if 
there is no judicial involvement, those decisions could be 
made by surrogates who would benefit financially from an 
early termination of the ward's life." This is just what might 
have happened to Terri long ago, if she had not had parents 
ready to fight for her. Have there been other Terris who 
have died defenseless and unnoticed? 
Legislative remedies are being proposed in Florida, to 
help those like Terri. They range from a simple disqualifi-
cation of a spouse as guardian if he is living with someone 
else, to a more far-reaching demand that earlier declara-
tions of a desire not to receive food and water through a 
tube either be made in writing or be backed up by evidence 
clear and convincing to a court that the patient had been 
accurately informed of the relevant medical realities prior 
to her statements. 
It may be difficult to enact such remedies. Why is the 
Florida legal system so cavalier about the lives of people 
like Terri? Is it because the fate of minimally communica-
tive people-or even of all incompetents-doesn't 
matter much to the rest of us? The Browning majority 
remarks that the only alternative to death for such people 
is "a bare existence." 
And Florida is by no means the worst state in terms of 
its lack of concern for the lives of those with serious disabil-
ities. In many hospitals across the U.S., the prior wish of a 
patient to be supplied with food and water through a tube 
can actually be overridden by doctors who think such 
feeding "futile" because her life is worthless-even if her 
desire to live has been clearly expressed in a written 
advance directive. 
The leading legal theorist Ronald Dworkin explains 
more deeply why such a patient would (for him) lack 
worth, why it could be right for doctors and judges to 
weigh a wish to die more heavily than a wish to live on in a 
state of dependency. He writes: "We are distressed by, even 
disapprove of, someone ... who neglects or sacrifices the 
independence we think dignity requires." For Dworkin, a 
person who chooses to live in great dependency denies 
that she is someone "whose life is important for its own 
sake." He quotes with approval the nineteenth-century 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche on this point: "To go on 
vegetating in cowardly dependence on physicians and 
machinations, after the meaning of life, the right to life, 
has been lost, that ought to prompt a profound contempt 
in society." 
Nietzsche called this philosophy "practical nihilism" 
and complained that, in his day, Christians stood in the way 
of its success. "This universal [Christian] love of men is in 
practice the preference for the suffering, underprivileged, 
degenerate .... The species requires that the ill-constituted, 
weak, degenerate perish ... -and not [live on in] a feeble, 
vegetable existence in expectation of a false afterlife." 
Not surprisingly, some Christians still stand in the way 
of this philosophy. In the same statement referred to above, 
the Pope insisted that it is not enough to "reaffirm the 
general principle" of the value of human life, "it is neces-
sary to promote the taking of positive actions as a stand 
against pressures to withdraw hydration and nutrition as a 
way to put an end to the lives of these patients." 
Who is right, Dworkin or the Pope? Does someone 
who does not count equality a thing to be grasped, but who 
accepts the loss of all, thereby diminish her dignity and the 
value of her life? Put more simply, how do we answer the 
plea, "I thirst" ? • 
Richard Stith teaches at the Valparaiso University School of 
Law. Besides his law degree, he has a Ph.D. in Religious 
Ethics, both from Yale, and has served as Director of Medical 
Ethics at the St. Louis University School of Medicine. (All 




y PARTNER AND I ARE PULLED OUT OF ROLL CALL TO 
meet Vice Control. They need a couple of 
uniformed guys because one of their undercover 
cops has just made a crack cocaine buy in an apartment and 
now Vice wants to go in for the bust. So, Vice pulls up to the 
station in an unmarked van with tinted windows and my 
partner and I hop in. 
One of the vice officers is a beefy white guy named 
Rogowski. He has mastered the art of simultaneously 
looking tough and bored; from all outward appearances, 
he could be waiting in line for nachos, as opposed to gearing 
up to take down a dope house. He has a mustache and is 
wearing a Miami Hurricanes sweatshirt with his badge and 
gun concealed underneath it. As we go over the plan, I think 
about how Rogowski is maybe the best possible last name 
for a mustached, tough-looking Vice cop. I wonder 
whether he has a first name like "Bronco," or even 
"Bruno." That might be too much to hope for. 
The undercover (U.C.) who made the buy tells us, "It's 
Unit #3. There's a little Hispanic guy in a light blue 
hoodie-he's our seller. Take him first. Then there's a fat 
Mexican guy, and a black guy with a bald head who's about 
6' 1. They're all coming back with us." 
"So just three guys," I said. 
"Yeah, three hypes," he assures us. (A hype is a crack-
head.) "There's a little girl up there too. She's maybe five 
years old." 
The child in the dope house. If there's anything more 
depressing, I don't know what it is. This is never good news. 
But that doesn't mean we aren't going in. Often, there are 
children in drug houses. Sometimes they live there, some-
times they're brought along for the ride by an addict parent. 
They're not safe there for a number of reasons, but fore-
most among them is that rival drug dealers often conduct 
their own raids on dope houses and they're not as particular 
about whom they shoot as you might wish. So you want to 
get the child out, but if you have specific intelligence that 
there are guns in the house and the raid has a high proba-
bility of ending in a shoot-out, you wait until the child has 
left. Otherwise, you just try and secure the child when you 
go in. You do the best you can. It is yet another ugly element 
of the drug war. 
We arrive at the site and the U.C. goes back inside the 
apartment building where he initially made the buy. The 
van pulls up in the rear alley. My partner and I turn our 
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radios off so the constant squawking doesn't broadcast our 
arrival and we jump out of the van to follow the U.C. We 
exit right onto an ice floe and my partner navigates it 
gracefully while I slip and slide. We make it to the rear 
stairwell, and then inside, and trail about ten feet behind 
the U.C., out of sight of the peephole in #3. Rogowski is 
behind us and there's another vice cop watching the back 
door who will come in close on our heels when we make 
entry. Four of us, because the U.C. doesn't count; he'll fade 
back when we enter. Four against three. Not bad odds. 
We've all known worse. 
The U.C. knocks. He's a brave fellow. For all he knows, 
they made him as a cop when he bought the dope and now 
they're waiting for him behind the door with growing 
resentment and loaded shotguns. Voices then. Shuffling 
around. I'm aware of the sounds of my shallow breathing in 
the narrow hallway, and a tight band forms high up on my 
chest because drug raids get complicated and sometimes 
things go wrong. There's a reason my partner and I wear 
our ballistic vests every day. There are cops who don't. I'm 
not sure what galaxy they think they're in. 
We hear the door to #3 open. The U.C. talks to 
someone. And then he's in. 
"I had to buy some beer," the U.C. says. 
THAT'S OUR CUE. MY PARTNER AND I ENTER FIRST, GUNS drawn. You never want to hesitate in the doorway. You go in fast and you keep moving because in the 
doorway you're a target; linger in the doorway, and you 
might as well wear a blinking neon bulls-eye. I'm in the 
kitchen and I'm face to face with the Hispanic guy in the 
blue hooded sweatshirt. The seller. The vice cop was 
right-he is little. I tell him to get down on the floor. My 
gun is pointed at his neck. His eyes get dinner-plate big, but 
he doesn't get down. At this point I have a decision to make. 
I need to get him down right now, to control him, because I 
don't know whether he's armed and it's not nearly time to 
put my gun away. So I can either give him a fist or elbow shot 
with my non-shooting arm, stun him by throwing him 
against the wall, or figure something else out altogether. I 
have about half a second to decide this. 
I end up grabbing him by the shirtfront and taking him 
face-down to the floor with one hand. I can do this because 
I weigh 200 pounds and I'm kind of strong and he weighs 
about 110 and he's not-crackheads are rarely paragons of 
physical strength and agility. When he's down, I look up, 
where all hell has broken loose. My partner and Rogowski 
are in the living room dealing with the fact that the intelli-
gence we got about there being only three adult occupants 
is off. Way off. Sure, there's the fat Mexican guy over there 
on the couch and yes, I see the 6' 1 bald guy in the back 
bedroom. But they aren't alone. There are seven other 
adults in the apartment, and now they're standing up and 
running around and dropping crack pipes and making for 
the window and I swear I see one guy doing a kind of 
panicky deep-knee bend, and they're all generally acting 
the way crack addicts do when the cops come calling. 
I hear the five-year-old before I see her. She's wailing, 
because she's five, because everyone has guns and everyone 
is shouting. I pin my guy to the floor with one knee and try 
and cover as many people as I can with my gun. I pray that 
none of the hypes goes for a weapon and no one has to fire 
a round, because with all these people and the child and so 
few of us cops in such a small space, an already bad situation 
could turn into a waking nightmare. My partner calls for 
backup on the radio. The vice cop who was watching the 
rear comes in on the run. We order everyone down to the 
floor. But not everybody plays nice. From the kitchen, I tell 
one lady to get down and when she hesitates, I shout at her, 
"What is it about 'Get down!' that isn't fucking clear to 
you?" and then she does. I try to be as professional and 
courteous an officer as the next guy. I know this language 
may mean the movie will be rated R, but a well-placed use 
of "fuck" here and there in a high-stress situation is some-
times just the ticket to gain compliance. I think even my 
mother might approve-at least if it really is well-placed. 
H
ELP FINALLY ARRIVES. WE GET EVERYONE HAND-
cuffed and lined up. I look at the assortment of 
people. It is, even being kind, a motley crew. 
"Not really how you planned your Thursday afternoon 
to go, huh?" one of the vice cops says. No one says 
anything. Some are still on a crack high. Some don't have 
the energy or inclination to respond. Some don't under-
stand or speak English. 
We check for drugs and guns. It is the classic drug den. 
Glass crack pipes with blackened ends and cans of ultra-
cheap beer and lighters everywhere and razors underneath 
the couch. Mounds of soiled clothing in the corners, 
mildewed food, mattresses you wouldn't sleep on even at 
gunpoint, and a bathroom that hasn't been cleaned since 
mastodons walked the earth. People live here, but they 
don't live well, they don't live like humans. 
We end up arresting five of the occupants. The five-
year-old child is fine. Her mother is with her and she 
doesn't seem high, but the mom lies about her name to 
conceal the fact that she has a warrant for her arrest. It's a 
minor personal recognizance warrant and we end up 
letting her go, but not before I ream her out in Spanish for 
lying to us and endangering her child's life by bringing her 
into a dope house and all the rest. I could put in a call to 
Child Protective Services about the mother and child, but 
simply their presence in a known drug house wouldn't even 
register a blip on CPS's radar: too many far worse cases 
piling up on the desks of the over-worked case managers. 
I wave to the girl when she leaves the apartment. She 
has stopped crying, and she waves back with a big 'Hey it's 
the Police' grin. Her name is Cierra and she is a beautiful 
child with long brown hair and a slightly pug nose. I don't 
want to be overly cynical, but I wonder if there's any possi-
bility, however remote, that she isn't doomed, destined to 
become her mother, sitting on the couch of a crack house 
with her own child. 
Back outside, my partner and I decompress. Rogowski 
is back in the van. He looks like he's gotten his nachos and 
it's all good. We made some solid arrests. We shut down a 
dope house-at leastfor today. Everybody's safe, especially 
the child. No one's been shot. And my partner and I don't 
even have to write any reports-Rogowski and Vice are 
going to take care of all that. All action and no writing; it's 
like my partner and I have been temporarily transformed 
into TV cops. All in all, it's a fine afternoon. 
"Ohman," my partner says. He's got a little over a year 
left before retirement. After almost twenty-four years on 
the job, he's still an improbably hard charger, but I'm not 
sure how many more drug raids he can have in him. I rub the 
sweat off the back of my neck and point out the swathe of 
ice that we jumped out on when we hastily left the van. "I 
was sliding around on that but you navigated it with the 
sure-footedness of a mountain goat." 
My partner laughs. He likes that. "Maybe just an old 
goat," he says. Then he looks thoughtful. "So what was that 
about just three guys?" he asks. 
I shake my head. Sure, the vice cop told us just three 
people, but it isn't his fault. Crack houses are like that; their 
ranks can swell in a matter of minutes. Either that, or he 
meant a multiple of three. t 
A.P. is a police officer in a Mid-western city. The names in 
this account have been changed for the sake of anonymity, 
but the author would like to say that Rogowski's real name 
is even better than Rogowski. 
the silly season 
W
HEN PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH GAVE HIS VICTORY 
speech after the election, I caught sight of his 
daughter Jenna and wondered, "Is she wearing 
lingerie?" She appeared to be wearing a see-through, low-
cut, black, lacy thing, albeit over some other tight, low-cut 
shirt. Perhaps I was being hypercritical, so I asked my 
husband, "Is it just me or does Jenna Bush appear to be 
wearing lingerie?" 
"Yep, it definitely looks like lingerie," he replied. If a 
man says it looks like lingerie, it does. 
I respect George W. Bush, but am not impressed by his 
daughters. Maybe I am getting old, but I was shocked and 
dismayed by the twins' tasteless and vulgar display at the 
Republican National Convention. What are we to make of 
a girl who tells the whole world that her grandmother, 
former First Lady Barbara Bush, "thinks 'Sex and the City' 
is something married people do, but never talk about?" 
The word I would use to describe the Bush girls is 
"silly." I use the word as Jane Austen used it. In Austen's 
novels, silly girls use poor judgment, have vulgar manners, 
and are indiscreet and flirtatious. In Pride and Prejudice, 
Mr. Bennett is the father of five girls, two of whom are very 
silly. He bemoans this fact but does nothing to reign in 
their behavior. He thinks there is no point; they will be silly 
no matter what he does. The consequences are devas-
tating. His youngest daughter, Lydia, runs off with the 
scoundrel, Wickam, thereby bringing shame and disgrace 
to her family. 
Silly girls today are like silly girls in Jane Austen's time, 
only worse. Their manners are coarser, their language 
cruder, and their advances toward boys far more brazen. 
Even more dramatic has been the change in society's view 
of such behavior. The coquettish, naughty behavior of girls 
goes largely uncorrected. I am simply astonished to see the 
way girls dress and act in front of their parents. The silliness 
starts off innocently enough. Pre-teen girls wear low rise 
blue jeans, midriffs, and halter tops, shirts with straps that 
look like bra straps, and short skirts and shorts. They move 
provocatively to "hip hop" music in dance class. They 
scream uncontrollably and are sassy to adults. Their 
parents and others think this behavior is cute, especially if 
the girls, themselves, are cute. Later, when these same 
parents can no longer control their daughters, they wonder 
what happened. 
As a society, we have ceased to talk about what is proper 
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behavior for girls. The reason is because we no longer know 
how girls should behave and think any sort of admonition 
to act lady-like is sexist. Though we encourage girls to act 
like boys, the result is not boyish behavior (girls will never 
act like boys) but the worst kind of girlish behavior, that is, 
silliness. Though many claim to be concerned about the 
debasement and vulgarization of our society, few want to 
suggest that we must do something about the behavior of 
girls. Feminists have convinced us that women have a right 
to behave however they please. They can dress provoca-
tively and say whatever they want and expect men not to 
view them as sex objects or to view them as sex objects, 
depending upon what they want, which is utter nonsense. 
In A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue, 
Wendy Shalit shows just how devastating to women this 
attitude has been. Convincingly, she argues that women 
have set themselves up to become victims of men. 
"Encouraged to act immodestly, a woman exposes her 
vulnerability and she then becomes, in fact, the weaker 
sex." As a result many women, especially young women, 
are miserable. Most women are going to continue to want 
long-term relationships, and eventually marriage and chil-
dren. Instead, they have to pretend to care as little for men 
as men care for them. According to Shalit, women must 
reclaim their modesty if men are to become gentlemen 
once agam. 
T
HE PROBLEM IS THIS CAN BE TERRIBLY DIFFICULT FOR 
girls. Most will not take a stand against their peers 
and cannot disassociate themselves from the culture 
which surrounds them like the air they breathe. They do 
not have the intellectual insight or strength of character of 
Wendy Shalit. They must be taught from early on how to 
behave in a lady-like manner. 
Jane Austen recognized that the father plays an espe-
cially important part in this process. In Pride and Prejudice, 
Mr. Bennett, though likable, is largely absent from the lives 
of his daughters. He does not want to be bothered with 
disciplining his two young, silly daughters even though his 
older daughter, Elizabeth, begs him to do so. Eventually, he 
accepts responsibility for his failures and for the pain he has 
caused his oldest daughters and extended family members. 
He resolves to act as a proper guardian of the silly daughter 
who is not yet beyond redemption. Mrs. Bennett is a ridicu-
lous creature, and this makes the father's involvement 
more imperative. Yet even if a girl has a mother worthy of 
emulation, the father has an essential role to play. Fathers 
need to pay close attention to how their daughters dress 
and behave and correct them when they act silly. 
W
HEN I SEE THE IMMODEST DRESS OF SO MANY GIRLS 
today, I wonder how their fathers could have let 
them out of the house. Many probably are like 
Mr. Bennett, just as happy not to have to worry about their 
daughters' behavior. Society has now given them an excuse 
to ignore the shenanigans taking place in their households. 
Men, though often involved in the lives of their children, 
are no longer encouraged to be the head of the household, 
and this has resulted in their reluctance to set and enforce 
rules. 
Of course, fathers are more than disciplinarians. They 
are the first men their daughters shall love. From their 
fathers, girls learn how men ought to treat them. Fathers 
are their daughters' protectors and should act like it. 
Daughters should have in their fathers their first loving, 
caring, and protecting relationship with a man. Women 
have always fallen prey to caddish men and always will, 
which is why they need fathers to look out for them and 
teach them to expect gentlemanly behavior of men. 
Most girls, even silly ones, would be relieved to have 
rules to follow. Rules governing relationships with men 
define the playing field, thereby giving women the freedom 
to be themselves without constantly worrying about men 
taking advantage of them. Those, such as Austin's Lydia, 
who are incorrigibly silly and refuse to see the benefit of 
rules are all the more in need of them. Christian societies 
have always understood this. We live in a secular society, 
and it is unclear whether our present descent into madness 
can be reversed. However, we, as parents, must still look 
after our daughters-now more than ever, in fact. During 
these times which are fraught with dangers for our girls, it 
is especially imperative that fathers assume their proper 
role as guardians and protectors of their daughters. If that 
happens, we might begin to see a restoration of the lost 
virtue of modesty and the elevation of society which comes 
when women act like ladies. f 
Jennifer Ferrara, a formerly ordained minister of the ELCA, 
is a Roman Catholic laywoman. 
the puzzling case of evangelicals 
W
HEN I TAUGHT AT THE LUTHERAN SCHOOL OF 
Theology at Chicago thirty years ago, our 
faculty received free copies of Christianity 
Today. Typically, I would look at the cover with disgust and 
immediately throw it in the large trashcan. Not only was it 
fundamentalist, I thought, but it was politically conserva-
tive, something I would not tolerate in a religious maga-
zine in those days. In March of 2005, I have an article about 
Baylor University in Christianity Today. What accounts 
for such a dramatic change-was it I or the magazine? 
While Christianity Today has no doubt become a 
more sophisticated and moderate evangelical publica-
tion, I think the more significant change came in me. 
More specifically, change came in my attitude toward 
both evangelicals and fundamentalists. 
As a Midwestern member of a Lutheran church 
aspiring to be more like the regnant Protestant main-
stream, I shared many of the mainstream prejudices about 
evangelicals and fundamentalists. They were, I thought, 
"poor, uneducated, and easy to lead," in the famous 
words of an advisor to Democratic candidates in the pres-
idential election of 2004. Indeed, when I took a teaching 
position at Roanoke College in Salem, Virginia, in 1982, I 
feared that I might well disappear into an abyss of 
Baptists. (My fears were allayed when I discovered that 
there is a small but proud Lutheran presence in Virginia. 
Furthermore, a full-blooded Norwegian-American 
Lutheran couple from Luther College lived right across 
the street from us!) 
It was true that evangelicals-Baptists of all sorts, 
Methodists, members of the Church of Christ, etc.-
vastly outnumbered Lutherans, Presbyterians, 
Episcopalians, and Catholics in southwestern Virginia, 
but before long I grew to understand and appreciate the 
former groups. Now, one of my best friends is a moderate 
evangelical and I am acquainted with many conservative 
evangelicals and even a fundamentalist pastor or two. 
Over the years I have come to know more about the vast 
world of evangelicalism, a world that many mainstream 
Protestants and Catholics scarcely know. Christianity 
Today remains their flagship magazine, but it is only the 
tip of a huge iceberg submerged in American life. Below 
that tip is a large world of churches, schools, colleges, 
bookstores, publishing houses, para-church organiza-
tions, music, revivals, treasured writers, and voluntary 
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associations that mainstream Christians generally ignore. 
Evangelicals have generated a strong subculture and 
succeeded in the Christian formation of millions of 
Americans especially, but by no means only, in the South. 
I 
There are many varieties of evangelicals-conserva-
tive, moderate, liberal, peace and justice types, neo-evan-
gelicals, liturgical and non-liturgical, those who want to 
connect with the pre-Reformation church and those who 
don't, charismatic and non-charismatic. A goodly 
number of American mega-churches are led by evangeli-
cals, yet most evangelical churches are much smaller. 
What then holds all these various people together? 
The classic answer was given by the British scholar, 
David Bebbington, who summed up evangelical 
emphases in four points: conversionism-an emphasis on 
"new birth" as a life-changing religious event; biblicism-
a reliance on the Bible as the ultimate religious authority; 
activism-a concern for sharing the faith; and crucicen-
trism-a focus on Christ's redeeming work on the cross. 
These themes define some denominations as a whole, but 
they also define many Christians within mainstream 
Protestant denominations. Indeed, there are Lutherans 
with strong evangelical tendencies, many of whom 
preside over and inhabit the largest Lutheran churches in 
this country. 
B
UT THIS VARIETY AMONG EVANGELICALS IS RARELY 
noticed by the "cultured despisers" of evangelicals, 
who are themselves legion. Instead, they lump all 
evangelicals into one large category that, thus far, seems 
to be one of the few classes unprotected by political 
correctness. Those "cultured despisers" are amply repre-
sented by elite writers like Garry Wills, who recently 
compared the "fundamentalism" of the American elec-
torate with that of AI Qaeda and Saddam's Sunni loyalists. 
"Where else (besides in America) do we find fundamen-
talist zeal, a rage at modernity, religious intolerance, fear 
and hatred of modernity?" he intoned. Wills expended all 
this spleen, I gather, because George Bush, an evangelical, 
won the presidential election and was supported in his 
efforts by seventy percent of American evangelicals, none 
of whom, I might add, engaged in guerilla warfare in 
order to get their way. 
II 
But the general animus against evangelicals is also 
widespread among mainstream Protestants, whose 
hostility towards evangelicals is sometimes visceral. They 
despise all evangelicals and all they stand for. Why this 
negative assessment? Why are many mainstream 
Christians more comfortable with ultra-liberal Christians 
and secularists than with evangelical Christians who, after 
all, share with them the central teachings of Christianity? 
Some of the hostility is attributable to real theological 
differences between evangelicals and, say, Lutherans. 
One of the most vexatious is the "born-again" theme, 
which some interpret to mean that genuine Christians 
must be able to identify a decisive conversion experience 
in their lives. That demand does not do justice to all those 
millions, if not billions, of Christians who believe they 
were "born-again" when they were baptized and that the 
Christian life is a long-term unfolding under the guidance 
of the Holy Spirit. Some evangelicals are Arminians who 
believe that one has the free will to respond to grace, i.e., 
"make a decision for Christ," whereas Lutherans believe 
we "are in bondage to sin and cannot free ourselves" 
without the Spirit breaking through that bondage. Some 
evangelicals believe that the sacraments are merely 
"signs" and not means of grace, whereas Lutherans 
believe that the sacraments are genuine means of grace in 
which Christ is truly present. Evangelicals are generally 
not committed to liturgical worship, while many 
Lutherans definitely are. 
However, these differences do not account for the 
animus evangelicals receive. After all, we Lutherans have 
serious disagreements with Catholics over the status of 
the Pope and Mary. We don't much approve of the latitu-
dinarian Episcopalians, one of whose bishops said he 
would tolerate heresy for the sake of unity any day. 
Another, John Shelby Spong, now retired, denies most of 
the essentials of Christian belief. Still, some of us are 
willing to get very cozy with Catholics, others with 
Episcopalians and, especially, with mainstream 
Protestants. Few ecumenical conversations are going on 
among Lutherans and evangelicals. 
III 
Thus, I attribute the animus to some non-theological 
reasons. One major reason is that mainstream Christians 
have not taken the trouble to learn more about evangeli-
cals. They take Jerry Falwell to be the symbol of all evangel-
icals, when in fact he is more representative of fundamen-
talism than evangelicalism. Thus, mainstream Christians 
operate with old stereotypes that blind them to the fact that 
some of the best theology, church history, religious jour-
nalism, literary reflection, and book publishing is done by 
evangelicals. Instead, they continue to view evangelicals as 
uneducated and a bit "backwoods." (Recently I did some 
work with the Board of Azusa Pacific University, and I must 
confess that I expected the members to be un-monied and 
relatively uneducated. I was in for quite a surprise to find 
Hollywood producers, wealthy agricultural growers, 
industrialists, and a number of Ph.D.s on the board. All 
wanted APU to be a high-quality Christian school.) 
L
ACK OF DISCRIMINATING KNOWLEDGE OFTEN LEADS 
mainstream Christians and secularists to lump evan-
gelicals and fundamentalists together, when in fact 
there are major differences among them. Evangelicals have 
a high view of Scripture (it is the supreme authority), but 
they recognize different genres in the Bible and are more 
interested in the historical context of its writings; funda-
mentalists are more thorough-going literalists. 
Evangelicals are more likely to be engaged in culture; 
fundamentalists are skeptical of human achievements and 
actions that are not directly biblical. Evangelicals are open 
to cooperation with mainstream Protestants and Catholics; 
fundamentalists view other Christians with grave skepti-
cism and often go their separate way. Evangelicals increas-
ingly are educated in mainstream American colleges and 
universities; fundamentalists generally stick to their own 
bible schools. 
Another important source of bias against evangelicals 
has to with social class. Mainstream Christians are charac-
terized by what has been called "Protestant taste." For us it 
is bad form to wear religious enthusiasms on one's sleeve. 
Religious concerns ought to be kept private. Straight talk 
about the condition of one's soul is suspect to more sophis-
ticated believers. Religion should be inward and every-
thing outward should be in good order. Evangelicals, by 
contrast, tend to be informal and folksy. Above all, we 
think that one should not foist one's religious convictions 
on others, as evangelicals seem to do, another impolite 
confusion of the private and public realms. 
Perhaps another source has to do with resentment. 
Mainstream Protestant groups are declining. They have 
fewer children and don't "hold" them very well. They are 
not vigorous in evangelizing at home or abroad. They are 
aging and riven by conflicts over homosexuality and the 
absoluteness of Christ. The agencies of their liberal head-
quarters have little political clout in spite of constant 
"advocating." On the other hand, evangelicals are 
growing. They have more children than mainline 
Christians and they provide strong youth ministries for 
them. They evangelize at home and abroad. They believe 
there are clear biblical guidelines on both homosexuality 
and the status of Christ, and do not allow revisionist opin-
ions to challenge the orthodox consensus. Evangelicals and 
fundamentalists are, for the most part, political conserva-
tives and their leaders can actually deliver a lot of votes. 
Such "success" invites "sour grapes" responses, and I 
believe there are plenty of them. 
Closely related to the vice of resentment is that of 
arrogance. Evangelicals (lumped together with funda-
mentalists) and their activities are viewed as inferior by 
the many "cultured despisers" among Christians and 
secularists alike. The very 'successes' of evangelicals are 
attributed to their gullible, ignorant, and unsophisticated 
supporters. The clarity of their convictions is interpreted 
as bigotry, narrow-mindedness, and stupidity. Their reli-
gious intensity especially repels secularists, who believe 
themselves to be "above" such misplaced convictions-
any person of intelligence would reject evangelicals and 
what they stand for. This arrogance becomes very visible 
in the political realm. More than just disagreement lay 
behind the scorn heaped on John Ashcroft, the recently 
resigned Attorney General of the United States, as well as 
that continually heaped on George W. Bush. (This 
contempt, born of arrogance, became a political liability 
in the last election, I believe.) 
One must admit that animosity is a two-way street. 
Many evangelicals are also arrogant, believing that they 
alone know the will of God. They are contemptuous of all 
mainline Protestants, whom they consider to be back-
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sliders. Their growth and vigor sometimes gives them 
over to a dangerous pride. 
IV 
In spite of this, it behooves us Lutherans and other 
mainstream Protestants to be far more knowledgeable 
about and collegial with evangelicals than we have been. In 
fact, perhaps we need even to repent of the mean-spirited-
ness with which we have treated Christian brothers and 
sisters, including fundamentalists. We should be involved in 
vigorous ecumenical dialogue with evangelicals. After all, 
they teach and preach the essentials of Christian faith and 
life, even though there are disagreements about important 
theological matters. They are full of zeal for evangelism at 
home and abroad. There is much we can learn from them. 
And, there is much they can learn from us, which the more 
ecumenically-minded of them fully appreciate. f 
Robert Benne is Director of the Roanoke College Center for 
Religion and Society . 
George R. Sumner, The First and the 
Last: The Claim of Jesus Christ and the 
Claims of Other Religious Traditions 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004). 
Most American and European 
Christians today would probably say 
that the greatest theological issue 
bedeviling their ranks is moral 
theology (the sexuality wars). They 
may be right. But if and when that 
debate settles down, they will face an 
even more unsettling one-the chal-
lenge of religious pluralism. 
For most people in the pews, that 
question has taken the form of asking 
if non-Christians are saved. Most 
Protestant and Catholic theologians 
(who have not already decided that 
everyone is saved) have concluded 
they can be, but only by the merits of 
Jesus Christ. This is typically called 
"inclusivism." 
A growing number insist the salva-
tion of religious others has little or 
nothing to do with Jesus of Nazareth, 
but perhaps with "the Christ." This 
wedge between Jesus and Christ is at 
the heart of the new debate over 
whether Jesus is unique and final. In 
other words, is Jesus just one incarna-
tion that God has used through history 
to save people? 
In this new book George Sumner, 
principal of Wycliffe College in 
Toronto, has advanced this discussion 
in several ways. He has not only prof-
fered a helpful typology of Christian 
response to this question, but he has 
also proposed a new set of rules for 
inter-religious dialogue. 
Along the way, he analyzes 
"pluralism" (the philosophical 
proposal that Jesus is one among 
many saviors sent by God) with fresh 
acuity. 
Sumner says the real division 
among theologians of the religions 
anymore is between those who favor 
what he calls "final primacy" and 
those who advocate some version of 
pluralism. The latter can be traced 
back to Gotthold Lessing, who 
famously said there is an "ugly ditch" 
between the facts of history and the 
eternal truths of reason. No religion 
can be called true that is founded on 
historical events, because access to 
them is limited. Only "natural reli-
gion," supposedly accessible to all 
through reason, should stand the test 
of time. 
According to Sumner, both 
Schleiermacher and Hegel built upon 
Lessing's foundation, starting with a 
notion of "religion-in-general" that 
ultimately relativized the particulari-
ties of Christian doctrine, despite their 
insistence that Christianity was the 
pinnacle of religious development. 
Pluralism developed from there, 
involving six elements: historicism (all 
theology is local and therefore rele-
vant only in a limited context), evolu-
tion (since religion is a human 
response to ineffable religious experi-
ence, it forever develops as history 
unfolds), doctrinal evacuation 
(doctrine is wrongheaded because the 
divine is beyond concept), competi-
tion in good works (because religion is 
essentially morality), suppression of 
fanaticism (because fervent devotion 
is the source of most historical evil), 
and dialogue (so that diverse religions 
can find their common essence). 
Final primacy, in contrast, asserts 
that "Christ is the One toward whom 
the narratives [explaining how other 
religions relate to Christian faith] run 
and from whom their truth (to the 
extent that they are true) derives. He is 
at once the finis legis (the end or 
purpose of the law) and the prima 
veritas (the first truth)." In other 
words, the particularities of the 
biblical Jesus Christ become both 
starting place for investigating other 
religions and norm by which other 
truth claims are measured. This in turn 
denies most of pluralism's claims: 
final primacy insists that there is no 
common essence that unites all the 
religions; that while Christian 
doctrine sees through a glass darkly, it 
still sees; religion (at least the 
Christian variety) is not merely human 
response but also divine initiative; 
local events can be truth for all persons 
and histories. To gainsay the last state-
ment, as Lessing and his pluralist disci-
ples do, is to speak of something less 
than the Infinite and Omnipotent 
God. 
Sumner has helpfully organized 
the last few hundred years of Christian 
responses to other religions into four 
types, each of which, he warns, can 
devolve in pluralist directions. The 
most ancient response, which actually 
goes back to the early Greek Fathers 
such as Justin Martyr and Clement of 
Alexandria, is called the logos 
theology. This claims that God has 
scattered seeds of the Logos (Greek 
for Word) in all the world religions, 
and distinguishes logos asarkos (the 
Word without flesh) from logos 
ensarkos (the Word with flesh). More 
modern uses identify the Word with 
the second person of the Trinity, but 
suggest that Jesus was just one of many 
incarnations of this Word. Sumner 
points out that this is a modern version 
of the old Nestorian heresy, which 
posits two persons in Christ, sepa-
rating Christ from Jesus of Nazareth. 
Barth admonished his readers that 
Logos theology is also misused when 
abstract concepts are said to link 
Christianity to other religions. The 
Buddhist Pure Land concept of grace, 
for example, is claimed to be a seed of 
the Logos. But Barth objected that any 
biblical concept separated from Jesus 
Christ is no longer Christian; hence 
Pure Land grace is radically different 
from Christian grace. 
Thomas Aquinas famously devel-
oped a second model ("implicit faith") 
for the relationship between Christian 
and other faiths. He stipulated that 
(non-Christian) faith in providence 
may be a kind of implicit faith in a 
Mediator (STII.II.q.2, a.7, ad.3). Karl 
The third model is the most 
popular and the most 
dangerous. It claims that in 
the Christian faith is the 
same experience of the 
infinite that exists in other 
religions. 
Rahner's proposal that there are 
"anonymous Christians" who 
respond faithfully to pre-conscious 
awareness of God in their own being 
(Rahner called this the "supernatural 
existential") and are thereby saved, is a 
twentieth-century development of 
Thomas' implicit faith. Sumner 
complains that this approach invites 
speculation, devalues the Cross, and 
makes church and mission super-
fluous: "If grace is already at work, 
why bother?" 
The third model, based on human 
self-consciousness, is both the most 
popular and most dangerous. It 
claims, among other things, that in 
Christian faith is the same experience 
(or "consciousness") of the infinite 
that exists in other religions. All 
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concrete religions seek to lead us from 
unconscious to self-conscious aware-
ness of this ineffable Mystery. The 
danger here, Sumner advises, is that all 
doctrine becomes relativized and 
Christ's finality eclipsed. Hegel, for 
instance, suggested that the Trinity 
expresses a deeper logical and onto-
logical truth. According to Raimundo 
Pannikar, that truth is nonduality 
(monism), best seen in Hindu advaita. 
This is an example, as Claude Welch 
observed, of how Trinitarian specula-
tion without clear Christology 
(uniting Jesus with the Christ) breaks 
the Spirit loose from the godhead, 
undermining both Jesus' uniqueness 
and Christian metaphysics. 
Sumner suggests that the fourth 
model is the least problematic: law 
and gospel. By this is meant the notion 
that other religions are used both to 
maintain the social order and inspire 
despair: "Insofar as [the religions] lead 
to a crisis before the cross, [they] play 
the classic role of law as the occasion 
for grace" (30). 
But even this last model is defi-
cient because it narrowly restricts the 
providential purposes of the religions. · 
This is why Sumner suggests his new 
model of final primacy, with some 
important caveats. First, he warns, any 
Christian encounter with religious 
others that categorically rules out both 
witness and worship is not worthy of 
the name Christian. 
Second, all encounters should 
remember Augustine's rule, opera Dei 
triuni non divisa sunt: the works of the 
triune God are not divided. If any 
Person of the Trinity is relegated to a 
bailiwick separate from the others 
(such as the Spirit's separation from 
the Son), departure from orthodoxy 
looms. Third, Christian theology of 
religions must remain accountable to 
other Christian interpretations, espe-
cially if they come from closer contact 
with religious others. Most Hindu-
Christian dialogue, for example, has 
been between liberal Christians and 
upper-caste Hindus, ignoring the 
counter-claims of Christian Dalits 
(Untouchables). 
Fourth, no Christian theology 
should ever imagine that it has 
engaged another tradition as a whole. 
That task remains beyond reach for 
those on the outside, perhaps even for 
insiders. Hence all Christian account-
ings should acknowledge they have 
encountered religious others only in 
part and by degrees. Inability to be 
comprehensive, however, does not 
excuse failure to strive for responsible 
interpretation. Sumner laments that 
too often, for instance, Christian 
accounts of Hinduism ignore or 
underplay Christology, God's person-
hood, sin, atonement, and church. 
Finally, Christians should reject 
triumphalism, recogmzmg that, 
perhaps by providential design, we 
have not been given intellectual 
certainty of our positions. 
In Sumner's new model, interreli-
gious dialogue is redefined as disputa-
tion-one tradition interrogating 
another on key issues of common 
interest. To this reviewer, this is a 
welcome move. Too often in the past, 
interreligious dialogue partners have 
given short shrift to doctrinal differ-
ences either for fear of offense or 
pluralist conviction that doctrine is 
ephemeral. Yet Sumner insists that 
ignoring doctrinal difference not only 
misses the most fruitful possibilities 
for understanding, but fails to respect 
the religious other. He defines dispu-
tation as spirited discussion at 
"receptor sites": issues of common 
doctrinal interest that provide apt 
occasion for debate. 
For illustrations of disputation 
done rightly, Sumner points us back to 
rival theological schools at the 
University of Paris in the thirteenth 
century, where Franciscans and 
Dominicans debated the meaning of 
biblical doctrines and then retired to 
the chapel for a common Eucharist. 
He also directs us to ninth-century 
Baghdad, where Christian and 
Muslim believers "delighted albeit 
under the constraints of the medieval 
Islamic laws of dhimmi, in disputa-
tions between the faiths in its house of 
wisdom, the host faith being, one may 
reckon, confident enough of its own 
cultural and intellectual vigor and 
divine sanction to listen to challenges 
with a benevolent ear." 
Sumner's important proposal 
leaves us with only the beginnings of a 
reflection on what he rightly suggests 
is the next question: Why has 
Providence put us in a world with 
other religions? In the spirit of theo-
logical humility, he wisely warns that 
there is no simple, undialectical 
answer to the question, just as there is 
no one answer to the question of why 
God has permitted evil. 
For example, he advises, God 
willed Assyria's conquest of] erusalem 
but also its own later judgment. Hence 
God can use what is misdirected for 
His own providential purposes. Even 
what is properly directed in the reli-
gions, such as their truthful teachings 
about God and the moral life, are 
nevertheless incomplete and mis-
leading when separated from the 
finality of Christ. And the very survival 
of some religions (such as the Aztecs', 
for a time) was a witness to Christians' 
resistance to the lordship of Christ-
since the stubborn refusal of some 
Aztecs to change religions was a reac-
tion to what they saw in the "faith" of 
murderous conquistadores. Thus, the 
religions can stand as a witness against 
the church. 
The value of Sumner's book is 
twofold: first, it should put to bed the 
excl usi v ist- incl usi vist-p 1 uralist 
typology, and refocus debate on the 
only significant divide that remains 
between orthodoxy and pluralism. 
Second, Sumner also suggests that 
interreligious dialogue should not fear 
but, in fact, welcome serious theolog-
ical debate. Only respectful disputa-
tion takes difference seriously. The old 
model for interreligious dialogue is 
anything but pluralistic: it denies truth 
to any of the actual beliefs of the 
world's religions, affirming as real 
only a minimalist religion restricted to 
an intellectual elite. 
The new question of the meaning 
of religious diversity will require 
another book. It will need to start with 
the Bible, where the question has been 
answered in a variety of ways, but in 
terms we have not recognized. For 
example, the Old Testament Yahweh is 
not "alone" in the heavens, as it were. 
There are other divine beings "up 
there," some allied with him and 
working to carry out his designs, and 
others opposed to him and actively 
working to frustrate his purposes. 
By divine beings I don't just mean 
angels. The text makes a remarkable 
number of references to other "gods." 
Many readers dismiss this language as 
referring to empty idols, preferring to 
interpret "gods" as later chapters in 
Isaiah interpret them: "Besides me 
there is no god" (44:6c). Yet most 
books of the Old Testament speak of 
"the gods" as existing realities-real 
spiritual beings with minds of their 
own. 
The Psalms fairly explode with 
evidence. "There is none like you 
among the gods, 0 Lord" (86:8); "For 
great is the Lord, and greatly to be 
praised; he is to be revered above all 
gods" (96:4); "Our Lord is above all 
gods" (135:5); "Ascribe to Yahweh, 
[you] gods, ascribe to Yahweh glory 
and strength" (29: 1, my trans.); "He is 
exalted above all gods" (97:7); "For 
Yahweh is a great god, and a great king 
above all gods" (95 :3). And so on. 
But it's not just the Psalms. In 
Exodus, Yahweh predicts that he will 
execute judgments "on all the gods of 
Egypt" (12: 12). The author of 
Numbers then declares that that is 
indeed what happened: "Yahweh 
executed judgments against their 
gods" (33:4). There is no hint that 
Yahweh is the only God. 
Instead it is clearly implied that 
Egypt has her own gods, and Yahweh 
will defeat them. When Yahweh gives 
his people the Ten Commandments, 
the first commandment implies the 
existence of other gods: "You shall 
have no other gods before me" (Ex 
20:3; see also Deut 5:7). In Exodus 
23 :32-33 Israel is told not to covenant 
with or worship other gods; there is no 
suggestion that the gods of Israel's 
neighbors do not exist. 
The Old Testament takes four 
approaches to the gods (hence four 
approaches to what we would call 
Gentile religions). The first is neigh-
borly pluralism: other religions are led 
by real gods but gods subordinate to 
ours; we can get along as long as they 
leave us alone. We might even honor 
their gods to the extent they are 
worthy of honor. 
The second is compeuuve 
pluralism: other religions are not 
worthy of honor because at their head 
are deities that rebelled against 
Yahweh and violated his contract with 
them. Rather than fulfilling the func-
tions to which they had been 
assigned-to administer the nations as 
delegated servants of Yahweh-they 
enticed their charges to give exclusive 
devotion to themselves. The Hebrew 
prophets said this is in fact what the 
Israelites themselves had done, giving 
idolatrous devotion to lesser powers, 
instead of exclusive devotion to 
Yahweh. So according to this view, the 
Gentile religions were cults devoted to 
real but treasonous powers. 
The third model is vehement 
missionary exclusivism: other reli-
gions are devotion to what are not 
gods. Or if their gods have any exis-
tence, they are weak and pathetic, infi-
nitely inferior to the only creator, 
Yahweh. 
The fourth model, cosmic war, 
sees the religions as communities 
animated by powers hostile to 
Yahweh, actively fighting Yahweh's 
control of the cosmos. According to 
this model, it is no surprise that 
history is full of conflict, because its 
driving animus is conflict between 
divine forces, which are visibly 
represented by both religious and 
political communities. In other 
words, wars between nations are 
really only the shadowy surface of 
the deeper and more fundamental 
combat between spiritual powers. So 
Samuel Huntington, the Harvard 
political scientist whose Clash of 
Civilizations (1996) claimed the real 
inspiration for modern war will be 
cultural and religious, was repre-
senting what could be called one Old 
Testament model. 
This is just a bird's-eye view of the 
Old Testament's range of answers to 
the question of the meaning of other 
religions. The New Testament offers 
yet other answers, referring to these 
other gods as "principalities" and 
"powers," among other things. The 
question of why God permitted them 
is yet another question, but which is 
suddenly easier to answer-at least 
from these biblical perspectives-
once their meaning is discerned. 
A fuller Christian answer to the 
question-Why are there other reli-
gions at all?-must explore the host of 
answers given by thinkers in the 
history of Christian thought. It will 
range from the Greek fathers-who 
saw them as repositories of seeds of the 
Logos, from which Christians may 
learn-to Jonathan Edwards, who 
saw them as demonic traps but 
nonetheless full of Christological 
types teaching truth to those who have 
ears to hear, and to twentieth-century 
African theologians who believe 
African religions can teach Christians 
about the communion of the saints. 
If Lutheran and other Christian 
churches somehow survive the sexu-
ality wars with orthodoxy intact, they 
will need to give their attention to this 
more demanding debate. It is 
demanding because of the vastness of 
the rival traditions encountered, the 
complexity of our own tradition on 
these questions, and the danger of 
losing the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. 
IfTillich was right to say that culture is 
the form of religion, and politics the 
outworking of culture, then this ques-
tion has geo-political significance. 
Today's Islamist hostility toward 
Christianity is a painful reminder. It 
behooves us, then, not only to follow 
this debate, but for some of us to 
engage in both respectful disputation 
and further exploration of the provi-
dential meaning of religious diversity. 
Gerald R. McDermott 
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Owen Gingerich. The Book Nobody 
Read-Chasing the Revolutions of 
Nicolaus Copernicus (New York: 
Walker, 2004). 
One of the joys of life in retirement is 
the time it allows to take a chance on 
books outside of one's usual sphere of 
interest. On my weekly trips to the 
local library, I check out the shelf of 
new acquisitions. Since I have had 
little interest in astronomy, for several 
weeks I passed over a book with 
Copernicus in its title. But finally I 
decided to give it chance; maybe I 
would learn something interesting 
about astronomy or Copernicus. 
What I found was a book that has gone 
to the top of my list of the best books of 
2004. 
Owen Gingerich is the semor 
astronomer emeritus at the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory and research professor of 
astronomy and of the history of 
science at Harvard University. The 
book nobody read is De revolution-
ibus and was published in 1543 by 
Nicolaus Copernik, better knows as 
Copernicus, in the year of his death in 
the Baltic Sea city ofFrauenburg, terri-
tory of Varmia, Poland where he was a 
canon of the cathedral. As even those 
not specially interested in history or 
astronomy know, the significance of 
the book lies in its being the first in 
European Renaissance history to 
clearly postulate a heliocentric view of 
the universe. 
In 1970 as they were planning the 
1973 celebration of the 5 OOth anniver-
sary of the birth of Copernicus, 
Gingerich and fellow historian of 
science Jerry Ravitz remembered the 
claim of Arthur Koestler in his best-
selling history of early astronomy that 
De revolutionibus was the "book that 
nobody read." Their off-the-cuff list 
of sixteenth-century astronomers who 
would certainly have read it numbered 
only seven or eight. And there it stood 
until a few days later, Gingerich had 
the opportunity to be in the library of 
the Royal Observatory of Scotland 
where he stumbled on a copy of De 
revolutionibus that was thoroughly 
annotated. Clearly, this copy had been 
carefully read. 
This chance discovery lead to a 
thirty-year quest to document all the 
existing copies of the book which 
resulted in the publication in 2002 of 
An Annotated Census of Copernicus' 
De Revolutionibus (Nuremburg 1543 
and Basel, 1566). The Book Nobody 
Read is the story of making that 
census. 
The full title of Copernicus's book 
in English is About the Revolutions of 
the Heavenly Spheres in Six Books. 
According to Gingerich, ninety-five 
percent of Copernicus's book is highly 
technical and would have been of 
interest only to professional 
astronomers. Among other things, it 
contains a star catalog, methods for 
going from a sparse collection of 
observation to computed planetary 
orbits, and tables useful for predicting 
planetary positions. A general reader 
would probably have neither the 
interest nor ability to use this portion 
of the book. It is the first portion, 
about five percent, that presents his 
sun-centered cosmology that could 
have been of general interest and has 
made it such an important book in the 
history of science. 
So the reader of Owen Gingerich's 
book will not learn very much about 
the contents of Copernicus' book. 
This is not a book about astronomy, 
although there is an interesting but 
somewhat technical section about the 
earth-centered cosmology. It is also 
not a book about Copernicus, 
although there is a chapter about him. 
Rather, it is a book about the life and 
times of the copies of Copernicus' 
book as they were produced, made 
their way to contemporary 
astronomers, to libraries, to the Index 
of Prohibited Books, and finally to 
private collectors, thieves, forgers, 
and auction houses. 
Along the way Gingerich chroni-
cles his efforts to identify the author-
ship of the annotations found in many 
of the books. Was this copy owned by 
Tycho Brahe, the great Dutch 
astronomer? What kind of evidence 
do these annotations give about its 
influence on Johannes Kepler? What 
does Galileo 's copy look like? Can any 
of this give insight into the way in 
which Copernicus' book influenced 
the ultimate success of the heliocentric 
model? 
The name Georg Joachim 
Rheticus is probably known only to a 
few specialists in astronomy. Who he 
was and what his role was in the 
publishing of De revolutionibus is 
typical of the many interesting 
segments of this book. As Gingerich 
tells the story, Rheticus was a twenty-
five-year-old newly appointed 
Lutheran mathematician at 
Wittenberg University. A favorite of 
Philipp Melanchthon, he was allowed 
to travel to Catholic Frauenburg 
Poland to learn first-hand about the 
Copernican ideas that had been circu-
lating among mathematicians and 
astronomers throughout Europe. It 
was Rheticus who persuaded the sixty-
six-year-old Copernicus that his work 
should be published and he who 
arranged for its publication in 
Nuremberg by Johannes Petreius. 
It may be trite to call this book a 
"page-turner," but it was hard to put 
down once I started. It combines the 
best of history and mystery and is a 
very well-told engaging story. 
Edgar Luecke 
Paul J. Griffiths, Lying: An 
Augustinian Theology of Duplicity 
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004 ). 
Paul Griffiths has dedicated his 
latest book to an elaboration and indi-
rect defense of a teaching he accepts, 
but "remain[s] in many ways unhappy 
with": Augustine's unconditional ban 
on lying. Augustine's views on lying 
(or "the lie" as he and Griffiths charac-
teristically refer to it) are a modestly 
well-known feature of his thought, 
and are, as Griffiths puts it, "extreme." 
In Augustine's view, and in Griffiths', 
lying is in every case sinful and, thus, 
forbidden. As Griffiths notes, this 
teaching has found few friends, even 
among Christians; he is not quite on 
friendly terms with it yet, himself. But 
he regards it, all the same, as correct-
indeed, importantly so. As discom-
fiting as Augustine's teaching may be, 
Griffiths thinks it follows inevitably 
upon the acceptance of a fully 
Christian view of ourselves as 
language-users created in the image of 
God. Thus, he thinks, we cannot have 
fully adequate views on a wide range 
of topics in philosophical theology, or 
indeed of theological ethics, while also 
rejecting Augustine's ban on the lie. 
Or, at least, we cannot do so in full 
consistency. 
One of the principal delights of 
Griffiths' book is the way it situates 
Augustine's teaching on the lie in rela-
tion to his views about God, being, 
creation, human nature, language, 
evil, and sin, thereby affording the 
reader a cursory tour of some of the 
most important and influential aspects 
of Augustine's thought. The book can 
be recommended, notwithstanding its 
eventual focus on a single kind of sin, 
as a vivacious and illuminating review 
of Augustine's thought as a whole. 
Briefly, Augustine held that the 
Trinitarian nature of God is reflected 
in His human image-bearers through 
our speech, among other ways. The 
divine gift of language is the gift of 
being able to convey our thoughts (and 
beyond them, created reality), in 
words. Our words are begotten by our 
thoughts, just as the second person of 
the Trinity is begotten by the first. Or 
they can be. 
The problem with lying, on 
Augustine's view, is not the familiar 
one of its generally (but not inevitably) 
deleterious consequences, such as the 
erosion of trust and social cohesion, 
but the little-remarked (indeed, little-
recognized) fact that lying, the delib-
erate severance of word from thought, 
takes a divine gift and misuses it, 
undoing one of the ways in which God 
meant for us to image Him. It is a kind 
of blasphemy. Indeed, in the particu-
larly straightforward way that it 
expropriates a divine gift for purposes 
that violate that gift's nature, lying is 
the archetypal sin. Augustine finds 
support for this claim in Jesus' remarks 
about Satan, "the father of lies." 
As I said at the outset, Griffiths' 
book is an elaboration and indirect 
defense of Augustine's teaching. The 
elaboration of the view sketched 
above occupies the first half of the 
book. The elaboration is also part of 
the defense, though. For Griffiths is 
not only doing philosophical theology 
in this book; he is also modeling how 
he thinks philosophical theology 
should proceed. Griffiths remarks, 
near the end of his introduction, that 
his book "is not an argument. It is 
instead an attempted seduction." 
In Griffiths' view, despite all the 
loose talk one hears about postmoder-
nity, it remains easy and common to 
assume too much about the power of 
argument. Griffiths is not what Plato 
calls in Phaedo a "misologue," a hater 
of reason. He is as ready and able as 
anyone to draw distinctions, to follow 
out implications, and to note ways in 
which someone's thought fails in its 
own terms. What he does not think is 
that reasoned argument is an espe-
cially effective tool for converting 
people from one set of more-or-less 
basic intellectual assumptions to 
another. For one hoping to effect such 
conversions, he thinks, the best proce-
dure is simply to exhibit, initially in 
clear and powerful description, but 
then also in forceful advocacy, the 
position to which one hopes others 
will convert. Griffiths pursues this 
strategy further in the second half of 
his book, a set of ''Augustinian read-
ings." 
These are sketches of nine histori-
cally significant texts (beginning with 
Plato's Hippias Minor and concluding 
with Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie in 
an Extramoral Sense"), all of which 
stake out a position contrasting with 
Augustine's on the ethics of duplicity. 
These sketches afford a clearer view of 
the methodology Griffiths advocates. 
Because he has sworn off argument as 
a means of vindicating Augustine's 
views (past a certain point), what is left 
for Griffiths is to highlight contrasts 
and conflicts between Augustine's 
views and those of others, and to offer 
the critique that an Augustinian, 
speaking as an Augustinian, would 
make of the contrasting views. 
Griffiths regards such "committed 
readings" as the only honest kind and 
contends that they are moreover 
aesthetically superior to (an inevitably 
unsuccessful) neutrality. 
The results of this explicitly 
committed reading are mixed. By and 
large, the interpretive work is excel-
lent, so that, although Griffiths offers 
no unifying narrative of western 
thought on the lie, the reader receives 
a good sense of what western thinkers 
have thought and said on the topic. 
More frustrating, especially in light of 
Griffiths' claims about the aesthetic 
superiority of committed readings 
(and his manifest gifts as a writer), is 
Griffiths' critical commentary. Again 
and again, Griffiths ends up telling us, 
simply, "this other thinker's views are 
to be rejected as insufficiently 
Christian, for they do not draw upon a 
Trinitarian theory of language." 
Granting that that may be what 
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Augustine would have said, and also 
that complete neutrality is impossible, 
one would still like to hear some spec-
ulation, at least, as to how the non-
Augustinians might reply to this 
Augustinian critique, and how the 
Augustinian might meet these 
replies-if only to deepen our sense of 
the power and resources of the 
Augustinian position. 
For example, how might Kant (or a 
Kantian) reply to Griffiths' charge that 
his reflections about lying are insuffi-
ciently Christian, indeed "pagan"? 
Mightn' t he question Griffiths' 
assumption that any account of 
anything is more appropriate for 
Christians if it draws explicitly on 
Christian doctrines? As Griffiths 
acknowledges, "the distance between 
Augustine's metaphysic and ours is 
great"; mightn't Kant suggest that there 
are good reasons for that, having little 
or nothing to do with insufficiently 
Christian reflection? In each case, how 
might an Augustinian reply? 
I worry, though, that I am 
appearing more put off by Griffiths' 
book than in fact I am. Lying repays 
reading not only for its careful explica-
tion of Augustine's teaching, but also 
for the associated presentation of a 
provocative but neglected theology of 
language, for the detailed and helpful 
studies of others who have written 
about lies and, not least, for Griffiths' 
style, which is as lucid and lively as any 
I've encountered in recent academic 
philosophy or theology. Most impor-
tantly (and here I avow my own 
commitments), Griffiths challenges us 
to reflect on a question that lurks, most 
often unaddressed, beneath the most 
heated ethical debates of our time: are 
there occasions when an action is 
properly demanded, or forbidden, in 
the face of apparently unmitigated and 
uncompensated suffering? Like 
Griffiths, I believe that there are, and 
that this conviction is a natural 
complement to the conviction that we 
are finite, fallen creatures under God. 
But this is, as Griffiths notes, an 
uncomfortable view to hold, particu-
larly in the contemporary west. 
Whatever my reservations about some 
of Griffiths techniques of seduction, 
then, I hope he woos many. 
Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb 
ST. FRANCIS IN SUNDAY SCHOOL 
The book says Francis turned aside 
From an evangelical tour to field birds 
And preached. Easy to remind 
To praise, at once they rose in flight. 
There is the story. Make of it 
What you will, likely nothing more 
Than joy in creation and creator-
Just as preached a million times before. 
So, Lord, let me love these sober ones 
Because I am alone a fool or child 
Among them, delighted and lost, 
Enrapt by the saintly, feathery tale, 
And prefer it to more solid 
Fare to build up the kingdom's builders 
Or arm your bold crusaders, while 
It plays lightly on mind and heart. 
It didn't reach their hearts did it? 
One called it, "Divertimento," 
Another, ·~ry concoction," 
And would I say it is not so? 
But did they recall in their fresh, 
Modern, ironed Sunday lives 
The lepers' rags of cloth and flesh 
Which Francis saw and touched and loved 
When he was not regaling birds? 
And are the lovely plumage and the song 
Necessary miracles only in a world 
Of chicks devoured by snakes and unclosed wounds? 
Neither text nor teachers 
Answer. And we have neither saint 
Nor leper in our class to make the letters 
Suddenly rise alive from the page 
And fly, leaving the book pure and blank 
And us astonished to silence. 
Mary Ann Ramey 
Letter from Xanadu, Nebraska 
(first published in May 1955) 
Dear Editor, 
You probably remember that 
about a year ago I wrote you a little 
review ofT. Romney Beall's Putting 
God to Work for You. I'm not much of 
a man for reading, but this book fasci-
nated me and I often pick it up and 
read a page here and there just to buck 
me up when I'm feeling low. You never 
did review it in The Cresset, so maybe 
you don't think much of it, but for us 
practical people a practical book like 
Beall's is just the thing. 
Anyway, Beall made a speech the 
other night in Omaha and the Mrs. 
and I went in to hear him. He's even 
better in the flesh than he is in writing. 
The guy's got bounce and energy and 
if he wasn't already a preacher he 
could probably make a killing as a 
salesman. His talk was on "Selling 
Christianity" and it was a humdinger. 
Beall's main point was that 
preachers and, for that matter, laymen 
are basically salesmen. They've got a 
good product and a potentially big 
market. So if they're not selling their 
product, the fault is either with the 
packaging or with the sales technique. 
The trouble with the packaging, 
Beall says, is that it is still in the style 
and the language of a hundred years 
ago. He took as an example the word 
"sin." Advertising religion as a cure for 
sin, Beall says, is like advertising a 
patent medicine as a cure for sour 
stomach. People don't have sour 
stomach anymore. What they have is 
"acid indigestion." In the same way, 
people aren't bothered by sins 
anymore. What they have is 
psychoneurotic (I hope that's spelled 
right) conflicts. I had never thought of 
it quite that way, but he says that 
studies have proved that names 
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impress as the square of their length, 
so a clever advertiser will either find or 
make up some big, juicy, jaw-breaking 
name for his product if he wants to 
really push it. 
I 
THINK HE'S GOT A POINT THERE. IT 
always has seemed to me that you 
can't get the sort of people you 
want into the church if you are going 
to be constantly harping on sin. Maybe 
you could pick up a few bums and 
lushes, but we've got enough of those 
in the church already. If you want to 
sell the substantial people in tow, 
people like the guys that spend their 
Sunday mornings playing golf, you've 
got to offer something on a little 
higher level than a sin-cure. I can just 
imagine how Jimmy Baker, our 
Chamber of Commerce secretary, 
would react if I would try to tell him he 
was a sinner. He'd either think I was 
trying to be funny, or he would tell me 
to mind my own business. 
Beall says that our sales tech-
niques are all wrong, too. The church 
is too dignified, he claims. He says 
that some preachers act like they 
were bankers or high-type insurance 
men instead of salesmen. We don't 
get out and sell, but wait for the world 
to come to us. I didn't get all of the 
details of what he had to say on this 
score but I remember that one of his 
major points was that people like to 
do what everybody else is doing. The 
idea to get across to them is that 
coming to church is the thing to do. 
And he says that he can't see anything 
wrong even with a singing commer-
cial if that's what it takes to sell your 
product. In fact, he mentioned a 
church out east that boosted its 
membership twenty-five percent in 
G.G. 
three months with a singing commer-
cial that went something like this: 
(Tune: Alexander's Ragtime Band) 
Come on along, come on along, 
Come and join our happy throng! 
We're bright and gay, 
We work and play 
At the Church where we belong. 
And if you want to know its name, 
the name's Saint Epicurus. 
Come on along, come on along, 
Epicurus welcomes you. 
I'll have to admit that I can't quite 
see singing commercials to advertise 
the church but that's probably because 
the idea is new to me. When you come 
down to it, though, if the idea is to get 
people to come to church, what's 
wrong with singing commercials? 
Anyway, it was a real experience 
listening to a live-wire like Beall. I 
don't know where the man stands on 
doctrine, but as a promoter you've 
sure got to hand it to him. He was 
telling us about his own church in New 
York and, although he didn't brag 
about it, you could tell that he really 
runs an establishment. He's got 
enough things going there that he 
could keep the whole plant running 
and paying for itself even if they didn't 
hold any services. And, in my books, 




Maria Tomasula is a contemporary artist and art professor at the University of Notre Dame. Her intricate and meticulous paint-
ings are currently receiving much critical attention and acclaim. A native of East Chicago, Indiana, Tomasula explores ways 
that still life objects, such as pieces of fruit and flowers, are able metaphorically to represent various states of being and can 
allude to Christ's passion and to the lives of saints. She is inspired by the Christian imagery she saw growing up in a Latino 
neighborhood, and by works of Renaissance and Baroque art that impress with their rich color, shimmering surfaces, and 
careful attention to visual textures. For Tomasula, the sliced and pinned pomegranate depicted in Yield is a reminder to 
viewers of their mortality, of the transient nature of the flesh. Through such a reminder, viewers can ponder an earthly exis-
tence that. while tied to a body subject to pain, injury, and sickness, still is able to provide glimpses of transcendent beauty. 
Tomasula's painting is a fine work to think about during the Easter season, since it offers a visceral view of its symbolic 
subject. and at the same time presents the subject as sacred and worthy of admiration, even veneration, given the visual rich-
ness of the picture arising from the artist's labor-intensive technique. 
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